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ABSTRACT 
 
The one common feature amongst all underdeveloped nations is their intent to develop.  
The question is how to achieve this goal in the most efficient and effective manner.  
China’s recent premier, Deng Xiaoping, captured this challenge in what has become a 
celebrated metaphor …“It does not matter whether the cat is black or white; as long as it 
catches the mouse, it is a good cat.” For China, the choice of development strategy has not 
been Communism or Capitalism, but rather a mixture of both with central direction and 
decentralized profit incentives combined.  This unique model was launched at the time of 
the 1978 ‘Open-Door’ policy and heralded a period of unparalleled growth and 
development.  Access to technology to support the creation of modern industries came 
through foreign investment, and China’s central planners were in a strong position to direct 
inward technology transfer to what were held to be the ‘back-bone’ industries essential for 
high technology industrialization. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to analyse China’s development process, with 
particular reference to the development of the high technology aviation industry.  Aviation 
(commercial aircraft production) is part of the broader industrial sector, aerospace.  This 
represents one of the highest technology sectors, embracing knowledge-intensive activity, 
innovation, high skills and high value-added.  Aviation is regarded as a strategic industry, 
and as such, China has viewed foreign technology not only from a development perspective, 
but also as a vehicle for achieving sovereignty and sustainability. In other words, China’s 
long-term aim has been to develop an ‘indigenous’ aviation industry.  However, such 
aviation ambitions are shared by several other Asian nations, including Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia.  This thus makes the task of gaining technology 
from the major aviation giants, such as Boeing and Airbus, very competitive.  Moreover, 
the drive to build commercial aircraft has both an economic and a nationalistic dimension, 
and so ‘success’ carries not profit but political rewards, also. 
 
ii 
 
In evaluating the challenge Asia faces in developing an indigenous aviation industry, 
secondary and primary data were gathered, providing a sense of country strategy and 
performance.  Japan is the technology leader, with countries playing the role of technology 
followers.  China, however, is at the back of the pack, with limited local capacity and 
constrained indigenous capability.  However, notwithstanding the country’s ‘chaotic’ 
industrial development history over the last 50 years, the present powerful combination of 
high economic growth, massive demand for commercial air travel - and thus airliners, 
unlimited central government resources, command planning and an absolute commitment 
to succeed, suggests that China is strongly positioned to replace Japan as the aviation 
technology leader in the years to come.   
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Chapter 1   China’s Industrial and Technological 
Revolution 
1.1 Making the Case for the Study 
This opening section of chapter one seeks to make the case for a high-level study of the 
development of China’s aviation industry. Subsequent sections will outline the purpose, 
value, study pattern, and data-access strategy. However, at this initial stage, there is a 
need to sketch the study’s contextual backdrop. Issues that need to be addressed include, 
why study China? Why industrial and technological development? Why aviation 
production? Necessarily, the starting point for such a discussion has to be China itself. 
Never before has the world witnessed an economic transformation that comes close to 
that presently taking place in China. The scale of the economic forces at work in China 
and their impact on the global economy is nothing short of a revolution. 
1.2 China: The Great Leap Upwards? 
Three centuries ago China’s industriousness led the world. The Chinese had a history of 
creativity, inventing paper, gunpowder, printing, the compass and other advanced 
technologies. However, war, colonial subjugation and imperial suppression then 
constrained this creativity, and with it, the conditions for economic advance. 
Circumstances changed once again during the closing decades of the 20th century when 
liberalisation rekindled China’s economic vibrancy. This current economic 
transformation is without doubt the greatest industrial revolution the world has ever 
seen. From nowhere, China’s economy has grown dramatically, now accounting for 9 
per cent of ‘global’ gross domestic product (GDP).1 In dollar terms its GDP is the fourth 
biggest in the world, only slightly smaller than that of Germany;2 and after adjusting for 
price differences, China’s economy is second only to that of the United States (US).3 
 
China’s increasing economic strength is inevitably affecting world-trading patterns. It is 
now the second largest global exporter; total value of exports was 1.218 trillion U.S. 
dollars, up 27 percent year on year.4 Trade with the US amounted to well over 60 per 
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cent of this figure, making China the largest exporter of goods to the US.5 China’s 
growth surge is also affecting the import-side of the international trade equation. China 
will soon become the world’s second largest importer after the US, by overtaking 
Germany.6 This import growth has helped regenerate Japan’s stuttering economy, and, 
more generally, has acted as a locomotive for Pan-Asian growth. There are many factors 
that account for China’s remarkable boom, but two stand out as arguably the most 
influential, namely, politico-economic liberalisation and the role of foreign direct 
investment. 
1.2.1 ‘Non-dependent’ Politico-Economic Policies 
For more than 2000 years the market mechanism in China was little developed. 
Partially, as a consequence of the absence of competition and trade, the idea of self-
sufficiency became deeply rooted. Chinese people believed that they could achieve 
anything they wished without access to foreign capital and resources. This view of 
‘non-dependence’ became even more entrenched following the creation of Communist 
China in 1949.7 International isolation and strategic considerations played a crucial role 
in perpetuating China’s emphasis on self-reliance. This was highlighted when the 
Korean conflict erupted in the early 1950s and China, as an ally of North Korea, faced 
an economic embargo from Western countries. As a matter of necessity, then, the early 
years of Communism were marked by a national effort to achieve economic 
reconstruction and industrial development. It reflected the Chinese view that there was 
little alternative but to develop self-reliance. Communist ideology strengthened still 
further China’s parochial view of development. This was shown powerfully during the 
turbulent period of China’s Cultural Revolution, and the manner in which the use of 
foreign (Western) capital was regarded as contradictory to socialism. Dependence upon 
capitalist countries was interpreted as ‘losing face’, whilst the contrary goal of ‘creating 
face’ could only be achieved through reliance on national endeavour.8 This ideological 
approach dominated China’s policy-making until 1976 when the Cultural Revolution 
disappeared under the weight of its own contradictions. 
 
In reality, of course, self-sufficiency was always an ambitious goal, becoming near 
impossible today, particularly with regard to technological development. As a 
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consequence, China collaborated with the Soviet Union, and from the 1950s onwards, 
numerous joint ventures were set up with the USSR and other countries from the 
socialist camp. Although investment values were small, China used rouble loans for 
obtaining complete (turnkey) plants. Examples of early projects included the Sino-
Soviet Zhong Chang Railway, the Sino-Soviet Xinjiang Non-Ferrous Metal Company, 
the Dalian Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding and Repair Company and the Czechoslovakian 
International Marine Transportation Stock Company.9 This post-Independence Chinese 
politico-economic model created paradoxes which continue to this day. For example, 
self-sufficiency remains a central part of China’s development policy, yet since the late 
1970s it has been pursued alongside an agenda of openness, liberalisation and 
globalisation.10 The country, moreover, remains wedded to Communist ideology, but the 
capitalist profit-motive has been the driving force, securing rapid economic growth. 
What has resulted is Communism and Capitalism co-existing together. This unique 
hybrid is termed ‘market-socialism’ (or capitalism with Chinese characteristics-
Shichang Shehui Zhuyi市场社会主义). However, not withstanding various ‘stresses and 
strains’, it is a model that appears to be working. Despite China’s huge swathe of 
moribund state-owned enterprises, protected by the highly interventionist policies of the 
central planning regime, market-socialism has provided the economic conditions for 
explosive growth. China's National Bureau of Statistics in January 2009 revised the 
country's 2007 gross domestic product (GDP) figure, which meant that China then 
overtook Germany as the world's third largest economy. China's GDP reached 30.07 
trillion RMB (4.4 trillion U.S. dollars) in 2008, up 9 percent from a year earlier.11 The 
GDP per capita was RMB22,640.81 (US$3312.92).12 
1.2.2 FDI: Catalyst for China’s Rapid Industrialisation? 
A key factor underpinning China’s economic success is Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). In 1990, China received $5.5 billion in foreign investment.13 By 2007, this figure 
had grown to US$67.3 billion, making China the biggest FDI recipient amongst the 
developing economies.14 Research suggests that foreign capital offers benefits to the 
recipient economy through exposure to modern manufacturing methods, leading to 
increases in capital intensity and labour productivity. The infusion of foreign capital 
acts as a catalyst for industrialisation. China’s policy makers, however, remain aware 
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that FDI has its disadvantages. The downside of FDI was originally highlighted in what 
was termed, dependencia theory.15 This theory argues that foreign enterprise exploits the 
host economy’s markets, promoting little in the way of skilled labour, subcontractor 
links or added-value. 
 
In China, both the central planning apparatus and foreign companies have seemingly 
gauged the net effect of FDI and reached the conclusion that the benefits outweigh the 
costs. Thus, as reported by the United Nations Conference on Technology and 
Development, more than 80 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies have invested in 
over 2000 FDI projects in China.16 Moreover, because the government’s policies seek to 
promote future investment, FDI growth is expected to continue, with economists 
predicting that during the next Five Year Plan (2006-2010) FDI values will reach $100 
billion a year.17 
 
China’s FDI policy has its origins in the nineteenth century. In 1899, the US proposed 
to Imperial China that it should adopt an open door policy (Menhu Kaifang 门户开放).18 
This initiative was designed to coax the country into exposing its market to overseas 
business, but history has shown that Menhu Kaifang was a false start. For 50 years, up 
to the advent of Communism in 1949, FDI had only a limited impact. There were some 
pockets of foreign investment: in the 1930s fledgling aircraft industry, for instance, but 
the investment was of only marginal importance and constrained to Shanghai and the 
north.19 
 
Between 1949 and 1978, FDI opportunities became even more limited. Apart from 
China’s ill-fated 1950’s industrial co-operation with the former USSR, the Beijing 
government effectively closed its door to multinational business. Soviet collaboration 
ended in the late 1960s and China again became technologically isolated. Obsolete 
equipment and techniques that had been imported in the 1950s still constituted the 
‘backbone’ of industrial capacity a quarter of a century later. As a consequence, China’s 
technological frailties were revealed and reform became urgent. The reforms finally 
came in the late 1970s and the turning point was the 1978 Third Plenum of the 
Communist Party. At this conference, China committed itself to the four 
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modernizations; that of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national 
defence.20 The purpose of modernisation policy was to quadruple China’s 1980 GDP of 
RMB 480 billion to RMB 1800 billion by the year 2000.21 The ‘trickle-down’ effects of 
this growth would be to raise the living standards of Chinese people through economic 
development.  
 
To realise this ambitious quadrupling growth objective, China needed capital, 
technology and managerial expertise. The new Chinese leadership formulated the path-
breaking policy of economic reform and the opening-up of the economy to the outside 
world. The architect of this policy was Deng Xiaoping, who sought to introduce a new 
‘open policy’ (Kaifeng Zhengce开放政策).22 At the heart of this open policy was the 
need to attract FDI. There were several reasons why FDI was considered important:  
•Foreign capital was viewed as essential for compensating the shortage of local 
capital, without increasing China’s external debt burdens 
•There was a requirement to simultaneously upgrade local technology, equipment 
and management skills 
•Technology transfer would improve local production through its impact on 
economic structures and product quality, thereby encouraging export-oriented 
practises 
•FDI would help towards the training of local technical and management personnel, 
promoting China’s foreign economic co-operation 
•Foreign capital would help to increase job creation and income generation. 
 
Thus, economic modernisation was viewed as impossible in the absence of international 
co-operation. Second time around, policies were evolved to ensure that the 1979 open-
door policy actually meant open-door. For instance, the Act of Joint Venture 
Enterprises, endorsed by the 1979 National People’s Congress, ensured the legal rights 
of multinationals, giving them access to China, albeit through joint ventures with local 
Chinese firms.23 Wholly foreign-owned enterprises were at last allowed to operate, but 
only in certain areas.24 The post-1978 policies moved aggressively to open-up China to 
foreign capital and along with appropriate economic liberalisation policies, the aim was 
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to make China’s local market an attractive place for foreign companies to invest in 
production facilities and even research and development (R&D). 
 
A further important policy development to encourage foreign investment into China was 
the country’s 2001 membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This led in 
the following year to foreign companies finally being able to buy ‘controlling’ positions 
in domestically listed Chinese firms.25 This was a significant policy step, heralding 
China’s embrace of globalisation, and since 2001, the country’s commitment to the 
WTO’s regime of economic liberalisation and deregulation has been substantial. For 
instance, in agriculture, across a transition period of five years, Beijing agreed to reduce 
tariffs from an average level of 31.5 per cent to 17.4 per cent.26 For industrial products, 
it promised to quickly phase out quantitative restrictions, cutting the average tariff from 
24.6 per cent to 9.4 per cent.27 
 
China has also agreed to sign the WTO’s information technology agreement, resulting 
in the elimination of tariffs on telecommunications equipment, aerospace and IT 
products, with the most far-reaching changes reserved for the local services sector. 
Restrictions hitherto facing foreign service providers in areas such as licensing, equity 
participation, geographical location, business scope and operations are to be relaxed 
over time. Significantly, Beijing has decided to open-up telecommunications, financial 
services, distribution and other service-related industries to FDI. Apart from improving 
market access, the Chinese government has also agreed to increase the transparency of 
its trade regime. It plans to end all prohibited subsidies, liberalise trading rights and 
require State trading companies to operate in a commercial manner.  
 
Liberalisation has clearly hastened investment inflows. In the past two decades, China 
has attracted a cumulative $400 billion in FDI; the third biggest amount after the US 
and UK.28 Yet this huge figure constitutes just four per cent of China’s GDP, compared 
with 39 per cent for the UK.29 Although China’s FDI is small relative to the size of its 
economy, its impact has been amplified by investment focused on key sectors, as 
demonstrated in Table 1.1 below. In 2007, manufacturing accounted for more than 51 
per cent of China’s total contractual FDI value.30  
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Table 1.1: Distribution of FDI in China for 2007 
                                                                                                         Unit: 100million US$ 
Sector No of 
Projects 
Share 
% 
Contractual 
FDI Value 
Share % 
Total 37882 100 835.21 100 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry& Fishery 
1048 2.77 9.24 1.11 
Minging 234 0.62 4.89 0.59 
Manufacturing 19193 50.65 408.65 48.93 
Construction 308 0.81 4.34 0.52 
Transport, Warehouing, Post& 
Telecommunications 
658 1.74 20.07 2.40 
Computer And Software 1392 3.67 14.85 1.78 
Wholesale, Retaining 6338 16.73 26.77 3.20 
Hotel And Restaurant 938 2.48 10.42 1.25 
Finance 72 0.19 90.10 10.79 
Real Estate 1444 3.81 170.69 20.46 
Lease And Business Services 3539 9.34 40.19 4.81 
Scientific Research, Technology 
Service and Geological Prospecting 
1716 4.53 9.17 1.10 
Management of Water Conservancy, 
Environment and Public Equipment 
154 0.41 2.73 0.33 
Residential Services and other Services 270 0.7 7.23 0.8 
Education 15 0.04 0.32 0.04 
Health Care, Social Security & Social 
Welfare 
13 0.03 0.12 0.01 
Culture, P.E. and Entertainment 207 0.55 4.51 0.54 
Public Management and Social 
Organization 
1 0   
Source: Ministry of commerce of the People’s Republic of China (www.fdi.gov.cn) 2009,  
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/lntjsj/wstzsj/2007nzgwztj/t20081110_99059.htm 
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1.3 Strategic Industries: China’s Technology Development 
Paradigm 
The targeting of foreign investment into China’s strategic sectors, or what the 
authorities call ‘backbone’ or strategic industries (terms used interchangeably in this 
study)’ has not happened by accident. It has been a deliberate policy by both the foreign 
companies and the Chinese government; the former, because global growth is located in 
these high technology sectors, the latter, because of the interventionist nature of 
Beijing’s policymaking. China’s policy was based on Plan 863 (named after the date of 
its introduction: March 1986). The Plan aimed to promote what is now widely termed 
‘dual-use’ industrialisation: the development of local capacity in sophisticated 
commercial technologies applicable to both the defence and commercial sectors. 
 
FDI has been instrumental in the development of China’s strategic industries; these, as a 
consequence, have become mainly foreign-owned and managed. As a result, such 
industries are integrated into the global technology value-chain, enabling China to 
accelerate its industrial and technological transformation, normally, a long process. 
Beijing’s strategy seeks to avoid reinventing the technological wheel, rather it is aimed 
at exploiting advances made elsewhere, of trying to leapfrog the traditional early stages 
of industrial development. In this regard, fostering FDI as the vehicle for technology 
transfer is perceived as the most cost-effective way forward. Beijing’s policy approach 
is therefore interventionist, emphasising liberalisation, competitiveness and 
globalisation. Multinational investment is attracted to China and targeted on designated 
high-tech sectors, including chemical fibres, precision machinery, biotechnology, 
energy development, aviation and space. 31  Beijing aims to evolve a dynamic 
comparative advantage in these technology sectors. Aviation production is recognised 
as a key enabler for industrial and technological development. China thus aims to 
facilitate the development of these technology-lead sectors, recognising that it needs to 
foster access to relevant dynamic technologies.32  Figure 1.1 shows that the country has 
three options: purchase commercial aircraft on the open market; promote local 
production capacity through attracting MNC investment; and/or build indigenous 
production capability. China’s development policy has been to proceed sequentially 
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through each of these three stages. The thrust of this study is to evaluate its progress 
towards achieving indigenous production, the final and most difficult industrial and 
technological challenge (see analysis in Chapter 5). 
Figure 1.1: China’s Stage Model for Aviation Industry Development 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
For the purpose of formulating this study’s focused aim, these introductory comments 
have sought to make the case for an evaluation of the development performance and 
status of China’s aviation industry. The planning authorities formally recognise 
aerospace as a strategic industry making a strong contribution to the industrialisation of 
China. The sophisticated technological nature of the industry’s outputs will, moreover, 
lead to beneficial spin-offs, both horizontally and vertically, in the country’s production 
processes. China’s aviation industry, therefore, is politically, economically, and 
culturally, of huge intellectual and practical significance to observers from both the 
Orient and Occident alike. 
1.4 Aim 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: firstly, at a general level, to evaluate the 
development of Asia’s commercial aviation industry, and, secondly, at a more focused 
case-study level, to offer an analysis of China’s progress towards the policy goal of 
achieving indigenous aviation capacity. 
1.4.1 Enabling Objectives 
•Evaluation of the theoretical rationale for promoting economic development 
through Foreign investment 
Purchase from 
international market 
using distributor 
channels 
Foreign investment 
into local production 
capacity 
• FDI 
• Joint Venture 
• Offsets 
• Subcontracts 
Build indigenous 
production capacity 
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•Appraisal of post-Independence policy development in China aimed at developing 
local, diversified industrial capability through the creation of strategic industries 
•Description and empirical analysis of the development of major Asian aviation 
industries, particularly progress sustained via indigenous industrialisation 
•Description and empirical analysis of the development of one of China’s more 
important strategic industries, the aviation industry 
•Deep analysis of the ‘effectiveness’ of technology transfer, including both foreign 
investment and offsets, creating the skills and capability for self-sustainable growth 
in China’s indigenous aviation industry 
1.5 Study Value 
China’s economic model is one that is currently the focus of global attention; the reason 
is simple, it is successful. Stellar growth rates over the past quarter of a century have led 
to the transformation of China’s economy. Throughout this period, Beijing has sought 
to upgrade, diversify and expand its industrial base. Although Chinese manufacturers 
have exploited their abundant low-cost labour to become globally dominant producers 
in such goods as toys, bicycles and textiles, the thrust of China’s development strategy 
has been directed towards moving up the technological ladder. Policymakers have 
sought to ‘evolve’ a dynamic comparative advantage in higher value-added technology 
fields, such as aviation, telecommunication, automobiles, and microelectronics. These 
industries have been recognised as strategic growth poles within the Chinese economy, 
generating skilled workers, local research and development capacity, and also labyrinths 
of innovative local sub-contractors. The ultimate goal of this development process is to 
lay the foundation for indigenous industrialisation. If this can be achieved then these 
strategic industries will act as catalysts not only for industrialisation but also for 
accelerated transition from low to high value-added technological development. The 
strategic industries will radiate innovation and efficiency benefits, both upstream and 
downstream, across China’s economy. 
 
Aviation represents one of China’s principal strategic industries. The aviation industrial 
development path, i.e. heavy reliance on technology transfer has been the typical 
approach followed by the planning authorities for the development of China’s modern 
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industrial sectors. Foreign MNCs have established manufacturing facilities in China, 
such that an emerging consolidated oligopolistic market structure has been created. 
Although a production base exists, the real issue is:  how ‘deep’ has been the process of 
industrialisation? If the MNCs have only created assembly operations, generating 
minimum skills and value-added, then this is a ‘shallow’ form of industrialisation. Not 
only will there be few technology benefits transmitted to the broader manufacturing 
sector, but the lack of ‘deep’ industrialisation will perpetuate China’s dependence on 
overseas suppliers. This study’s originality, and hence ‘contribution to knowledge’, 
comes from its empirical evaluation of China’s performance in developing aviation 
manufacturing capability. Moreover, a cross-sectional analysis has been conducted, not 
only across sectoral cases in China’s aviation industry, but also across other country 
aviation industries in Asia. This is the first applied-empirical academic research project 
to investigate this focused subject.33 
1.6 Conceptual Framework 
The present study is concerned with the role and effectiveness of inward technology 
transfer in support of Chinese industrialisation. The starting point for discussion, 
however, goes back to the policy issue that all countries have to face: how best to effect 
economic development? There is no magical solution, no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
industrialisation strategy that can be applied to all underdeveloped countries, under all 
circumstances. Actual technology development will depend on the success of broad-
based development technology strategy/planning and the extent of technology access. 
1.6.1 Asian Regional Context 
Industrial strategies have to be designed and refined so that they are appropriate to 
particular economic conditions at a point in time and adapted as the dynamics of 
macroeconomic conditions change. Surprisingly, even in a 21st century context, 
characterised by rapid globalisation, the desired end-state for many developing 
countries is still what is variously termed self-reliance, self-sufficiency or 
indigenisation. Essentially, this is the point at which the local economy can claim to 
have created the capacity for both broad and deep industrialisation. This is clearly an 
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ambitious policy goal, but one which, for instance, India, South Korea Japan and many 
other Asian Countries, including China, still seek to achieve.  
 
Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia have all followed 
similar development paths as that of China. Their immediate aim has been to promote 
industrialisation, reducing dependence on agricultural cash crops. Yet, whilst strategies 
may differ between states regarding, for instance, the nature of government 
interventionism, the ultimate goal is the same: to industrialise, promote technological 
capability and achieve economic sovereignty through indigenous production. Whether 
the countries enjoy rapid or conservative economic growth, at some stage, policies will 
need to be formulated to promote science and technology and increase value-added. 
This will most likely arise from enhanced skills, the creation of local specialist supply 
chains and local research and development. None of this will be easy; there will be 
serious costs involved; it will take time to develop the skills and competences, and the 
industrial infrastructure will need to be evolved. Notwithstanding these barriers, Asia’s 
search for local high technology capacity remains as strong as ever. This is no more 
than true  than in aviation. It is matter of national security, defined as both economic 
and military, to develop domestic production in this important ‘strategic’ industry. 
 
For the Asian countries, the typical strategy for developing production capacity is to 
‘piggyback’ (Dapei搭配) on progress achieved in the advanced countries. The results 
from such a strategy are mixed, with Japan at one end of the spectrum, having achieved 
remarkable success, and Indonesia, at the other, suffering stagnation and a diminution of 
capacity. As a latecomer to development, generally, and for aviation, in particular, the 
real question is how has China has progressed, both in relation to its own domestic 
economic context and when benchmarking against competitors in the Asian regional 
context. 
 
Indigenous industrialisation is dominant in the thinking of China’s leaders because, as 
hitherto stated, often in the country’s history it has suffered colonial exploitation, 
suppression, and dependence on foreign supply. Consequently, it has become almost 
ingrained in Chinese culture that dependence on outside sources must be minimised. 
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Chinese government statements have affirmed, and continually re-affirmed, the 
overriding importance of this policy objective. Note, for example, the following 
technology-driven statement by Jiang Zemin in his mid-1990’s speech to the Chinese 
people: 
•“We must understand clearly that the world’s most advanced technology is not 
for sale…New ideas are the very soul of national progress and are indispensable 
to the development of any country. If we do not have our own autonomous 
ability to create innovation and just depend on technology imports from abroad, 
we will always be a backward country… As a great socialist country, we must, 
in the field of science of technology be master of our own fate…As we continue 
to learn from others and to import advanced foreign technology, we must remain 
focused on raising China’s ability to do research and development on its 
own…”34 
 
In the design of an appropriate Chinese aviation development ‘model’ not only must the 
broad ‘macro’ policy aspects be captured, but also the more focused ‘micro’ structural 
and technology issues associated with the ‘deepening’ of local industrial development. 
The method adopted for this study is detailed in Figure 1.2 below (developed further in 
chapter 2). The venn diagram identifies the three principal attributes for effective 
indigenous industrialisation; that of, development planning, technology planning and 
technology development (the latter defined not just in terms of growth, but also the 
ability to secure high levels of sustainable competitive performance in a dynamic global 
business environment). Whilst there may be some overlapping, the industrialisation 
process is sequential, systematic and strategic, as explained in the following sub-
sections. 
1.6.2 Development Planning 
The development planning interface in Figure 1.2 highlights the identification and 
selection of development plans appropriate for the fostering of local industrial and 
technological development. The vehicle for most countries’ industrial planning is the 
Five-Year Development Plan. The Soviet Union, since 1928, and India, since 1951, 
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Figure 1.2: Modelling Indigenous Industrialisation (I2) 
 
Source: author 
 
provide good examples of countries that have employed Five-Year Plans. China has 
trodden a similar path and since its First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) introduced a 
succession of centrally coordinated development programmes. Their purpose is to 
identify, prioritise and coordinate development activities within investment constraints. 
The initial development of underdeveloped countries may involve costs if the 
development regime allows market forces full rein. These are the costs of competition, 
arising when firms compete in a fledgling industrial sector and, as a result, suffer high 
unit costs caused by over-competition and thus capacity underutilisation. Government 
has an interventionist role to play in guiding investment and resources in the framing of 
appropriate consumption-goods or capital-goods led development policies. This is 
particularly important in the development of balanced or unbalanced investment 
approaches and import-substitution or export-promotion strategies.  Whatever the 
development policy, economic transformation will focus on industrial expansion and 
diversification. The initial development push, in turn, will necessitate the design and 
implementation of technology plans. 
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1.6.3 Technology Planning 
The next stage in the progression toward indigenous industrialisation is technology 
planning. This is concerned with determining how best to source the technologies 
required to fuel the industrialisation push. Few latecomers to industrialisation aim to 
reinvent the wheel by undertaking the high cost R&D option to create new technologies. 
By definition, under-developed economies are resource-constrained, lacking the 
physical and human capital for frontier invention-innovation product and process 
development. Industrial latecomers, therefore, will benefit from following the 
technology ‘leader’, a dynamic advanced country driving technological advance. 
Latecomers can thus emulate ‘best-practise’ management and organisational approaches 
and ‘share’ the fruits of technological progress achieved elsewhere. 
 
In the globalised environment that now characterises the international economic and 
financial system, the normal conduit for transferring technology from one country to 
another is FDI. Additionally, in the contemporary era, a further vehicle for technical 
transfer is what is called ‘offsets’. This occurs because of the tight international sellers’ 
market for high value items, such as aircraft. In such circumstances, purchasing 
countries demand offsetting investment, normally the means for locally producing the 
constituent components and/or subassemblies of the aircraft being purchased.  This is 
not necessarily a ‘win-win’ process, however, as the transferring MNC will be intent on 
ensuring that its valuable ‘brand’ and cumulative R&D investments will be safeguarded. 
By contrast, the local company will be endeavouring to exploit extant learning and 
capabilities developed elsewhere. Dependent on the recipient’s technological absorptive 
capacity, technology transfer will either be a positive or neutral learning experience for 
the transferee. Academic studies have indicated, for instance, that India’s early in-
country foreign collaboration machine tool ventures proved neutral, with minimal 
‘deepening’ of local capability occurring.35 Whilst the capacity to produce a broad array 
of machine tool models was achieved, India’s manufacturers were unable to reduce 
dependence on foreign partners for the next generation of technology.36 In other words, 
Indian firms were able to ‘productionise but not indigenise’. Japan, on the other hand, 
was better placed to effectively absorb the technologies transferred by its overseas 
collaborators. 37  Japan, during most of the 19th and 20th centuries employed huge 
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numbers of highly trained cadres of scientists and engineers dedicated to the process of 
‘reverse engineering’. These skilled workers were also focused on the development of 
2nd and 3rd generation technology, representing improved versions of the original 
overseas design. Thus, since the late 1860s, Japan has been playing technological 
‘catch-up’ with Western countries, a process that in some of Japan’s high technology 
sectors, continues today.38 
 
China’s contemporary technology planning regime closely emulates Japan’s policy 
experience. The Chinese government has for the past 50 years been introducing science 
and technology, trade, and industrial policies to encourage local industrial development 
through technology transfer. The principal medium for this transfer has been FDI. 
Policies such as Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 ‘open-door’ model, WTO membership, and a 
whole cluster of other industrial plans have acted in concert to provide the appropriate 
conditions for attracting the enormous FDI values that have found their way into China 
over recent years. 
1.6.4 Technological Development 
The final key element highlighted in Figure 1.2 is technology development, reflecting 
actual industrialisation through the development of key sectors. Although an important 
part of the planning apparatus for developing countries, the targeting of development on 
important sectors of the local economy does not normally form part of the policy 
approach in the advanced countries. The already advanced economies are more likely to 
be subject to market forces, with less reliance placed on government interventionism.  
 
However, whilst not formally based on an interventionist policy, FDI transfers into, say, 
the US or the UK, are in the main sourced from global high technology manufacturers; 
the latter’s products being more appropriate to the refined market segmentation and 
higher income levels of consumers in the advanced economies. At the process level, 
MNC intermediate technology outputs are compatible with the production capabilities 
and skill-sets of Western industrial sectors. Adam Smith’s view of this production 
process is that it is guided by an ‘invisible hand’, i.e. the market.39 Smith argued that the 
market allocatory mechanism is driven by the constant search for profit. Local and 
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MNC investment therefore gravitates naturally to the growth poles within the economy 
to capture economic ‘rent’ (super-profit). Market conditions are, of course, less 
sophisticated and less open in the industrialising countries. Incomes are low, and a 
middle-class, whose demands are essential for the promotion of consumer durable 
goods production, has yet to emerge. Labour is plentiful, but normally low-skilled, and 
a manufacturing substructure of specialist suppliers is also absent. In such under-
developed economies, it is the government’s responsibility to manage industrialisation. 
This is normally done through the adoption of an interventionist approach; that is, an 
institutional ‘visible-hand’ to guide scarce resources to the ‘strategic’ sectors within the 
economy.40 The notion of strategic industries will be examined in more detail in Chapter 
5, but at this stage it is important to recognize that China’s policymakers have followed 
this ‘visible-hand’ approach, with the aim being to promote a spectrum of designated 
high technology ‘backbone’ or strategic industries. 
 
China’s backbone industries are held to be of policy significance for three principal 
reasons: 
•Firstly, they are seen as drivers for rapid industrialisation. These industries are 
expected to employ large numbers of workers (many of whom are highly skilled), 
they also contribute greatly towards the growth of output and export opportunities, 
hence earning valuable foreign exchange. 
•Secondly, the strategic industries are viewed as catalysing agents in the promotion 
of local technological development. The industries are characterised as high 
technology, high value-added, and knowledge-intensive, specialising in productive 
activities such as telecommunications, avionics, machine tools, transportation 
equipment and microelectronics, including aviation. 
•Thirdly, the strategic industries are, rightly, interpreted as ‘dual-use’ industries, 
and are therefore critical to the servicing of China’s defence-industrial needs. Plan 
863 symbolises this process of civil-military integration in that it emphasises 
policies designed to encourage the development of dual-use strategic industries for 
national security purposes. 
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1.6.5 Indigenous Industrialisation 
For China, as with most other industrialising countries, the policy goal of government 
planning is indigenous industrialisation. To this end, there is a recognition that whilst 
inward technology transfer is necessary to foster industrial development in a cost-
effective way, it is not sufficient. Also important is the need to ‘localise’ the 
technologies transferred. Strategic industries can thus play a critically important role in 
generating the sophisticated skills and technological expertise essential for pursuing 
technological development. 
 
The confluence of the circles shown at Figure 1.2 illustrates that indigenous 
industrialisation (I2) is the outcome of development planning, technology planning and 
technology development targeted on the establishment of strategic and other lead 
industries. As stated in the study aim, the purpose of this research and, indeed, its 
‘contribution to knowledge’, is thus to offer an analysis of the development of one of 
China’s most important strategic industries, that of aviation. The study focus is on the 
‘effectiveness’ of technology transfer. In essence, is China making progress in 
achieving its policy goal of indigenous industrialisation or is the process one of 
dependent technological development? Indigenisation depends on China’s capacity to 
‘absorb’ the technologies transferred and this will be influenced by industry-level 
considerations such as government science and technology policy and cross-cultural 
assimilation, i.e., the likelihood that foreign and Chinese business cultures can fuse and 
create synergies. Technological absorptive capacity facilitates indigenisation. However, 
to measure progress towards the indigenisation goal requires performance criteria. This 
is explained in greater detail in section 2.6 (Figure 2.10) of chapter 2, but it is suffice to 
note at this point that this study will employ three metrics: the level of local value-
added; the capacity for technological innovation; and the degree of sophistication of the 
local value chain.  
1.7 Choosing an Appropriate Research Method 
The choice of research method is an important element in doctoral study. Indeed, for 
some PhD theses, methodological design represents the original contribution to 
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knowledge. This does not apply in the present study, but it is acknowledged that the 
process of data acquisition must be clearly explained and justified. Thus, in the 
discussion that follows, the factors influencing the choice of research methodology will 
be addressed. There are two main issues:  
•Firstly, examining the purpose, philosophy and process of the research 
methodology options (sub-sections 1.7.1-5) 
•Secondly, the application of such understanding to the development of an 
appropriate methodological framework for empirical evaluation of China’s aviation 
industry (sub-section 1.7.6). 
 
Saunders et al have summarised the range of research methods available to students, 
representing them graphically as the research ‘onion’.41 As the construction of this onion 
is complex, its constituent elements require explanation. Thus Figure 1.3 illustrates an 
adapted ‘onion’ structure, with the linked text seeking to explain its cell structure. 
1.7.1 Research Philosophy 
Research methodology is concerned with data acquisition. There are numerous 
philosophical schools of thought helping to shape decisions on the choice of appropriate 
methodology. These schools debate issues such as deductive v inductive theoretical 
reasoning and the use of qualitative v quantitative analysis. Collis and Hussey evaluate 
the latter debate by reference to two philosophical paradigms: the first is ‘positivistic’, 
including cross-sectional studies, longitudinal research and surveys; the second is 
‘interpretivist’   concerned   with  case  studies,  ethnography, grounded  theory  and 
participative enquiry.42 The principal difference between these two forms of research 
philosophy is that the positivistic tends towards the acquisition of numerical data, whilst 
the interpretivist emphasises the qualitative approach. There is, of course, a distinction 
between the two paradigms, but the reality is that the two schools are not mutually 
exclusive but mutually supportive. Acquisition of primary data and its associated 
qualitative interpretation go hand-in-hand. 
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Figure 1.3: Options within the ‘Research Process’ 
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Source: Adapted from Saunders, M. Lewis, P and Thornhill, A, ‘Deciding on the Research Approach  
            and Choosing a Strategy’, in Research Methods for Business Students, Pearson Education, 
            (2004), pp 84-112. 
 
The scientific research approach typically adopted by the natural scientist or natural 
philosopher is most often associated with positivism. The principle for this approach is 
mainly concerned with observable phenomena that can be gathered impartially, 
subsequently analysed, and then repeated under controlled conditions if necessary. The 
strategy has objective characteristics where emphasis is placed on method, structure, 
repeatability and the application of quantitative techniques. There is often a tacit 
assumption that the observer does not affect the observed; that is, the researcher is able 
to stay detached from the study subject.43 This last point must be seen as a goal; it is 
certainly subject to challenge, especially in the fields of the physical sciences, where it 
is often difficult or impossible to observe any phenomena without effect. 
The positivist approach usually begins with the deduction of a hypothesis derived from 
available theory. A hypothesis is essentially a proposition made as a basis for reasoning 
or indeed as the starting point for further research from currently known facts. A 
hypothesis will make some statements about a relationship between entities, their 
behaviour as a function of such a relationship, dependencies, and so on. The hypothesis 
is then expressed in meaningful terms using descriptions accessible in the real world, in 
this way it is possible to devise real mechanisms for measuring and making 
 21
observations. This process is known as reductionism, whereby a problem or hypothesis 
is broken down into smaller and simpler component parts so that they may be better 
understood. Subsequent measurements then become part of a test, perhaps in the form 
of an experiment or some other type of inquiry, and the outcome of the tests usually 
indicates the strength of the hypothesis in some way. The hypothesis, or indeed the 
experiments, may then be modified and repeated to improve correlation of the 
hypothesis to theory and, if successful, current theory may be modified in light of a 
successfully tested hypothesis. 
 
It is important to recognise that the initial hypothesis is simply a groundless assumption, 
containing no presumption of truth and is a practical opposite to theory, which itself is a 
system of facts that already reliably explains something. This may sound rather counter-
intuitive but the whole point of this type of research strategy is ultimately to test 
rigorously the statements contained within a hypothesis for significance. The gathering 
of data and the relationships between variables is the root of deduction and is embodied 
in many standard statistical techniques, such as the Student T test, which is specifically 
designed to test the similarity (or differences) between hypotheses. This is basically an 
a priori method, where truth can be deduced before experience and observation. 
 
The other high level research philosophy is termed interpretivism. This has regard to 
research undertaken in a humanistic environment, less appropriate to scientific analysis 
that is subject to the hard laws existing in the physical sciences. The social science 
context of business and technology management is more complex, and if the 
complexities are not acknowledged and investigated their influence on behavioural 
factors will be lost. Cultural and environmental ‘invisible’ considerations are powerful 
and generalisable qualities that affect visible outcomes. Thus, an interpretivist 
researcher seeks to discover the cause(s) behind the reality. This is often described as 
social constructivism. In this sense, reality is viewed as the result of a social 
construction of events; of people’s social interactions; of motives, intentions and social 
values. 
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Saunders et al include in their research process ‘onion’ (Figure 1.3), the notion of a third 
research philosophy called ‘realism’. This philosophy ties closely to the previously 
mentioned social constructivism. The distinction between a constructivist and realist 
approach is that the former believes that people share interpretations of phenomenon 
based on thought and beliefs, whereas the latter, whilst accepting the subjective basis of 
social behaviour, also recognise the importance of objective social forces, at the macro-
level, that influence behaviour; they argue that realism goes beyond reality and also 
captures human thoughts and beliefs. 
 
Whilst researchers separate out each of these three schools, there is in practice much 
overlap between these philosophical positions. Research philosophy represents an 
elevated, high level, position that a researcher adopts to develop knowledge. Its basis is 
intellectual rather than practical, influencing the manner in which researchers approach 
their craft. In the social sciences, phenomena are more unique and less predictable than 
in the physical sciences, but outcomes may still be generalisable as characterises a 
quantitative experimental model. Hence, research can often contain elements of 
positivist, interpretivist and realist approaches integrated together. 
1.7.2 Deductive and Inductive Research Approaches 
Reliable application of deductive, positivist methods to the world of economics and 
business is questionable. Unlike the physical sciences, there are fewer ‘absolutes’, such 
as reliable theories and situations that can be reduced in complexity to a level suitable 
for testing. One of the biggest differences between the natural sciences and business is 
that situations or outcomes are usually dependent on both circumstances and people. 
Circumstances are often unique, which means that they may be quite difficult to recreate 
or repeat. The unique nature of the subject area introduces a significant level of both 
unpredictability and subjectivity and often removes the ability to generalise 
meaningfully except at a superficial level. Acceptance of these points is probably two of 
the more difficult intellectual hurdles that need to be overcome to employ an alternative 
research approach successfully. 
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When all of these features are taken in the round, it becomes evident that there needs to 
be another approach to research, especially one that does not implicitly rely on scientific 
theory. An alternative approach does exist and it is generally known as inductive 
research, focusing on facts and observations; this is often referred to as 
‘phenomenology’. In practice, an inductive approach is one that observes and accepts 
the facts as presented, but also builds up a deeper understanding of what is actually 
happening rather than presupposing what should be happening. 
A phenomenologist pursuing an inductive approach will typically be looking for details 
and structures behind observed behaviours and outcomes and then interpreting their role 
and relevance. This may not be a simple concept to grasp but Schein developed a 
cultural model in the early 1980s, offering a layering within organisations as a useful 
tool to illustrate the concept.44   Figure 1.4, below, illustrates three layers, listed as 
Artefacts and Creations, Values, and Basic Assumptions.  On either side of this list are 
the associated cultural, tangible and intangible organisational attributes and conditions. 
Each of the three-layers in Schein’s model can be explained, thus:45 
•The first, most superficial, layer has regard to artefacts and creations; that is, 
things that can be seen or felt, such as technologies, offices or the outward 
trappings of an organisation.  
•The second layer comprises values, requiring a greater level of awareness to 
understand, such as…‘what does our organisation really stand for?’ 46 
•The third and final layer is composed of the basic assumptions that are intrinsic to 
people and organisations. These are not usually visible but are powerful at shaping 
behaviour, activities and ultimately success. Moreover, the third and deepest layer 
is not always rational and this is another subjective feature that perhaps denies the 
application of positivism in this type of analysis. 
 
•Schein’s model helps to illustrate the complexities of studying behavioural topics. 
It is often straight forward to observe phenomena in organisational and business 
contexts, but there will likely be many cultural and environmental issues that affect 
decision- making and general behaviour that will be hidden to positive, quantitative 
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analysis. By contrast, a phenomenological and interpretive philosophical 
methodology will explore and question the intangible human ‘landscape’ that lies 
behind the physical and macro 
Figure 1.4: Schein’s 3-Layer Organisational Model 
Examples of 
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Source: Schein, E.H. ‘Does Japanese Management Style Have a Message for the American Manager?’  
             Sloan Management Review (Fall, 1981), p64. 
 
organisational environment. ‘Induction’ is a powerful tool that essentially builds theory 
up from the bottom and is based on a wide expanse of observations. Induction usually 
succeeds in getting a better idea about the context and the feeling of what really makes 
things happen. Induction tries not to join cause and effect, especially when there is a 
human interaction at work (and this especially includes the worlds of business, political 
economy and technology management). Underlying or hidden reasons for behaviours 
and processes are often the key to an inductive research approach; ‘statistically’ sound 
generalisations are less important and therefore small sample sets may be used rather 
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than large ones. This technique easily allows alternative theories to be offered, mainly 
because it does not operate under the constraints of a rigid hypothesis that may only be 
cherished or discarded after proof or refutation. Theory follows data in the inductive 
method and this is probably the single most important point that differentiates the 
method from positivism.  Induction is basically an a posteriori method, where truth 
follows from experience and observation. 
1.7.3 Research Strategy 
There are typically six research strategies available to a social sciences student: 
1) Experiment: 
This involves the definition of a specific theoretical hypothesis. The hypothesis then 
makes demands on the selection of samples from populations that have statistical 
significance. The samples are tested under various experimental conditions where 
variables are changed scientifically, one-by-one, to determine cause and effect. 
Measurements are taken in all permutations and conditions and data are recorded for 
analysis. 
2) Ethnography: 
This is a rather specialised inductive approach that is based on time-consuming, first-
hand observations of behaviour and is especially suitable to the social sciences. The idea 
is to observe reactions of individuals (usually) in their own environment and this may 
apply equally to business as to field anthropology. 
3) Case Study: 
A deeper study of a particular subject allows the development of a much more intensive 
understanding of that subject. This method is especially important for getting to the 
bottom of the context of a problem, generating a much richer picture of the set of issues. 
Standard questions (who, why, and what) are often answered as a matter of course in 
this approach. There are a number of general methods that can be used including 
questionnaires, surveys and analysis of documents or the wider body of knowledge. 
4) Grounded Theory: 
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This technique is based on the gradual building up of data into theory. The method 
begins without an initial theoretical framework (i.e. without an hypothesis), but a theory 
emerges from the process of aggregation of data and knowledge. Increasing knowledge 
permits the postulation of ideas that can be tested in turn and any emergent theory 
remains grounded in the data that have already been collected. In this sense the method 
is actually a combination of induction and deduction. 
5) Survey: 
This method relies on the collection of large amounts of data. It is an empirical method 
for sampling large populations and is based on observation, or, more often, the use of a 
questionnaire. Care needs to be taken with this method to standardise all the data so that 
meaningful analysis can be carried out (the problem of comparing ‘apples with pears’ is 
a common error in surveyed data). Surveying permits a good degree of control over the 
process, but the range of questions asked might act to deter responses. 
6) Action Research: 
This method tends to involve the research subjects in the process of research itself. The 
object of such activity may be a particular institutional problem, which itself may have 
important ramifications on an organisation if resolved. The focus is on action, as stated 
in the title, and on outcomes. This method is often applied to the management of change 
and is rather inductive in nature, compared with a deductive approach, which expects 
the detachment of the observer from the observed. 
1.7.4 Time Horizons 
There are two basic types of study that a student may undertake, depending on the 
timescales available and the desired output of the study: 
1) Longitudinal studies: 
This method tends to follow a problem right through from inception to resolution. In 
this sense it is especially suitable for use on problems that are developing over time, or 
for studying subjects over extended periods in order to assess change in real time. The 
solution to some change management problems might be effectively managed using this 
technique, where a researcher can move along with the subjects and assess the success 
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of various interventions. Whilst a longitudinal study may be performed fairly quickly, it 
is normally associated with longer-term research projects. 
2) Cross-sectional studies: 
These are typical of comparative studies of organisations within the same industry, 
across different industries, and sometimes across different economies. Cross-sectional 
analysis may be characterised as representing a snapshot of the topic at a specific point 
in time. It is implicit in this time horizons that time is a significant constraint. A 
successful cross-sectional study is likely to be dependent on the tight articulation of 
questions if a survey is used, or a good understanding and bounding of the problem 
being researched if other collection methods are to be employed. Case studies and 
interviews can also be integrated into this method. 
1.7.5 Data Collection Methods 
1) Sampling: 
This method seeks to secure representative data by researching a scientifically valid 
number of units from the entire population. The sample can be selected randomly or 
structured according to characteristics such as organisational size, ownership, public or 
private affiliation. 
2) Secondary data 
This refers to the collection of data already in the public domain. Examples of 
secondary data might involve books, articles, government reports and corporate 
documents.  
3) Observation  
As shown in Figure 1.3, this method is closely linked to the research strategy called 
action research. It is where the researcher enjoys opportunities to observe and record the 
behavioural characteristics of the units under research. 
4) Interviews 
Interviews can be structured or semi-structured. The latter are held to be preferable for 
this study. This is because, while the questionnaires are standardised, the nature of the 
questions allows the interviewee to develop responses in a flexible way, thus providing 
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additional information and opinion. Interviews should be conducted with individuals 
possessing the appropriate level of responsibility. 
5) Questionnaires: 
Questionnaires are a useful data acquisition tool, particularly for retaining large amounts 
of empirical data that can be used for comparative purposes. Questionnaires need to be 
designed carefully to obtain relevant, specific and original information, as well as aimed 
at answering the research question. Questionnaires can be used to source both 
qualitative and quantitative data. 
1.7.6 Research Design (Selected Research Methodology) 
In the complex world of business and politics it is always difficult to adhere to a single 
research approach and time horizons; in fact, it may even be counter-productive to do 
so. In practice most studies tend to use a number of approaches in combination. This has 
the benefit of covering more ground, permitting the researcher to move flexibly through 
the study zone and allowing a degree of shift in study aims, data sources, analysis 
methods and output types. The adoption of a number of different approaches allows the 
topic to be approached from different angles, including those not pre-selected at the 
outset. Accordingly, the research methods chosen for this study are mixed and can best 
be illustrated by adapting Figure 1.3, as shown in Figure 1.5, below. Thus, for Figure 
1.5, the research design for the present study is formulated across several layers, 
including: a realism-interpretivist (phenomenological) philosophical position; a research 
inductive approach; grounded theory, survey and case study research strategies; time 
horizons that are both cross-sectional and longitudinal; data acquisition methods that 
include secondary data, questionnaires and interviews, undertaken on a sampling basis. 
The shaded boxes indicate the comprehensive research methodology options chosen and 
the red lines indicate the direction and development of thinking in the design of this 
study’s research method.  
 
The development of a research methodology is described by Yin as the … “first 
practical step away from the philosophy and theory of research to the design of 
research.”47 In regard to the present study, research design is critical because the  
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Figure 1.5:  Selected Research Methodology 
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Source: Adapted from Saunders, M. Lewis, P and Thornhill, A, ‘Deciding on the Research 
             Approach and Choosing a Strategy’, in Research Methods for Business Students, Pearson  
             Education (2004), pp 84-112.  
 
‘contribution to knowledge’ will come from fieldwork in Asia and China. The paucity 
of data on the nascent aviation industries of Asia and China indicate that empirical 
investigation is essential, so consideration must be given both to the volume of data 
(adequacy) and its quality (accuracy). For this reason, the appropriate research strategy 
for this study is held to be that of the mutually reinforcing ‘triangulation’ method. 
Figure 1.6 below, illustrates the three key research elements of this approach, 
incorporating secondary research, survey/questionnaires, and interviews. The arrows in 
Figure 1.6 show the progression of the research process, from secondary research to 
survey and finally to fieldwork interviews.  
 
Secondary Research: This is the starting point for data capture in this study. A 
thorough trawl of literature sources will be undertaken. This will include books, learned 
journals, specialist publications and quality magazines/newspapers. Web- based 
searches will also form an important part of the search for secondary material. The 
author is bi-lingual in Mandarin Chinese and English and therefore extensive searches 
and interrogation of Chinese material will be supplemented by reports, sector 
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Figure 1.6: Triangulation Research Methodology Model  
 
Source: author 
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documents, company Annual Reports and archival papers from fieldwork visits to 
focused China-based industry associations and Government Departments. Secondary 
data used in this study will be collected from several sources. Principal amongst these 
are the:  
  China Statistical Yearbook;  
  Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade;  
  A statistical survey of China; and 
  Web-site  
www.fdi.gov.cn ,  
www.xiahua.gov.cn 
www.sina.com  
http://www.chinaonline.com,  
http://en.ce.cn/ 
www.arj21.org,  
www.csaa.org.cn 
www.spaceref.com, 
http://www.boeingchina.com 
http://www.airbus.com.cn/ 
http://www.bombardier.com.cn/http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/default.htm 
http://www.avic1.com.cn/ 
http://www.avic2.com.cn/ 
http://www.snecma.com.cn/cs/group/index.html 
 
Survey/Questionnaire:  
This part of the research process involves sending questionnaires to companies selected 
for the survey. The questionnaire was designed around five themes: general data; value-
added; supply chain; skills and training; and technological innovation; these themes 
being sections in the questionnaire. A pilot questionnaire was firstly e-mailed to Ms 
Chen Qi (Embraer) and Ms Xu Bo (AVIC) to check the completeness and relevance of 
the questions. Modifications to the questionnaire were made, based on the feedback 
from the pilot survey. The changes were mostly to remove issues of sensitivity, eg 
questions on profit from the draft questionnaire. The questionnaire (Appendix 2) was 
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then emailed to several Chinese aviation companies, with responses from four major 
companies, covering AVIC, Embraer, Safran and Roll-Royce. This response represents 
something like 70-80% of total output value for China’s aviation industry in 2008. 
Companies not responding to the survey included Boeing, which, whilst a major 
aviation player in China, does not produce aircraft. It is engaged in a joint-venture 
aimed at the conversion market, and channels a high level of offsets/subcontract work 
into Chinese aviation factories; however, to repeat, it does not produce commercial 
aircraft in China. Similarly, whilst it was disappointing that Airbus did not participate in 
the interview/questionnaire survey, at the time the survey was conducted, Airbus China 
was not producing aircraft in China; the output of the A320 had not begun during the 
survey period (first unit is scheduled to come off the Tianjin assembly line, June/July 
2009). 
 
Fieldwork/Interview:  
ASIA: To establish whether the China fieldwork findings are consistent and 
generalisable to other countries in the Asia region, comparative fieldwork was 
undertaken amongst several ASEAN countries. The choice of countries was determined 
by preparatory investigation as well as compliance with the countries included in the 
‘Flying Geese’ model, explained fully in Chapter 3. Thus, empirical investigation of 
aviation firms was undertaken in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, though not in 
Taiwan (negligible commercial aviation production; mostly military), South Korea 
(some commercial aviation production, but insignificant compared to military 
production) and Japan (highly relevant to the Asia survey, but due to Japan’s 
sensitivities over aviation (a strategic industry), the researcher was unable to arrange 
interviews, at Mitsubishi in Japan). The list of Asian companies visited and personnel 
interviewed is shown at Table 1.2. Although only one company (PT Dirgantara) visit 
was conducted in Indonesia, this Bandung company represents 100% coverage for 
Indonesia’s aviation industry. Equally, ST Aerospace represents 100% coverage of 
Singapore’s aviation industry at the local prime contractor level and the survey of three 
major Malaysia commercial aircraft producers account for close to the total of non-
military aircraft production in this country. 
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CHINA: The fieldwork was conducted in September 2008. At least 2 hours were spent 
interviewing key executives, including those at director level, at each of China’s major 
Table 1.2: Asian Aviation Interviews 
Company Country Name Title 
Singapore Technologies 
Aerospace Ltd Singapore Ho Yuen Sang  
Deputy President 
(Operations)  
 
Rolls-Royce, Singapore Singapore
Dr Kurichi 
Kumar 
Head, Advanced 
Technology Centre, 
 
Rolls-Royce, Singapore Singapore Dr Nigel Hart 
Head, Advanced 
Technology Centre, 
 
Rolls-Royce, Singapore Singapore
Mr Jonathan 
Asherson 
Regional Director-
South East Asia 
Economic Development 
Broad Singapore
Ms CHAN Ying 
Xuan 
Assistant Head, 
Transport 
Engineering  
SME Aerospace Sdn.Bhd. Malaysia 
Mr. Chee Eng 
Boon 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Ministry of Defence, 
Malaysia Malaysia 
Dr Kogila 
Balakrishnan 
Principal Assistant 
Secretary, Defence 
Industry Division 
BAEs System (Internatinal ) 
Ltd Malaysia 
Mr Richard 
McKie 
Director-Industrial 
& Business 
Development 
Composities Technology 
Research Malaysia Sdn Bhd Malaysia 
Mr. Azizi 
Azizan 
Corporate 
Communications 
Business 
Development 
Composities Technology 
Research Malaysia Sdn Bhd Malaysia 
Mr. Zulkarnain 
Mohamed 
Senior General 
Manager 
Eurocopter Malaysia 
Mr. Syed Abdul 
Rahman 
Alhadad 
Senior Director, 
Quality, Flight 
Operations and 
Training 
Eurocopter Malaysia 
Mr Mohd Nizam 
Mohd Arop  
Manager Public 
Relations and 
Corporate 
Communications 
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EADS Malaysia 
Ms Jamaliyah 
Ambia 
Director of 
Marketing 
Malaysian Industry-
Government Group for High 
Technology Malaysia 
Mr Maj Zailani 
Safari 
General Manager 
Strategic 
Technology 
Malaysian Industry-
Government Group for High 
Technology Malaysia 
Mr Lt Col Ir 
Kamarulzaman  
Zainal 
Vice President - 
Intelligence & 
Research 
Malaysian Industry-
Government Group for High 
Technology Malaysia 
Mr. Shamsul 
Kamar Abu 
Samah, 
Manager 
Intelligence & 
Research 
Agusta Westland Malaysia 
Mr Peter 
Richings 
Regional Business 
Executive Sales & 
Marketing 
PT Dirgantara 
Indonesia/Indonesian 
Aerospace Indonesia 
Mr. Sonny Saleh 
Ibrahim 
Vice President 
Technology 
Business Center 
PT Dirgantara 
Indonesia/Indonesian 
Aerospace Indonesia 
Mr Gusti Naurah 
Sudira 
Supervisor of 
Technology 
Cooperation  
Source: author 
 
aviation companies, except for Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier. The impact and 
development of these companies was covered, to a large extent, by interviews with 
independent aviation consultants and specialists. At the meetings, every opportunity 
 
was taken to cross-check the data included in the completed questionnaire, by directed, 
but nevertheless, open-ended discussion, allowing the interviewee the flexibility to go 
‘off-script’ and develop more detailed responses. Interviewees often brought along discs 
and ‘internal’ hard copy reports to support the interviewer’s data collection efforts. 
Research and education are accorded a high priority in China and Asia generally, and 
for those company executives interviewed, there was a willingness to support the 
fieldwork. Table 1.3 provides a list of executives/specialists interviewed in China. All 
the interviews were conducted at the respective company headquarter in Beijing, given 
the Chinese authorities’ reluctance to grant site visits to the ‘sensitive’ aviation 
factories. The list of China companies/originations contacted and personnel interviewed 
is shown at Table 1.3. Data acquisition is thus a combination of secondary research, 
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survey questionnaire (the draft survey questionnaire is shown at Appendix 2) and 
interviews. The questions are open and broad, encouraging interviewees to extend 
discussion beyond narrow parameters, embracing issues of wider relevance. 
Table 1.3: China Aviation Interviews 
Company 
Coun
-try Name Title 
Embraer China China 
Mr Guo Dong 
Yuan President, Embraer China 
Embraer  China Ms Chen Qi 
Director of 
Communications, 
Embraer China,  
Embraer  China Mr Xiao Fusheng Advisor, Embraer China, 
China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II China Ms Xubo 
Director, Aero-products 
Division  
China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II China Mr. Xia Qunlin 
Director General, 
International Cooperation 
& Trade Department 
China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II China Mr. Wang Wenfei 
Deputy Director General, 
Aircraft Department,  
China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II China 
Mr. Jiang 
Yunsheng,  
Director, AVIC II 
Planning Department  
Rolls-Royce 
International Limited-
China China 
Dr Guangqiu 
Wang 
Director of Business 
development 
Rolls-Royce 
International Limited-
China China 
Mr Richard 
Margolis 
Regional Director, North-
east Asia 
Safran China 
Representative office  China Dr NI Jingang 
Deputy Chief 
Representative 
China Aviation News China Mr. Rong Weiren Reporter 
International Aviation 
Group China Mr. David Xu Chief-in Editor 
Source: author 
 
The triangulation research model is premised on the need to achieve data adequacy and 
accuracy to support empirical analysis of the strategic and high profile, but relatively 
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unexplored, Chinese aviation industry. The strong mixture of research strategies, time 
horizons and data collection methods will provide confidence that the research results 
are valid and generalisable. The triangulation metaphor is taken from navigation and 
military strategy, which use multiple reference points to locate an object’s exact 
position. 48  Triangulation thus seeks to obtain confirmation of findings through 
convergence of different perspectives; the point at which these converge is seen to 
represent reality.49 The triangulation method was employed during fieldwork in China 
and the Asian countries. Its purpose is aimed at reducing interviewer bias and validating 
data accuracy. The use of secondary data sources, including corporate archival material 
is a broadly accepted approach in social sciences research. Similarly, the use of the 
survey questionnaire techniques alongside a mixture of informal and standardised 
interview models is deemed legitimate.50 It is possible to explore the same research 
question using both techniques, although one tool may be more appropriate than the 
other depending upon a number of issues: time and money; sampling criteria and the 
population being researched; and the type of data being uncovered.51 Interviews provide 
the opportunity for deeper research and are held to result in a higher quality of 
measurement.52  
 
The Asia fieldwork offers a comparative evaluation of China’s technology development 
experience, allowing the opportunity to check for consistency. For instance, the nature 
of technology access challenges industrialising countries face. As can be seen from 
Figure 1.5, the China fieldwork is an attempt to explicitly research the differing 
contextual problems and challenges faced at three sectoral levels, namely, the prime 
local contractor, prime foreign contractor, and foreign subcontractor level. This 
approach is similar to undertaking a multiple case study approach, which can be defined 
as … “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
context and in which multiple source of evidence are used.”53 Moreover, the study of a 
‘case’ can be a study of n cases depending on the subject under study.54 Thus, in the 
fieldwork of China’s aviation industry, multiple case studies have been undertaken of 
the foreign aircraft/subsystems manufacturers in China as a means of evaluating the 
technology transfer/development experience, both within and between each of the cases.  
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1.8 Study Structure 
Following this introductory chapter, there are five further chapters to this study. Chapter 
2 provides a critique of the literature on industrial and technological development. The 
purpose of chapter 2 is to highlight the theoretical issues relevant  
for the later empirical investigation of Asia and China’s progress in indigenous aviation 
production. Discussion in chapter 2 centres on the theoretical evaluation of importing, 
infusing and indigenising foreign technology and is structured around the ‘fully’ 
developed conceptual model at Figure 2.10 for analysing the applied issues in 
subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 begins this applied analysis by exploring Asia’s 
development performance in the promotion of local aviation capacity. A well-known 
academic study framework has been employed to examine the process of technology 
transfer and development at the Asia regional level. Termed the Flying Geese Model, it 
depicts Japan as the technology leader, with the other Asian countries as followers or 
latecomers to industrial and technological development. The empirical investigation in 
this Chapter sets the stage for evaluating the focused case study of China in Chapter 4. 
Here, as per the venn diagram shown at Figure 1.2, China’s development at the macro-
level is examined. To begin, there is an analysis of China’s industrial development 
through the ‘curse’ of centralisation over the first 30 years of Communism. From 
collaboration with Soviet Union to the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution, China’s 
development path was anything but smooth. The analysis focuses on technology 
planning during the post-1978 ‘open-door’ period. This period is characterised by the 
growth of inward FDI and associated technology transfer, kick-starting China’s 
industrial and technological push. Finally, the chapter focuses on Technology 
development, both in general terms, but importantly also in regard to the fledging 
aviation sector. The discussion centres on the origins of the aviation industry and on the 
early policy emphasis given to military aircraft production. Following this discussion, 
an examination of China’s recent policy initiatives and practical achievements will be 
undertaken as a means of providing the building-blocks for later analysis of the progress 
achieved in indigenising commercial aviation production. This is undertaken in Chapter 
5, where the study becomes firmly directed forwards development of China’s aviation 
sector, recognised formally as a strategic industry. Here, the particular challenge of 
promoting strategic industries will be explored, focusing particularly on the 
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technological development of the aviation industry. The thrust of this chapter is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of technology transfer through both FDI and offsets 
investments. By reference to the extended conceptual model shown at Figure 2.10, 
chapter 5 examines the success of the industry’s technology absorption capacity. Thus, 
by analysing several pre-determined I2 metrics, the chapter seeks to establish the extent 
and nature of technology ‘deepening’ rather than simply the ‘broadening’ of the 
technology base. The closing chapter 6 will specify conclusions and policy 
recommendations with the purpose of drawing together all strands of the discussion and 
analysis. The underlying goal of this thesis is to advance knowledge and promote policy 
improvement, inviting other interested observers to make their own contribution to this 
important debate. 
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Chapter 2 Achieving Economic ‘Take-off’: the 
Challenge of Transferring, Absorbing and 
Indigenising Technology 
2.1 Planning for Development: Can Success be Transferred? 
All countries seek economic development, but the question is how can this be achieved? 
Adam Smith in his 1776 treatise entitled: An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, argues that the most efficient form of economic advancement is 
through the market mechanism. 1  Market forces (supply and demand) act via an 
‘invisible hand’ driving resources to the growth poles of an economy. This is known as 
Capitalism. It is a model demonstrating that consumer sovereignty is exercised through 
choice, with suppliers striving relentlessly to maximise profit. 
 
Although Adam Smith’s ‘perfect markets’ model informs contemporary policymaking, 
it is nothing more than an ideological construct. In reality, demand functions are not 
horizontal, industrial consolidation occurs continuously, proprietary information is 
protected, and product differentiation is a major business preoccupation. Capitalism is 
an aggressively competitive business where firms seek to remove their rivals from the 
market. Thus, through seeking competitive edge, the long-term corporate goal is aimed 
at evolving monopoly positions and dominating the market. It is a process of economic 
transformation. In a highly dynamic market-based environment, where the role of 
government is limited, investment will gravitate towards those sectors enjoying high 
demand and profit. On this basis, Smith argued that microeconomic competitiveness 
provides the foundation for macroeconomic success (defined traditionally as high 
economic growth, low inflation, high employment and a balance of payment surplus). 
 
However, the problem with Adam Smith’s model for most underdeveloped countries is 
that Capitalism is often inappropriate for ‘initiating’ the development-push. By 
definition, poorer countries are capital-scarce and labour-abundant. Capitalism, 
therefore, exposes a developing country to the dual dangers of high risk and distant 
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returns. There is also the possibility of surplus supply and thus capacity under-
utilisation where capital-intensity is low and market access high. As a consequence, 
governments inevitably have to intervene in poorer countries to kick-start the 
development process. Such interventionism spans the spectrum of selective promotion 
of strategic economic sectors to full-blown Communism. 
 
These introductory comments suggest that the development of underdeveloped 
countries poses challenges distinct from those of the already advanced countries. If 
correct, then policies need to be crafted and aligned to the development status a country 
has reached. Accordingly, the purpose and structure of this chapter is to profile the 
process of economic development against the conceptual model shown at Figure 1.2 
(Chapter 1). Stage I of the development cycle is development planning, highlighting the 
identification and selection of development plans appropriate for promoting local 
industrial and technological development. Thus, to begin this chapter, the scene is set by 
evaluating the traditional development models. Whether the politico-economic context 
is Capitalism or whether it is the command economy, a common thrust of these 
development models is that of seeking to propel economies into self-sustaining 
economic growth. Through a stage-process approach, development conventionally 
requires industrialisation and thus diversification away from dependence on agricultural 
cash crops. Industrialisation is founded on manufacturing and a host of associated 
conditions, including the generation of higher quality skill-sets, increased productivity, 
and also promotion of positive cultural attributes.2 However, perhaps the most important 
aspect of industrial success is technology. This begs the question, however, as to how 
best to access technology?  
 
Stage II in the development cycle is technology planning. This has regard to 
determining how best to source the technologies required to foster industrialisation. For 
‘late-comer’ countries, the government takes the lead by adopting an interventionist 
strategy to initiate technological development. Chapter 2 thus explores the historical 
experience of major industrialising countries/regions, identifying their respective 
macro-level technology strategies. Western, Soviet, African and Asian technology 
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politico-economic planning frameworks are examined to provide the broad context for a 
detailed evaluation of the sources of technology acquisition.  
  
Stage III, the final stage of the development cycle, concerns the role of government in 
implementing policies designed to accelerate industrialisation through the promotion of 
strategic industries. Of relevance here is the process of technological upgrading, 
examined by reference to Asia’s ‘flying Geese’ model. 3  In this regard, ‘lead’ or 
‘strategic’ sectors will be defined and the role of ‘dual-use’ technologies in 
industrialisation evaluated. Discussion will focus on technology access in the modern 
era, However, foreign investment involves costs as well as benefits. Thus, to close 
discussion in this second stage of the development cycle, a critical analysis of the costs 
and benefits of FDI is undertaken. 
2.2 Development Planning: The initial Development Push 
Development planning is today a necessary precursor to the development of 
underdeveloped economies. Government has an important role to play in this process, 
irrespective of the politico-economic model countries pursue. Government normally 
adopts an interventionist strategy, directing resources according to some pre-determined 
plan. This might focus development on strategies such as import-substitution or export 
promotion, balanced or unbalanced growth and consumer goods-led or capital goods-led 
models to transit from agricultural to industrial economies. Although the development 
literature recognises these different approaches, the policy impact is weakened because 
the writings have been customised by Anglo-Saxon economists to replicate the 
conditions in the advanced countries. This is obviously inappropriate for the poorer 
countries, and was long ago recognized as such by Dudley Seers, who argued 
that …“the economics of development must have more direct relevance to the problems 
of the less developed countries.”4 To overcome this theoretical and policy remoteness, 
both modification and extension of traditional western economic theory is required. This 
does not mean that traditional theory has no value, but simply that it is necessary to 
modify conventional economic theory. It is clearly important to take account of 
particular circumstances that alter the institutional framework and cause behavioural 
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relationships to differ in the poorer countries from what they would be in the more 
advanced economies.5 
2.2.1 Development ‘Stage’ Models 
As a means of tailoring theory to the unique challenges faced by developing economies, 
academics have mused over the transition process, from poor to rich, in terms of a uni-
directional pattern of stages. Adam Smith, was perhaps the first writer to classify the 
stage-process, referring to the development sequence of hunting, pastoral, agricultural, 
commercial, and manufacturing stages.6  Karl Marx progressed this thinking, arguably 
in a more radical way, to examine the stages of Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Communism.7 Of course, critical to the Marxian framework is the crisis of Capitalism, 
whereby the proletariat overpower the Capitalist class and take ownership of the means 
of production. Marxists argue that autarchy under the command economy model can be 
legitimised, because the government is the people and the people is the government. 
 
At the other end of the politico-economic spectrum is Rostow’s 1959 stage model.8 
Rostow attempted, heroically, to generalise the ‘sweep of modern economic history’ in 
a set of five stages of growth,9 as illustrated in Figure 2.1. These stages are designated 
as follows: traditional society; pre-conditions for take-off; take-off; the drive to maturity; 
and the age of mass-consumption. 10  For Rostow, the ‘take-off’ into self-sustaining 
growth was the pivotal factor in his schema.  He defined take-off as …  
“a decisive transition in a society’s history…[a period]… when the scale of 
productive economic activity reaches a critical level and produces changes 
which lead to a massive and progressive structural transformation in economies 
and the societies of which they are a part, better viewed as change in kind than 
merely in degree.”11 
 
For take-off to occur, Rostow argued that three conditions must be fulfilled: 
• The rate of productive investment must rise to at least 10 percent of national 
income 
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• Development with a high rate of growth must occur in one or more of the 
substantial manufacturing sectors 
• Political, social and institutional frameworks must be put in place to ensure that 
economic growth has an on-going character.12 
 
Figure 2.1:   Rostow’s Stage Model 
 
Source: Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.  
 
Rostow’s thesis generated considerable debate, activating a broader discussion as to the 
value of identifying ‘stages’ in the development process. Kuznets, for example, 
criticised the uni-directional, non-cyclic, development process, whereby a stage 
materialises, runs its course, and never recurs.13 Thus, even in the process of devolution 
and decline, the return to a level experienced previously is first viewed as a recurrence 
of the earlier stage. The critical issue asked by Kuznets is how such a simple design can 
be a summary description or analytical classification of a vast and diverse field of 
historical change.14 For instance, Marx’s analysis of the ‘March of history’ appears rigid 
and arbitrary, generalising Britain’s take-off to the development experience of all 
countries. 15  Similar criticisms can be applied to Rostow’s thesis, particularly the 
linearity and generalisability of the stage-sequencing. Stages may be skipped, though 
this may be difficult to establish and sequencing may be blurred.16 The problem is that 
stages are not mutually exclusive and the characteristics of earlier stages may become 
mixed with those of later stages. However, notwithstanding these criticisms, the 
Time 
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writings of Smith, Marx and Rostow have helped focus analysis on four important 
development attributes: the dynamics of production; the ‘strategic’ issues constituting 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the transition of economies from 
one stage to the next; the role of government in creating institutional frameworks; and, 
finally, the significance attached to ‘lead’ manufacturing sectors. Manufacturing was 
recognized as the zenith of development by all stage theorists. For Smith, manufacturing 
is the final stage. Equally, Marx viewed it as the defining moment, representing the 
transitional stage where ownership of capital becomes divorced from its use. Finally, for 
Rostow, the development of manufacturing capacity is the mechanism for achieving 
successful economic take-off. However, although manufacturing is a lead sector, there 
is uncertainty as to whether some industries within the broader area of manufacturing 
are more ‘strategic’ (possessing greater economic centrifugal forces) than others. 
 
Rostow’s focus on the ultimate goal of promoting manufacturing development is closely 
aligned to two further separate schools of development; one favouring balanced 
industrialisation and the other favouring an unbalanced approach. Balanced growth runs 
counter to Rostow’s model, because the latter emphasises targeting investment on lead 
sectors rather than a broad-based investment strategy. By contrast, proponents of 
balanced growth advocate that investment decisions are mutually reinforcing and that, 
as the classical economist Jean Baptise Say once argued … “supply creates its own 
demand.” 17  Such arguments have an intuitive appeal, particularly during the initial 
phase of industrial development. Moreover, the logic of balancing investment across a 
number of different industries is self-evident. Judicious capital injections ensure that the 
capital-labour ratio is increased, enhancing worker productivity. Also, importantly, 
these workers become each other’s customers. In this way, a pattern of mutually 
supporting investment in different lines of production can enlarge the size of the market 
and help to fill the vacuum in the domestic economy of low productivity and low 
income activities. 
 
Compared to balanced growth theory, Rostow’s model represents an entirely contrary 
approach to industrialisation in the sense that a single industry, or limited cluster of key 
industries, is the source from which an initial acceleration of income and investment 
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radiates across the economy. Such lead sectors often have three pathways of impact 
(linkages) on the local economy: forward, lateral and backward. As discussed later in 
this chapter, the nature of the lead sector and the impetus provided to the emergence of 
supplier industries is a key determinant not just for economic take-off but also for self-
sustaining development. 
 
Rostow’s notion of forward, lateral and backward linkages and the role of ‘leading 
sectors’ resonates with the views of the unbalanced growth theorists. Central amongst 
these is Hirschman.18 His view is unequivocal that investment must concentrate on 
those industries most conducive to transforming the economy to a higher stage. 
Hirschman maintains that this is preferable to dissipating scarce investment funds by 
attempting to advance on all fronts at the same time.19 This is highlighted by Wilber’s 
metaphor … “to be breathlessly climbing a peak in a mountain range is…more 
important than standing poised on the crest of a ridge in the foothills.”20 Pre-dating the 
work of Rostow, Hirschman documented the important external economies that would 
be generated by a country investing in those industries exhibiting high linkage effects. 
He laid emphasis on two of the three types of linkage: (i) the ‘input’ provision or 
backward linkages, and (ii) the ‘output’ utilisation or forward linkages. 21  From a 
development perspective, Hirschman argued that backward linkages have the greater 
stimulative effects. The advantage of an industry with high backward linkages relates to 
the part it plays as an inducement mechanism to the development of a feeder-network of 
ancillary industries. If the expansion of a particular industry leads to a general increase 
in economic activity, embracing a considerable number of subsidiary and basic 
industries, then it must be classified as a key industry, meriting a high development 
priority.22 
 
Hirschman’s interpretation of leading sectors not only emphasises the importance of 
triggering a quantitative demand response from supplier industries (backward linkages) 
but also highlights the lead sector’s role in cultivating new techniques and technologies. 
Lead sectors are therefore likely to be modern, innovative and knowledge-intensive 
industries. Technological diffusion and development are likely to become more 
powerful forces, as the economy’s absorptive capacity improves. The important role of 
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capital accumulation and technology in both the Rostow and Hirschman ‘lead sector’ 
approach is encapsulated in the development of the Harrod-Domar growth model.23  
2.2.2 Harrod-Domar growth model 
At the heart of the Harrod-Domar model is a simple but powerful equation. It seeks to 
explain the growth process as: 
OC
SGDP
/
=Δ  
Where: GDPΔ  represents a change in national income 
  S is the savings-income ratio 
C/O is the capital-output ratio 
The variables in the Harrod-Domar growth model show that economic growth ( GDPΔ ) 
is dependent on a: 
• Rise in the savings-income ratio, providing the financial resources for quantitative 
and/or qualitative increases in capital investment; and/or a 
• Decline in the capital-output ratio, indicating a reduction in the amount of capital 
investment required to produce one unit of output. 
 
The Harrod-Domar model is thus important in defining the basic condition for 
developing countries to actualise economic growth. For growth to occur, capital is a 
necessary but not sufficient ingredient. Also important is the imperative to use capital 
efficiently, an important attribute of the ‘leading sector’ thesis.24 By definition, lead 
sectors have a strategic role to play in the growth and development of the host economy. 
Hence, improvements in the product and process technologies in such industries will 
have a significant impact on the pace of upstream and downstream industrial and 
technological development. Arguably, then, the technological strength of lead (or 
strategic or pillar) sectors can play an important role in initiating and sustaining 
economic take-off. Technology planning models have been conceptualised to explore 
the important contribution that high technology lead sectors can make in the 
industrialisation process. As discussed below in section 2.3, these models emphasize the 
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strategic significance of lead industrial sectors, both at a point in time and by 
geographical context. 
2.3 Technology Planning for Appropriate Technological 
Acquisition 
Developing countries seek to diversify their economies away from dependence on 
agriculture. The creation of Five-Year Plans provides the policy approach for 
investment into pre-determined industrial sectors. The aspiration is to evolve a dynamic 
comparative advantage that brings the advantages of high growth, skill-generation and 
robust export performance, as well as other economic benefits absent in agricultural 
production. 
 
However, transition from agricultural specialisation towards industrialisation requires 
technology planning, a vital stage in the search for indigenous capability. Traditionally, 
the principal sector in an industrial economy is manufacturing and this is unlikely to 
develop without access to technology. To drive the initial industrial push, ‘hard’ 
technology (physical capital, such as machinery) will need to be imported from the 
advanced countries to facilitate local production. Yet, this is just a first step. To secure 
progress towards industrial and technological self-reliance; that is, industrial 
indigenisation, it is essential that ‘soft’ technology (investment into human capital, such 
as the development of research and design capacity) also be created in-country. 
Technology planning aims to identify the strategic frameworks and technology 
acquisition and implementation options for progressing technological development. 
 
Surprisingly the role of technology in development has only recently attracted 
theoretical attention. Classical economists, such as Smith and Ricardo, did not recognize 
the importance of technology in their theoretical models.25 For both, the key issues were 
labour productivity, economic specialisation, and the existence of ‘free’ markets. At the 
international level, Ricardo developed Smith’s theory of absolute advantage to examine 
what he termed comparative advantage.26 Ricardo advocated an international division of 
labour, based on the comparative advantage of production and measured according to 
relative labour productivities. Capital was held to be immobile, constrained to the host 
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economy. Ricardo argued that if international trade operated according to his 
comparative advantage theory, then, compared to the pursuit of self-sufficiency, 
national output would be maximised. Thus, if all countries produced and exported on 
the basis of their comparative advantage, global welfare would be maximised. 
 
Two points need to be noted in relation to the classical comparative advantage theory. 
Firstly, the theory indicates that international specialisation should occur with the much 
later 1950’s Heckscher-Ohlin model, arguing that the pattern of trade should reflect 
factor proportions. 27  Accordingly, a capital-abundant country will export capital-
intensive goods, while a labour-abundant country will export labour-intensive goods. 
The critical assumption in this model is that the two countries are identical, except for 
the difference in resource endowments. This is also implies that the aggregate 
preferences are the same. The relative abundance of capital will cause the capital-
abundant country to produce capital-goods cheaper than the labour-abundant country, 
and vice versa. The second point in relation to comparative advantage theory is that it is 
static in nature, reflecting the given specialisation of particular countries. It implies, for 
instance that 1950’s Singapore ought to have specialised in rice production, trading with, 
say, Europe for manufactured goods. This, of course, would have been unacceptable to 
Singapore. Indeed, all governments seek to evolve a ‘dynamic’ comparative advantage 
through import-substituting industrialisation. Whether this specialisation is biased 
towards consumer-goods or capital-goods industrialisation is unimportant. What is 
important is that government makes a conscious policy-decision to diversify its 
economy away from dependence on cash crops and instead seek development through 
an emphasis on manufacturing. 
 
Yet, manufacturing requires access to technology. At its most basic level, this means 
access to blue-prints, designs, products, machinery and related ‘technology’, such as 
production organisation. Without technology, industrialisation would have been still-
born. For instance, without James Watt’s steam engine there would have been no 
industrial revolution,28 without aircraft and aviation systems there would have been a 
constrained aviation revolution. From even this cursory review of industrial history, it is 
apparent that lead sectors may change, dependent upon the industrial epoch and also 
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perhaps the country/regional context. The constant theme, though, is that lead sectors 
expand and/or improve the efficiency of the production base. Under this definition, the 
development and production of contemporary airliners are high technology operations 
and thus, at the heart of the industrialisation process.29 However, as discussed in chapter 
1, aircraft production is arguably the modern-day equivalent of the Industrial 
Revolution’s machine tool sector. 
 
Academics have conceptualised strategic frameworks to understand the development 
process in the emergence of lead sectors. These technology planning frameworks 
highlight the centrality of machinery to catapult development to a higher stage. The 
starting point is the ‘western’ model, focusing on the evolution of machine tool 
production in western countries. Professor Nathan Rosenberg, in particular, has written 
extensively on the contribution that machine tool manufacturers have made, and 
continue to make, in promoting competitiveness, innovation and the development of a 
‘machino-facturing’ economy.30 
2.3.1 Western Technology Planning Model 
A good reference point for the western model is the world’s first industrial revolution, 
which occurred in Great Britain from around 1760 onwards. Figure 2.2 below, charts 
the distinguishing characteristics of this model. However, whilst innovation and 
machinery production were at the heart of the industrial revolution, the origins of the 
transformation process lie at least one hundred years further back in time. Basic 
manufactures, such as textiles, were produced without power on simple wooden looms. 
Workers gathered together in ’factories’ and, significantly, all production improvements 
were undertaken by shop floor operatives. These workers were close to the production 
process; they could identify innovational opportunities and had the skills to apply. The 
factories, as such, were vertically integrated, principally because no specialist 
subcontractors existed during the middle ages. Factory workers, then, had no choice but 
to engineer process improvements themselves. 
 
As Britain’s manufacturing activities expanded, particularly with the onset of the 
industrial revolution, sufficient demand was created to sponsor the development of 
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subcontractors. Although outputs of the increasingly diverse 1st-tier manufacturers were 
different, the underlying vertical production processes were the same. This presses, 
Figure 2.2:   Western Technology Model 
Source: author 
 
railway equipment and armaments, all required similar industrial inputs, such as  
castings, forgings, and of course machine tools to cut and shape metal. As a 
consequence, sufficient demand was created for the birth of specialist subcontracting 
networks: ‘make-or-buy’ decision-making or the 18th century equivalent of 
‘outsourcing’ thus began to make its debut in Britain. Rosenberg termed this process, 
vertical disintegration, caused by technological convergence of the underlying vertical 
processes of production.31 
 
Machinery was the lead sector in Britain’s early industrialisation, characterised by a 
factor endowment of capital abundancy and labour scarcity. Customers would work 
with machine producers to determine machinery design. This process of consumer 
sovereignty led inherently to costly one-off or batch production. These production 
features equated to a capitalist, market-driven approach to engineering development. 
The search for profit meant that the market was highly competitive providing the basis 
for technological innovation. However, a major disadvantage of this early ‘Western 
model’ was that it was capital-using. It was also an evolutionary model, in that it 
required a considerable elapse of time before a specialist network of subcontractors 
would evolve. Once this occurred, though, the economy would likely be mature and 
innovative, possessing a highly diversified manufacturing base. 
Defining characteristics 
• Consumer sovereignty  
• One-off/batch 
production 
• Technological 
convergence 
• Vertical disintegration 
Development goal 
• Capitalist  
• market-driven 
• Capital-using 
• Technological 
innovation 
• Profit maximization 
Evolutionary process 
Transformation process 
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2.3.2 Soviet Technology Planning Paradigm 
The opposite conceptual approach to the western model was the 1930’s Soviet 
technology planning paradigm. As with Britain’s earlier industrialisation-push, the 
Soviet Union designated machine building as a lead sector. The country was a fledgling 
Communist state. It had effectively a ‘closed’ economy, with a scarcity of foreign 
exchange. The Soviet economy was also big, possessing abundant labour, but little 
capital. These factor conditions obliged Soviet planners to design their initial Five-Year 
Plans such that rapid industrialisation could be effected without recourse to substantial 
capital funds. 
 
Machine tool production was targeted as a lead strategic industry. It was believed that 
planning the development of an indigenous machine tool sector would enable the Soviet 
Union to capture the following industrial benefits: 
• Substantial increases in machinery output from an expansion of the underlying 
‘means of production’ 
• Creation of a local production capacity enabling planners the opportunity to design 
machine tools appropriate to factor conditions 
• As machine tool industry represents the ‘mother’ industry from which all 
engineering artefacts derive, either directly or indirectly (through second-generation 
machinery), an efficient machine tool sector allows enhancement of downstream 
investment opportunities through both lower cost and higher performance machine 
tool products.32 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the key attributes of the Soviet technology planning paradigm.33 The 
strategy required planners to direct capital resources to the construction of pre-
determined machine tool factories. Particular factories would specialise in the 
production of only one machine tool type, eg lathes. Different lathe models, reflecting 
different sizes, could then be produced in just one factory, but, as far as possible, the 
components and sub-assemblies would be standardardised. This twin focus on 
specialisation and standardisation allowed economies of scale to be achieved. 
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Figure 2.3:   Soviet Technology Planning Paradigm  
 
Source: author 
 
The defining characteristics of the Soviet planning paradigm highlights the important 
role of central planning to guide resources towards what were deemed to be 
development priorities. Production organisation of the strategically important machine 
tool producing factories, servicing the entire Soviet economy, was planned so as to 
exploit opportunities for cost minimisation. Product design represented adapted copies 
of existing, proven, machine tool products already in production in Western countries, 
By contrast, the Soviet Union’s process technologies were expensive process machines 
that were imported in limited numbers, solely for installation in the machine tool 
manufacturing factories. Hence, appropriate (labour-intensive) tool products would be 
produced in a cost effective (capital-intensive) way, exploiting the opportunities of 
economies of scale.34 
 
The Soviet technology planning paradigm has merit for big countries embarking on 
industrialisation, like India and China, with abundant labour but limited capital 
resources. 35  Most importantly, the approach emphasizes capital-saving. However, a 
major disadvantage for the former Soviet Union was that no market existed, because all 
resources were allocated by the planning authorities. In a Communist state, with an 
absence of profit, there is thus no incentive for firms to seek competitive edge. Without 
competition, there is unlikely to be innovation. The lack of innovation, moreover, will 
be reinforced by the absence of specialist, innovative, supplier networks. The speed 
with which the Soviet planners pursued industrialisation meant that there was 
insufficient time for subcontractors to evolve. Thus, the Soviet technology planning 
Transformation process Defining characteristics 
• Producer sovereignty  
• Specialisation 
• Standardisation 
• Scale 
Development goal 
• Command Economy  
• Scientific plan 
• Technological adaption
• Capital saving 
Revolutionary process 
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paradigm is a ‘revolutionary’ model, emphasising scale economies rather than 
competitiveness and innovation. 
2.3.3 African Technology Planning Model 
Figure 2.4 depicts a further conceptual framework, this time focused on the planning 
required to promote African technological capacity. The regional context here is black 
sub-Saharan Africa, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognising in 1980 
that something urgent was required to initiate economic take-off.36 The OAU Heads of 
State agreed on what came to be known as the Monrovia Strategy (after the country 
where the OAU conference was located), representing a coordinated approach to Africa 
reducing its dependence on external supply of foreign technology. The Monrovia 
strategy sought to achieve this goal by developing machinery production as a lead sector. 
In this respect, machine tools were viewed as the vehicle for the industrialisation-push.  
Figure 2.4:   African Technology Planning Model 
Source: author 
 
The machine tool output would be appropriate technology, with designs coming from 
‘South-South’ collaboration. Turnkey plants were established in Nigeria (servicing the 
needs of West Africa) and Tanzania (servicing the needs of East Africa). Through both 
import tariffs on foreign tools and the promotion of regional African markets, the 
minimum critical mass of demand for machine tools would be created to justify local 
machinery production. Over time, demand would ‘trickle-down’ to encourage the start-
up of small and medium size enterprise (SMEs). 
 
Transformation process Defining characteristics 
• Producer sovereignty  
• Market enlargement 
• Appropriate 
Technology 
• Promotion of Scale 
• Technology-pull 
Development goal 
• Supranational strategy 
• ‘South-South’ 
collaboration 
• Economic ‘take-off’
Involutionary process  
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Africa’s Monrovia strategy was an attempt to transform the economically moribund 
Sub-Saharan economies through the establishment of designated strategic industries as 
lead sectors. The strategy emphasised cost reduction through the production of labour-
intensive, standard and simple, agri-mechanical machinery. Scale was to be achieved 
though enlargement of national markets enforced by tariffs imposition on Western 
machinery imports. This was done via an import substitution policy on a continental 
scale. The Monrovia Technology Planning Framework was a supranational attempt to 
push Africa’s economies down the runway towards take-off. It was ‘involutionary’ in 
the sense that it sought African states to look inwards within the continent for a solution 
to the technological dependence on foreign technology supply. The model appeared to 
be working during the early 1980s but its long-term focus on technological self-reliance 
was overtaken by the short-term needs of survival, as a severe sub-Saharan drought 
began to bite in 1984. Attention and resources were thus diverted to coping with the 
effects of the drought, and since that time Africa’s technology policy has languished. 
2.3.4 Asia’s ‘Tiger’ Technology Planning Model 
The final conceptualised technology planning model to be considered has regard to what 
might be called Asia’s ‘Tiger’ framework. The Tiger metaphor was originally applied to 
the small Asian states of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, all of which 
developed modern, high-growth, economies through the 1960-80s. Moreover, from the 
latter part of this period, the People’s Republic of China could legitimately be added to 
this list.37 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, the Tiger economies planned a rapid economic 
transformation through the adoption of a ‘hybridisation’ approach to industrial and 
technological development. Essentially, these Tiger economies abstracted appropriate 
elements of the Western and Soviet technology models, adapting them to a planning 
approach appropriate to the economic circumstances faced by the post-WWII newly 
emerging Asian States. Scale was sought through aggressive export promotion. Long 
production runs allowed unit cost reductions to be achieved. Price-driven 
competitiveness in export markets was combined with parallel improvements in product 
quality. Innovation imperatives were fostered at both the corporate and governmental 
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levels; the latter reflected the fact that government in all the ‘Tiger’ states was, and 
continues to be, interventionist, providing institutional support for R&D as well as 
incentives for the protection and promotion of designated ‘infant’ industries. 
 
In the development of lead sectors, Asia’s ‘Tiger’ technology planning model 
emphasised the promotion of strategic industries producing critical technologies. 
Figure 2.5:   Asia’s ‘Tiger’ Technology Planning Model 
 
Source: author 
 
However, an important distinguishing characteristic of this model, compared to those 
described earlier was, and is, the heavy reliance on FDI in the pursuit of self-sufficiency. 
Given the small size of their economies, achievement of this latter policy-goal for most 
of the Tiger states was probably beyond their reach. Self-sufficiency nevertheless 
remains a cultural and institutional policy tenant. For China, in particular, self-
sufficiency, reflected in the drive towards indigenous industrialisation, is not only a 
policy ambition, but unlike the other Tiger states, is also probably achievable. For China, 
FDI was the principal vehicle for inward transfer of the enabling technologies required 
for economic transformation. As with most other latecomers to industrialisation the 
planning goal is non-dependent industrial and technological development; that is, 
indigenous industrialisation.  
Transformation process Defining characteristics 
• Scale 
• FDI-led development 
• Export biased 
• Technology-pull  
      and -push 
Development goal 
• Corporate and 
government strategy 
• Technological 
innovation, not 
invention 
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2.4 Technology Development through ‘Strategic’ Industrialisation 
Technology development is the third phase of the cycle towards achieving self-
sustaining industrial and technological take-off. It represents the practical culmination 
of the earlier planning phases, contextualising development according to the growing 
maturity and diversity of the local manufacturing base. The technology development 
phase focuses on the promotion of ‘champion’, ‘backbone’ or ‘strategic’ industries in 
the ‘latecomer’ industrialising economies, such as Malaysia, South Korea and China. 
Technology development is the final phase towards indigenisation of production activity; 
the closing stage of technology transition. Planning for technology acquisition is a 
fundamental part of the industrialisation process. Why ‘reinvent the wheel’ when 
technology can be transferred from the advanced economies.  
 
Technology transfer can be defined as the diffusion and adaptation of new technology, 
equipment, practices and know-how.38  This definition of technology transfer seems 
straight forward, but the process is complicated. Successful technology transfer needs 
attention to the following aspects of affordability, accessibility, sustainability, relevance 
and acceptability.39 Multinational Companies (MNCs), in particular, have a number of 
options for technology transfer.  These include contractual arrangements, such as 
technology licensing agreements, joint ventures, technical assistance, turnkey projects 
and direct foreign investment in wholly-owned subsidiaries or affiliates. Transfers also 
occur, for example, through the education of students abroad and through trade in 
capital goods between unrelated parties. Technology transfer can be understood as the 
process by which technology moves from one physical or geographical location to 
another for the purposes of application towards an end product.40  Transfer can take 
place either domestically from one sector to another or from one country to another 
conveying the required knowledge, experiences and skills. 
 
Technology transfer may comprise some or all of the following: fabricated materials 
and capital goods such as machines, instruments, equipment and associated technology 
(including as design and execution works); preparation of feasibility studies for projects, 
including technological experience; and skills, comprising knowledge relating to 
production, patents, documents, drawings, operation programmes, maintenance 
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instructions, training and education activities. 41   Figure 2.6 identifies technology 
transfer as a ‘progressive’ process. A technology, chosen, installed and operated by 
others not performing an active role in such operations, may nevertheless involve 
technology transfer via the transfer of: 
• Capital goods and engineering management and administrative services 
• Operation and maintenance skills 
• Technological knowledge and experience to acquire new and productive 
capabilities through local manpower acquiring the knowledge and ability to 
produce ongoing technological change.42 
 
Figure 2.6:   Development Stages in Technology Transfer 
 
Source:  Abdulrahman Al Ankari, Technology Transfer: a Case Study Analysis of the Saudi Oil and  
              Petrochemical Sectors. Cranfield University (2004), PhD thesis 
 
The two principal motives for a country to promote inward technology transfer are the 
creation of: 
Investment capacity: the capacity to establish new production units and to expand 
existing ones 
Innovation capacity: the ability to develop new techniques to achieve certain 
objectives. 
 
However, the importation of technology does not lead automatically to local 
technological development. For this to happen, local workers must take part in the 
process by trying to understand the technology, identify how it works and adapt the 
scientific and practical methods associated with its uses. Thus local firms must be able 
to improve productivity and adapt the technology to the changing conditions. Gill 
Wilkins, for example, notes that technology transfer should assist local workers in 
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developing the skills to choose appropriate technology, adapting the technology to local 
conditions and service requirements, and integrating it with existing indigenous 
technology.43  
 
Productive capacity influences investment and innovation capacity. For example, 
production engineers might acquire engineering manufacturing experience. In addition, 
they might also acquire the ability to adapt the technology through knowledge gained in 
the maintenance of machinery and the resolution of production bottlenecks. However, 
this capability is usually not enough to acquire the ability to design new production 
units or invent new technology. Such experience is acquired in specialised scientific and 
technological institutions and machinery and equipment plants. Moreover, the 
expansion of local productive capacity in a particular field will lead to the development 
of other sectors and industries, possibly resulting in the establishment of specialised 
institutions for the transfer and development of technology. 
 
Technology can be transferred through international organisations between two or more 
countries. Transfer can be performed in a commercial or non-commercial exchange 
between the private and public sectors. The channels include licensing, direct foreign 
investment, commodity reciprocity and strategic alliances. Likewise, technology 
transfer can be performed within the company or through mutual transfers between 
companies and government. Transfer mechanisms are diverse due to the fact that 
technology is not merchandise to be sold and purchased in the market. Technology 
comprises a mixture of material and conceptual elements that cannot be separated. 
Several mechanisms exist for transferring technology, namely: 
• Foreign investment 
• Technical cooperation agreements 
• Economic offset programmes 
• Licensing agreements 
• International subcontracting 
• Joint ventures 
• Research and development cooperation.44 
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According to Jose de Cubas, the foreign investment package, in most circumstances, is 
the most effective and cheapest way for technology to be transferred. 45  Foreign 
investment, by definition, implies ownership of capital by the foreign firm and the 
power to exercise control over operations of the entity in which such investment takes 
place. It is different from portfolio investment, as the latter involves only the acquisition 
of foreign securities by individuals or institutions without any control over, or 
participation in, management of the companies concerned. The most clear-cut case of 
foreign investment occurs when a firm sets up wholly-owned subsidiaries or affiliates 
abroad, where the operating control and usually the majority ownership of capital rests 
in the hands of the foreign firm. These subsidiaries may be established by the take-over 
of existing local firms or they may take the form of new green field ventures. These 
subsidiaries need not be wholly foreign-owned. Foreign direct investment may involve a 
joint venture agreement where a foreign-based firm has a majority share, an equal share, 
or even a minority share, in the ownership of the enterprise abroad. The important 
defining requirement of FDI, though, as noted earlier, is that the foreign company has 
operating control. 
2.4.1 FDI: Vehicle for Technology Transfer 
Due to increased international recognition of the benefits of free trade and capital 
mobility, not least because of expanded WTO membership, FDI has accelerated in 
recent years. In China, for instance, FDI surged from US$5.5 billion in 1990 to 74.8 
billion in 2007 (see Figure 2.7).46 MNCs are the dominant source of FDI and hence the 
principal vehicle for technology transfer. The growing size and power of MNCs means 
that they dominate world trade: the annual sales of the six biggest MNCs are only 
exceeded by the GDP of 21 states; MNC total sales amounts to two-thirds of global 
trade; and, remarkably, around 40 percent of world trade occurs ‘within’ MNCs.47 One 
way of viewing a multinational enterprise is as an economic institution that owns (in 
whole or in part), controls and manages income-generating assets in more than one 
country. In doing so, it engages in international production as a by-product of the 
imperfections in goods and factor markets across the globe. In a perfect market, no 
advantages can accrue to the MNC enterprises.  However, in reality, MNCs possess 
some advantages enabling them to produce and compete successfully in an unfamiliar 
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Figure 2.7:   China's Total Actually Utilized Foreign Capital in the Past  
        Three-Decades  
 
Source:  ‘Invest in China’ downloaded from  
 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/News/Focus/Subject/wzzgxe/wzfzjj/t20081204_99879.htm 
(19, April, 2009) 
 
foreign environment. Theorists, 48  have suggested numerous ownership-specific 
advantages49 deriving from possession of technology and marketing skills, as well as 
location-specific factors 50  like trade barriers and host government policies. Several 
authors have noted the different kinds of enterprises and associated forms of foreign 
investment. 51  For example, Caves 52  grouped foreign investment into the following 
categories: 
• Horizontally integrated enterprises: these are multi-plant firms that have 
established plants in different countries to produce the same or similar goods. 
Teece noted that the horizontal kind of investment directed at producing goods 
and services abroad, constitutes a significant portion of the world’s stock of 
investment. 53  Horizontal enterprises internalise markets for intangible assets 
(covering the knowledge that represents new products, processes, proprietary 
technology and the like). The reasons behind such investments may include the 
possession of an intangible asset such as technology, which the multinational 
firm can extract maximum rent through foreign production rather than licensing 
technology to a foreign producer. 
• Vertically integrated enterprises: These are international multi-plant 
enterprises, producing outputs in some plants and supplying inputs to other 
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plants. By comparison to best practise, MNCs operating in developing country 
environments may be obliged to pursue vertical integration as an efficient 
method of achieving supply reliability of intermediate products. 
 
The effectiveness of FDI as a mechanism for technology transfer and by implication, its 
role in the development process, has long attracted attention. For instance, Lewis and 
Caves have argued that the benefits of FDI include the generation of exports and foreign 
exchange, tax revenues, employment, accumulated capital and entrepreneurial skills.54 
Transferred technology can also provide wider benefits to the recipient countries. The 
OECD endorses the positive view of the role that FDI can play in economic 
development.55Supporting this view, the UNCTAD secretariat estimates that from 1991-
1996, only 27 of almost 600 changes in host country FDI policies were in the direction 
of greater restrictiveness.56 Exposure to a more open domestic market resulting from 
FDI is a source of competitive strength and exposure to international trade is a powerful 
stimulus to efficiency. 57  Moreover, the market power of MNCs allows them to 
overcome many of the economic obstacles associated with government. For instance, it 
is argued that MNCs enjoy benefits from the lack of bureaucracy, the ability to bypass 
protocol, the need to accelerate decision-making processes and, overall, a more 
comprehensive access to global markets and supply networks.58 
 
FDI provides numerous economic benefits to the recipient economy, but as Table 2.1 
shows, there are also negatives associated with foreign investment. There have long 
been criticisms of MNCs, in the way that they allegedly exploit the workers of recipient  
Table 2.1: FDI Cost-Benefit Analysis from the Recipient-Country Perspective 
FDI Benefits FDI Costs 
• Acquisition of jobs and 
engineering, management, 
marketing and R&D skills 59 
• Creation of local supplier 
capacity, including jobs and skills 
• Improvement of operational 
efficiency  
• Potential for technology spill-
overs, including skill and 
• Suppression of local supply 64 
• Increased dependence on foreign 
companies (loss of national 
sovereignty) 
• Exploitation of labour through 
continuance of low wage payment 
• Government inducements and 
incentives to persuade MNCs to 
locate65 
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innovation transfer 60 
• Source of scarce capital 
• Capture of new local and foreign 
markets 
• Long production runs combined 
with low unit cost through scale61 
• Exploitation of local natural 
resources 
• Development of domestic  
infrastructure 
• Creation of advanced logistical 
networks62 
• Contribution to balance of 
payments surpluses through both 
export promotion and import 
substitution 
• Evolvement of dynamic 
comparative advantages 
• Knowledge transfer 
• Nurturing of ‘synergistic’ 
technology clusters63 
•  Reduction of bureaucratic 
obstacles 
• Dominant impact of MNCs on the 
local economy66 
• Cultural problems in JV FDI67 
• Potential inflationary effects 
• Low value added production 
(assembly operations) 
• Weak promotion of local supply 
chains 
• Dependence on foreign- sourced 
management and R&D 
• Limited design capability 
• Transfer price problem, 
particularly loss of local tax 
revenue68 
• FDI creates jobs, but perhaps not 
the right jobs 
• Negative environmental impacts69 
• Potential to suppress trade union 
representation 
Source: author 
 
economies, by paying low wages, with limited provision for social overhead capital.70 
Production concentrates on low value-added activities, local sub-contracting activity is 
suppressed and cultural clashes are endemic as MNCs impose their corporate practices 
on an alien local business environment.71 At the macro-level, the recipient economy 
faces the potential danger of losing corporation tax revenue through MNC transfer 
pricing policies, with the likelihood that low interest rates to attract FDI will lead to 
inflation.72 Indeed, Stiglitz argues that whilst low interest rates in the recipient economy 
may attract FDI, leading to higher growth, ultimately, local development may be 
restricted through what he terms the ‘Dutch Disease’. 73  This refers to the Dutch 
experience of natural gas finds in the North Sea, leading to increased demand and the 
strengthening of the Gilder, with exports becoming increasingly uncompetitive.74 
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A major policy question surrounding FDI is whether or not it actually promotes the 
transfer of technology, capital, and management to the host country?  This question 
turns on the effect of firm-entry on technological capabilities.  Even if enterprises 
transfer the best production technology, they do not necessarily transfer the capability to 
generate future technology.  In some cases, they transfer ‘know-how’ (production 
engineering) but not ‘know-why’ (basic design, research and development). Local 
companies that are subsidiaries of foreign companies depend on the flow of technology 
as developed by the central organisation’s research and development activities. 
Research and development activities performed by the subsidiary companies are often 
extremely limited, if not absent.75 Local Research and development provision reflects 
limited adaptation of products to suit domestic conditions, often only including supply, 
maintenance and training.76 
2.4.2 Seven Stages of Technology Development 
A widely used development model for explaining the Tiger States path towards 
industrial and technological development is the ‘flying geese’ model. The analogy of 
the flight pattern of geese reflects the fact that Asian states, as late-comers to 
industrialisation, defer to Japan as the region’s technological leader. The process is thus 
one of a ‘path’ of Asian countries following and always trying to catch-up with the 
technologically dynamic Japan. The economic rise and fall of states is seen as a process 
that is tightly linked to the emergence, maturation and decline of particular industrial 
sectors. The ‘Flying Geese’ model posits that the diffusion of new products and 
technologies begins with their import into the less industrialised countries. Capital 
goods imports follow, and global ‘homogenous’ industries are established. In the final 
phase, the industrialising countries develop their own capital goods industries and an 
export capability is created.  
 
Table 2.2, below, shows the seven principal stages of technology transition within the 
‘Flying Geese’ model that industrialising countries need to pass through.77 The seven 
technological stages are sequential, with competence rising as countries progress 
towards stage seven. Technological leap-frogging, across previous stages is feasible, but 
from stage five onwards, the degree of difficulty in achieving industrial capability, 
increases the higher the stage reached. China, for instance, has implemented 
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development policy to promote oil and petrol-chemical industries, telecommunications, 
automobiles, sophisticated microelectronic chips, advanced electronic industries, as well 
as the development of an incipient commercial aircraft industry. Notably, these strategic 
sectors are referred to as ‘dual-use’ industries, their products having application to both 
Table 2.2: Seven Stages of Technology Transition from the Recipient-Country 
Perspective 
Stage Technological Level Product Type 
1 Light industry at most, low capital Raw materials, handicrafts 
2 Assembly and processing Toys, clothes 
3 Expand to heavy industry, consumer 
electronics 
Televisions, assembled CD players 
4 Increase local content, employ more 
technology-intensive processes, invest in 
brand name development 
Indigenously branded electronics 
with local content 
5 Top-shelf electronics, export of capital 
intensive goods 
Chemicals, autos, high-end 
electronics 
6 Domestic market drives growth, world 
leader in high-tech production (though not 
innovation) 
Korean DRAMs 
7 Innovator at the technology frontier Long-haul commercial aircraft, 
advanced pharmaceuticals 
Source: Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia (RAND, 2003), page 24; 
              modified by Daniel H. Rosen. See http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1719/ 
Note:      China is arguably located between stages 4 and 5, but categorisation will vary from industry to 
industry. 
 
civil and military production. They are industries, therefore, that can be truly described 
as lead sectors, located at the technological frontier of their respective fields of activity. 
 
The Flying Geese model is principally concerned with the role of leading sectors, 
viewing them as determining the development of national economies. This emphasis on 
the leading sectors thesis has also been linked to Raymond Vernon’s 1960’s 
International Product Life Cycle model, see Figure 2.8.78 Vernon postulated that product 
innovation occurs in high-income countries, such as the US, but diffuses over time to 
the poorer countries. As the product and process technologies mature so production cost, 
particularly labour cost, becomes more important. Vernon argued that ultimately the 
Western firm that originated the product innovation abandons production as its 
oligopolistic advantages disappear. The advanced firm willingly dispenses with output 
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because it has cultivated a more advanced replacement product, thus maintaining the 
technology-gap between itself and competitor firms in the industrialising world. 
Vernon’s theory predicts that in the final stage of the international product life-cycle the 
originating firm/country will exit the market, ceasing supply of this ‘old’ technology. 
However, there is a debate as to whether this actually happens, especially with respect 
to the knowledge-intensive products of leading ‘strategic’ sectors.79 The objective of 
closing the ‘technology gap’, particularly for newly emerging countries, such as China, 
thus becomes more challenging. 
 
A constant in the development of all these hi-tech industries is the dependence on FDI. 
Foreign capital and expertise are now viewed by policy-makers as a positive influence, 
providing an inexpensive access to modern technology propelling the local economy 
forwards on a steep Rostow-type ‘flight-path’ of self-sustaining economic growth. 
 
FDI can act as catalyst for indigenous industrialisation, but there are two sets of players 
in the development process, both with differing motives. The first player, the MNC, 
Figure 2.8:   The Product Life-Cycle As An Evolutionary Sequence of  
            MNC Development 
 
Source: P.Dicken, Global Shift - Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy, Sage (2008) p 
114 , 
 
locates close to a growing market, with the intent to exploit low cost labour positions for 
growing regional/global growth, maintaining organisational control, limiting technology 
access, minimising tax payment and maximising profit potential. By contrast, the 
second player, the host economy government, is impatient for the broadening and 
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deepening of technology transfer, the generation of highly skilled labour, increased tax 
revenues, and progressively higher added value investment into the local economy.  
2.4.3 Offsets as a Form of Technology Transfer 
The above review of the role that FDI has played in the ‘planned’ technological 
transformation of China has relevance to all industrial sectors. However, of particular 
relevance to defence and aviation is an important vehicle for technology transfer known 
as offsets. Whilst offsets apply principally to defence and military aviation, it is, as will 
become evident, of increasing significance to commercial aviation development, also. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.9, offsets represent one aspect of what is referred to as 
countertrade. In broad terms, countertrade is concerned with reciprocal trading activities 
that are often characterised by non-monetarised transactions barrier is the most obvious 
form of countertrading activity. Simple barter refers to one-off transaction, where 
money does not change hands. This is not that common in the 21st century, rather it is  
Figure 2.9:   The Evolving Offset Typology 
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(Technology Transfer)
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Source:  Matthews, R, ‘Saudi Arabia: Defense Offsets and Development’, (eds) Brauer, J ard Dunne, l, 
Arming the South, Palgvave (2002) 
 
 70
the slightly more complicated ‘clearing arrangement’ which has found favour amongst  
defence and aviation companies. Here, for instance, shipments of oil will be credited 
against the liabilities incurred for the purchases of multi-billion dollar arms purchases; 
this reflecting the payment system in the British-Saudi Al Yamamah 1988 arms deal. 
Other examples include the Iraqi purchase of Soviet MIG fighters and T-72 main battle 
tanks. The third form of barter is described as switch-trading or ‘swaps’. This exchange 
of money for goods, focuses instead on the need, often, for multiple swaps of goods by 
independent buyers and sellers, in order to finally close an initial deal and secure a 
mutual exchange of wants. A simple swap transaction might involve selling, for 
instance, Rolls-Royce aero-engines to Russia, with payment being made through the 
transfer of credits (via Indian goods) that Russian enjoys with India. Russian payment to 
Rolls-Royce is conducted by ‘swapping’ India’s trade debits with Russia to Rolls-Royce, 
UK, with the payment in the form of Indian goods not cash. 
 
The second major form of countertrade is called counterpurchase. This differs from 
barter, because here, money does form part of the overall transaction. An illustration of 
a typical counterpuchase deal relates to Malaysia’s purchase of British Hawk 
trainer/fighters in the late 1980s. There were two contracts: The first was the primary 
aerospace deal in which Malaysia procured 28 Hawk aircraft, paying for these in hard 
currency; the second, linked, contract had regard to the counterpurchase deal, with 
Malaysia demanding that BAEs (counter) purchase local palm oil and rubber to the 
value of 60 per cent of the primary Hawk aircraft contract price. 
 
Both of the above countertrade deals (barter and counterpurchase) offer short-term 
economic multiplier benefits through the creation of demand in the local market. 
However neither involves technology transfer; this latter aspect is fundamental, 
however, in the final form of countertrade arrangement, termed offsets. Whilst barter 
and counterpurchase are the preserve of the poorer countries seeking to stimulate 
demand for commodities in the local market. Offsets, by contrast, centre on the 
advantages associated with long-term technology transfer. The technologies transferred 
are normally targeted at providing the process capacity for producing defence and/or 
commercial technologies. Offsets are sometimes described as a ‘win-win’ situation in 
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which both parties to the contract benefit: the advanced country contractor gets to make 
the sale in a tight international market, and the poor country seeks to exploit its market 
power and leverage from the deal by obtaining technology transfer. The latter can be 
either direct (relating directly to the primary defence/aerospace contract) or indirect 
(relating to typically civil investment) unassociated with the primary defence/aerospace 
deal. 
 
Over the last 20 years traditional offsets model has expanded to reflect a number of 
market developments (as depicted in Figure 2.9). On the defence side, defence offsets 
are now sub-divided into direct offsets (linked to the primary defence contract) and 
indirect offsets (tied to other defence programmes unrelated to the primary defence 
contract). Also, there are indirect offsets, and these have regard to foreign defence 
contractors, after concluding on arms deal, being obligated to investing in commercial 
projects, independent of the primary defence contract. An example of indirect offsets 
would be the case of be Tate & Lyle, encouraged by BAEs (UK prime contractor under 
the AL Yamamah arms deal) to build a sugar refining factory. 
 
The important development in offset activities, of relevance to the present study, is the 
emergence of what might be termed civil-civil offsets. This is a recent innovative form 
of reciprocal trading mechanism, applying to central and local government procurement 
contracts. The contracts must be above a stipulated value to trigger a demand for 
offsetting investment by the overseas vendor company. World Trade Organisation 
regulations demand that developing countries, so defined, can engage in civil-civil 
offsets, but not advanced states. Moreover, such contracts are normally mega-dollar 
procurements, hence relevant to the purchase of expensive projects, such as power-
generating stations, oil refineries, and significantly commercial aircraft in oligopolistic 
international markets. 
 
Commercial aircraft are ‘big ticket’ items. Consequently, a country/company procuring 
modern aircraft for its national airline is in a strong position in a competitive global 
market to demand compensatory investment. This would most likely come in the form 
of work packages, including maintenance, repair and overhaul contracts, R&D, and in 
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the extreme, complete licensed production of the entire aircraft. China, in the 
development of its commercial aviation industry, has benefited from such civil-civil 
offset-related technology transfer. This has occurred where regional airlines, including 
Southern Airlines, Eastern Airlines and Xiamen Airlines, have procured Boeing or 
Airbus passenger aircraft. Work would then flow back into China’s aircraft factories 
(AVIC I and II), tied to, for example, the production of vertical and horizontal tail-fins 
and simple fabrication of structures on the main wing assemblies. Civil-civil offsets also 
encompass higher-level technology transfer programmes, including Embraer’s license 
production of the ERJ-90 at Harbin and the very big programme at Tianjian involving 
the license production of the Airbus A320. 
 
In recent years, a number of developing countries have engaged in technology offset 
contracts. In the early 1990s, for example, Saudi Arabia demanded civil offset work on 
the US$6 billion procurement of Boeing commercial aircraft for the national carrier, 
Saudi Airlines. This offset deal led to civil work on Boeing commercial airliners being 
channelled into the offset companies that were established under the Saudi Al Yamamah 
military offset contract. Similarly, the Indonesia Government sought civil technology 
offsets when purchasing Boeing passenger aircraft for its national airline, Garuda. The 
offset work went to Bandung–based aerospace company, PT IPTN (now called PT 
Dirgantara). Here, components and sub-assemblies would be produced under strict 
quality standards for onward delivery to Mitsubishi factories in Japan. The Japanese 
company would then integrate PT IPTN’s technologies into its own sub-contracted sub-
assembly work for final delivery to the Boeing factory in Seattle, US. In this way, 
technology offsets can be seen as a truly global subcontracting network of 
manufacturing activities. 
2.4.4 Offsets: Moving from Policy to Practice 
Technology transfer though licensed production is the most common form of offset. The 
aim is to leverage high technology from advanced country suppliers to establish local 
manufacturing capability. To facilitate this process mostly all countries have in place 
offset guidelines or policies. These provide the regulatory framework against which 
foreign vendors construct offset programmes. The guidelines, are, by definition, 
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prescriptive, but often there will be flexibility in their application. But this will vary 
from country to country. The UK’s Industrial Participation Policy,80 in other words 
offsets is based on a voluntary code, and is not the usual approach. Even more extreme, 
however, are the few countries that possess no formal offsets guidelines. These 
countries include Japan, Singapore and China. Under such circumstances, offset deals 
are worked out by the local government procurement agency and the foreign contractor; 
they will be negotiated, with the final outcome based on the relative bargaining 
strengths of the two contracting parties. 
 
Whilst the overseas vendor will seek to minimise the percentage offset requirement, the 
host country (purchaser) of the defence/aerospace system will aim to achieve the highest 
percentage technology transfer package. The goals of the offset package will normally 
highlight some or all the following considerations: maximisation of local job 
opportunities, increased skill content of local workers; economic diversification; 
promotion of high technology production; development of MRO services; and the 
introduction of higher value-added operations, including systems integration and R&D. 
The development of strategic, long-term, mutually beneficial offset relationships 
depends on the foreign contractor agreeing to progressively transfer acceptable levels of 
technology. Clearly, though, it is not in the transferor’s/commercial interests to release 
large amounts of modern technology to the transferee’s country, giving that this 
intellectual expertise/knowledge will likely have taken decades to accumulate. Thus, the 
final offsets package is the outcome of the relative bargaining strengths of the two 
contractual parties. 
2.4.5 Effectiveness of Technology Offsets. 
Recipient countries seek to manage offsetting investment to secure as much economic 
advantage as possible. However, there is much complexity associated with efficient and 
effective implementation of offset programmes. Should they be obligatory or voluntary? 
Should the offsets be directed towards direct (often defence) investment or indirect 
(social and commercial) objectives. What is the appropriate percentage offset target? 
Should it be modestly set, say 30 percent of the primary contract value, and therefore 
more attainable by the foreign vendor, or should it be targeted at 100 percent of the 
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primary contract value to achieve as much technology transfer as possible? Should 
multipliers be applied to certain sectors, such as education and training? Thus, offsets 
investment targeted at, say, education, attracts a multiplied credit of 5:1; instead of 1:1 
to be set against the vendors’ total offset target value. Finally if vendors fail to achieve 
the required total offset value in the contractually specified future period should a 
penalty be imposed? 
 
These, and numerous often policy issues, need to be addressed by the country offset 
committee. Notwithstanding this requirement, however, there is still much 
dissatisfaction over the effectiveness of offsets to deliver on the pre-determined 
development objective. The regular complaint is that insufficient technology transfer is 
achieved; that the capacity transplanted into the recipient country represents assembly, 
not production, of basic parts and components. The high value-added work is not 
transferred, remaining in the vendor’s factories in the advanced economics. It is also 
argued that ‘any’ jobs created are labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive, 
involving minimal skill enhancement and limited export potential, Moreover, export 
possibilities are weak because the vendor tightly controls the export of  proprietory 
knowledge to third countries. However, perhaps the most significant negative feature of 
inward technology transfer through offsets is the difficulty of ensuring the sustainability 
of manufacturing programmes. A problem here is that scales of production for most of 
the economies in the developing would are limited. This, in return, has the commercial 
drawback of reducing the offsets beneficiary’s competitiveness. Due to the limitations 
of scale most country recipients of offsets have focused on the development of MRO 
capability. This is an economically rational approach in that it provides a service that 
will be typically demanded over the lifecycle of the defence/aerospace system procured. 
 
There are many other considerations that work against the long-term effectiveness of the 
offsets package, but there is a need to evolve design capacity to refresh or replace 
product and process technologies transferred. Design and innovational skills do not 
normally reside in the prime contractor, which focuses on the development of systems 
integration skills combined with corporate policies aimed at cost reduction through 
scale. Innovation, by contrast, tends to come from value chain activities. The possession 
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of strong and competitive supply chains is not a characteristic of developing countries. 
Offsets, at least in the short-run, are unlikely to stimulate local subcontractors, without 
informed and well-directed government policies. Most of the offset programmes 
analysed in this study show little evidence of supply chain creation. 
 
Offsets are a sensitive field of study for defence/aerospace contractors because they 
form part of their marketing strategies. Hence empirical studies that examine the impact 
of offsets on sectoral development in recipient countries are scarce. However, there are 
two major offset programmes that have attracted much academic alternation. The first 
has regard to Saudi Arabia’s offset experience in the 1980s and 1990s and the findings 
indicate that little of the offsets development objectives were met. In particular, the 
Saudi goal of creating 75,000 skilled workers from the Kingdom’s three substantial 
offset programmes was not fulfilled, with just a few hundred Saudi unskilled jobs being 
created across the agreed period of time.81 The second example relates to the South 
African offsets programme introduced in the early 2000s. Here, the South African offset 
authorities had planned to create around 67,000 jobs for black people from the defence 
and civil offsets work and technology transfer packages. 82  Although there exist 
contradictory evidence on the effectiveness of this offset package, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the job creation and sustainability objectives have not been achieved. 
 
For offsets to work, it seems likely that the recipient country must possess the 
absorptive capability to adopt and develop the technologies transferred. The absorptive 
capability will be located in the local sub contractor supply chains, in the university and 
R&D institutes, in the advanced skill-sets of the workers, and, more generally, in the 
scientific and technological base of the technology receiving economy. Thus, offsets 
might work in Japan, the UK and Singapore, but there will be serious questions over 
their effectiveness in the poorer countries. The research question for this study is 
whether offsets will work in China, specifically in the context of developing a 
sustainable indigenous Chinese commercial aviation industry.  
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2.5 Enter the ‘Dragon’: The Technology Absorption-Indigenisation 
Challenge 
In contemporary Asia, the ‘Tiger’ technology development strategy has enjoyed 
substantial empirical investigation. By comparison, China’s ‘Dragon’ technology model, 
emphasizing the promotion of pillar industries, has received scant attention. The 
purpose of this study is to address this research lacuna by evaluating the effectiveness of 
China’s technology strategy through empirical analysis of one of the country’s principal 
lead or strategic industries, aviation. The analytical framework adopted is shown at 
Figure 2.10, overleaf, representing an extended version of Figure 1.2. The confluence of 
the three circles in the Figure 1.2 venn diagram represents indigenous industrialisation 
(I2) and is the goal or outcome of the development planning, technology planning and 
technology development phases of the cycle. Figure 2.10 develops the venn diagram 
identifying and justifying the critical attributes characterising the establishment of 
domestic industrial capabilities. In order to sustain this capability, however, it is 
essential that local industries are able to infuse and hence develop the technologies 
transferred through FDI and offsets. Effective absorption of transplanted technology 
will depend on an array of variables, but critical amongst these will be supportive 
government policy as well the capability of local organisations to culturally assimilate 
the technologies transferred. Whatever the preferred development and technology. 
strategy, the barriers to technology transfer will inevitably remain high. Indeed, with the 
passage of time, late-comers to industrialisation will increasingly find the technology-
gap between themselves and the advanced nations ever widening. The challenge to 
overcome the rich countries’ dominance of global intellectual capital has incentivised 
the industrialising world to ‘indigenise’ technological capability. For developing 
countries industrial indigenisation is an ambitious goal. Progress towards its 
achievement is shown at Figure 2.10 as the final goal of the technology transfer 
‘pathway’. I2 performance can be measured by evaluating: the degree of value-added 
generated locally; the success or otherwise in promoting domestic innovational capacity; 
and the extent to which higher quality local skills have been generated. These metrics 
will be employed in Chapter 5 to measure empirically the progress sustained by China’s 
aviation industry in achieving industrial indigenisation. Industrial and technological  
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Figure 2.10:   Aviation Production in China: The Technology Transfer-Absorption Pathway to Indigenous Industrialisation I2 
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self-reliance is still the policy goal of Beijing. However, in the present rapidly 
globalising international economy, simultaneous achievement of sovereignty and 
sustainability is probably a contradiction in terms 
2.6 Technological Absorption 
There is a panoply of factors influencing the success of the technology absorption 
process, including economic, political, social and technological. Most of the issues 
will be captured during company-level analysis, particularly… “transaction costs 
involving the revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing opportunities… [that]…are 
primary considerations both in the decision making of FDI and offsets and in the 
selection of entry models.”83 Of the major influencing variables at the industry-level, 
arguably two of the most important are, firstly, an ‘interventionist’ government 
approach encouraging the development of a domestic science and technology 
infrastructure and, secondly, the challenge of assimilating the divergent business 
cultures of China and other countries. The cultural gap between, especially, East and 
West, is created by societal differences in work attitudes, motivational structures, 
interpersonal norms and negotiation patterns that cannot be eliminated in a short 
time.84 
2.6.1 Government Sponsorship: the ‘Visible’ Hand of Resource Allocation 
In his 1990 book The Competitive Advantage of Nations,85  Michael Porter developed 
what he termed the Diamond model to explain the economic success of various 
countries. One of the points of the ‘Diamond’ is strategy and one of the important 
contextual conditioning factors of the model is the supportive role that government 
can play in promoting economic development. Since the publication of Porter’s book, 
it has become widely recognised that government intervention in support of industrial 
and technological development is derigour for rapid progression towards I2. Equally, 
Porter highlights the important role played by corporate strategy; the need for 
businesses to identify their goals as well as the strategies required for achieving them. 
Combined, government and corporate strategy, particularly in the science and 
technology area, can make an important contribution to corporate and country 
development performance. 
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The aviation industry questionnaire (Appendix 1) focuses on corporate and 
government policies designed to enhance the development of corporate technological 
capabilities, including R&D investment, cooperative research, product development, 
and infrastructural investment. At the industry-level, it is now axiomatic for 
government to adopt an ‘interventionist’ approach, promoting an appropriate science 
and technology strategy to create local innovative capability. Innovation demonstrates 
the capacity of a country to go beyond the threshold of dependence on overseas 
technology suppliers and progress towards self-reliant indigenous development. This 
process need not take generations to work through. Technology transfer and there to 
its effective absorption, can be facilitated, indeed, accelerated through government 
patronage. Particularly in Asia, governments take a long-term strategic view of 
economic development. They build for the future by investing in both physical and 
human capital infrastructures. Governments in Asia have invariably employed a 
science and technology strategy that highlights and promotes government-industry-
university trilateral partnerships, technology education and training, R&D funding in 
critical technologies fields, industrial clustering - both horizontally and vertically 
between manufacturers and subcontractors, and specialized niches of industrial 
excellence in high technology fields.86 In parallel, incentivisation programmes have 
been introduced to attract foreign companies to relocate manufacturing and R&D 
capacity. Incentives might include tax concessions, low interest loans and the 
financial sponsorship of world class R&D laboratories.87 
2.6.2 Cross-Cultural Relations 
Overseas business ventures involve considerable risks, including costly delays from 
bloated bureaucracy, political instability, exchange rate volatility, and war. However, 
arguably one of the biggest risks MNCs face derives from cultural barriers.88 China, in 
particular, has proven to be a battle zone for foreign companies that have grappled, 
often unsuccessfully, with the complexities of local business culture. At the root of 
China’s cultural values are Guanxi and Confucianism.(Rujia Sixiang儒家思想). These 
two values represent important influences, having the power to either advance or 
retard China’s present dynamic growth and development performance, depending on 
how they are managed by both foreign and local stakeholders. 
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Guanxi reflects China’s emphasis on the cultural attributes of interpersonal and inter-
organisational relationships and networking dynamics. The Guanxi concept comprises 
four important components:  
• the role of intermediaries (social connections providing leverage in the 
transferability of guanxi and also trust in business associations with unknown 
parties) 
• Mian zi (in Chinese business culture, reputation and social standing rests on 
the intangible social currency of both saving and creating ‘face’) 
• Reciprocality (a network of reciprocal bonds where the refusal to return a 
‘favour’ will cause loss of face, creating a lack of trust) 
• Corruption (not an element of guanxi, but sometimes required when guanxi 
does not exist and ‘deals’ are needed to oil the wheels of an inefficient, 
bureaucratic Communist regime).89 
 
Confucianism is a social philosophy in which the principal concern is the 
establishment of social harmony in a complex society characterized by an orderly 
hierarchy. Confucianism is not a religion but a set of pragmatic rules for daily life 
derived from the lessons of Chinese history. The key principles of confucian teaching 
comprise:  
• Social status (social obligation requires ‘high-power distance’ in relations 
between individuals, organisations and institutions) 
• Collectivism (Jiti Guannian集体观念) (China’s attention to the needs of groups, 
including the family system, has played an important role in generating 
economic dynamism, sacrificing opportunities for personal gain) 
• Interpersonal harmony (achievement of harmonious relationships (Hexie,和谐) 
between business partners) 
• Thrift (provision of savings for capital investment) 
• Long-term orientation (an appreciation that all social interactions and guanxi 
relationships are within the context of long-term balance).90 
2.7 Industrial Indigenisation (I2) 
Research into China’s aviation industry will be undertaken using survey methods, 
employing a questionnaire and following-up with intensive interviews (Appendix 2).  
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The case studies will focus on evaluating performance of the foreign-owned aviation 
companies, particularly with regard to raising local value–added from both the 
MNCs’ internal production activities and those embedded in the local supply chain. 
Data will be collected in order to evaluate local value-added performance, including 
establishing the nature, structure and trends in the development of indigenous 
innovational capacity, especially in the value chain, and also the degree of skill 
generation achieved in the aviation firms. 
2.7.1 High Value-added Production 
Raising value-added in local production is an imperative for securing progression 
towards the goal of I 2. Industrialising countries recognise the need to increase the 
technological level and associated local value-adding production inputs, but the 
typical absence of local capacity and capability in the primary firm and its 
subcontracting networks makes this no easy task. 
 
Value-added is defined as a build-up in value from input-cost to output-price. Thus 
value-added in production captures the costs associated with labour, capital, 
overheads (including R&D) and profit. If local value-added is low, then inputs are 
likely to be high value-added components and sub-assemblies produced in the MNC’s 
home economy. As a consequence, the FDI recipient company/country will see its 
value-added ‘squeezed’ and production will be assembly-based, using unsophisticated 
worker skills; a classic ‘screw-driver’ operation. The evidence on MNCs maximizing 
value-added opportunities for the local economy is contradictory. For instance, a 1995 
study commissioned by the New Zealand government found that up to 90 percent of 
the value-added generated by foreign MNCs was reinvested into the local economy.91 
Whilst the study did not reveal the extent of value-added, it did conclude that FDI had 
a strong cumulative benefit to the recipient economy, leading to above average wages, 
the purchase of goods and services, higher payments of taxes, technology transfers, 
and reinvestment of local earnings.92 In all, the beneficial effect on the local economy 
was greater than the profit repatriated to the MNC’s home economy. The opposing 
view is that low value-added activities have shifted from the North to the cheap labour 
forces of the South. The pattern of development in the South East Asian ‘Tiger’ 
economies supports this view, whereby the growth of FDI has resulted in an exodus of 
 82 
manufacturing from the developed world, especially in low value-added sectors; but, 
this is a simplistic view, because as these economies grow, so will outward FDI.93 
 
It is partly the fear that China would be left with a ‘static’ comparative advantage in 
low value-added production that prompted the Chinese planning authorities to develop 
a technology strategy seeking to evolve dynamic comparative advantages in high 
technology, high value-added industries. As stated earlier, the key aspect of adding 
value is that it is an important proxy of local industrial development. The more local 
manufacturers engage in higher technology activities, the higher the worker skills, the 
higher level of domestic value-added, and the greater will be the progress towards 
indigenous industrialisation. Policy should, therefore, focus on fostering the growth of 
these high technology ‘strategic’ or ‘backbone’ industries.  
2.7.2 Technological Innovation 
Technological innovation is a broad concept, but in the context in which it is used 
here, it means the capability to design and produce next-generation technologies. An 
innovative organisation is dynamic, engaging in pushing out the frontiers of 
knowledge. In a sense, it is a measure of progress towards indigenisation and self-
sufficiency, because innovative capacities release firms from dependency on foreign 
suppliers for future product development. The danger is that this may be ‘old’ 
technology by comparison to global product technology standards. This, therefore, 
signals the urgent need for China’s aviation companies to move beyond low-
technology activities, and, instead, into the design and development of aircraft and 
associated systems. 
 
This study will seek to establish whether china’s aviation companies have progressed 
from basic level technological capabilities, such as low value-added manufacture, 
maintenance, and marketing, to the higher levels of innovating new technologies. The 
need is to achieve an end-state of an organised innovative system that emphasises, 
formally and informally, technological adoption, modification and advancement. 
Performance indictors, here, would be R&D investment within the company, and 
corporate science and technology relationships, patent registrations, university 
cooperative research programmes and collaborative technology agreements with 
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supplier companies; the latter being important to raise process efficiency, often a 
precondition for product innovation. 
2.7.3 Local Sub-Contractor or Networks 
A principal characteristic of technology transfer in the development of aerospace 
production is the search for low labour cost locations for routine assembly operations. 
This is still the case today, with the professional and technical occupations more the 
preserve of the technology transferor countries/regions, such the US, Europe and 
Japan. The technology-recipient economies, by contrast, are focused on assembly 
rather than the more sophisticated design and R&D. This is, however, a simplistic 
explanation of global aerospace production and masks the development of a fairly 
complex Asian network of manufacturing activities. The South Korean and Taiwanese 
models have proved remarkably successful because of their pursuance of focused 
strategies to create innovation and scale, quite often biased towards the development 
of aerospace foundry work, at least in the beginning, and supported by generous 
government funding. South Korea’s Samsung, in particular, provides a remarkable 
example of what is achievable. In the mid-1970s, the technology gap between 
Samsung and the industry standard was around 30 years; today, this gap has long 
since disappeared.94 
 
If China’s aviation industry is to achieve success in technological progress, it will 
need to create ‘learning’ companies. The study will seek to measure performance in 
this regard by establishing, for instance, the continued level of dependency on the 
extent of incompany training schools, the proportions of trained engineers amongst 
total employees, and the placements and study opportunities in overseas countries. In 
general terms, this study will attempt to evidence whether investment into human 
capital has been viewed as a primary goal, and if so, whether the consequent 
generation of local skills and technical capacity has progressed China’s aviation 
industry towards industrial indigenisation. 
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Chapter 3 Regional Dynamics: Flying Geese, and the 
Development of Asia’s Commercial Aviation 
Industry 
3.1 Asia’s High Technology Ambitions 
The last chapter was concerned with critically evaluating the literature on broad 
development strategies. These included development approaches, such as Rostow’s 
‘take-off’ model, trading regimes, such as import substitution, and industrial and 
technology paradigms, including the development vehicles for acquiring technology, 
and here FDI and offsets were argued to be important. The analysis of the literature was 
generic in the sense that it was not sector specific. The message was clear, however; 
industrialising countries seek greater technological sovereignty, having ambitions to 
acquire design and manufacturing capacity in increasingly high technology industries, 
but in the absence of high-level skills, local supply chains and high value-added 
operations, domestic capability will remain superficial. Figure 2.10 offers a framework 
of analysis that reflects these development priorities. 
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to apply this framework to the development of 
Asia’s commercial aviation industry. Thus, given the almost complete lack of empirical 
investigation in this subject area, particularly directed towards ‘indigenous 
industrialization’ (the research lacuna) the dissertation now applies the framework to a 
regional and sectoral context. Chapter 3 examines Asia’s progress in aviation 
development. It is heavy on empirical detail and employs the ‘Flying Geese’ model, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, to investigate manufacturing performance facilitated by inward 
technology transfer. This comparative evaluation sets the benchmark for the subsequent 
country case study of China, in terms of its macro development, technology planning 
and development process (Chapter 4), and analysis of the extent of indigenous 
industrialisation achieved in the domestic aviation sector (Chapter 5). 
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3.2 Asia’s Flying Geese Technology Development Paradigm 
The flying geese thesis derives from the work of a Japanese academic, Professor 
Kaname Akamatsu.1 His model took shape in the 1930s, but further elaboration of the 
theory was conducted after the Second World War. 2  Akamatsu was concerned to 
explain and analyse the nature of production and trade in Japan’s technology industries 
before the Second World War. His writing evolved into a technology development 
theory that he described under the Japanese lyrical name. Gankoo Keitai (Flying 
Geese). The model is very much focused on the transfer and dissemination of 
technology across countries, and in that sense it mirrors the process involved in 
Vernon’s 1966 International Product Life Cycle that was analysed in Chapter 2.3 
 
The Flying Geese model traces the introduction of a new product into Asian countries 
via imports. Later, these same countries having absorbed the technology become 
exporters (corresponding to the decline phase in the product life cycle thesis). In the 
analysis of these trading patterns, Asia became segmented into three groups of countries 
according to the level of development reached: Japan as the technological head 
(Senshinkoku) the newly industrialising countries (NICs) (Shinkookoku); and, finally, 
the ASEAN4 countries.4 Akamatsu’s theory was that industrial development in Asia 
would ‘trickle-down’ from Japan to the NICs and then to the ASEAN4. A five-stage 
life-cycle of technological advance is associated with Japan and the other two groups of 
countries in Asia’s economy. This life-cycle traces the gain and then loss of 
comparative advantage, leading to the relocation of production across Asian countries 
experiencing different levels of technological maturity. The five stages of the 
technological life cycle can be applied to any typical industry. This part of the model 
incorporates the features of Akamatsu’s 1960’s papers, and also the later elaboration by 
Dowling,5 adopting the notion of Yamazawa,6 of a final decline stage in the relocation 
of technology to other countries; the five stages are explained, below: 
 
1. A country enters into the process of technology development through imports of 
industrial goods from an advanced country. This eventually induces local production as 
domestic demand expands. However, foreign imports continue, as the quality and 
production costs of local output is inferior to foreign imports. 
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2. Stage two is where the government aims to accelerate the process of local 
industrialisation and technological development through an import-substitution strategy. 
The encouragement of local demand via this approach must be made to work through 
the erection of tariff barriers and associated import restrictions. This process occurred in 
the ASEAN4 in the 1970s. Protectionism, combined with long production runs of 
standardised goods, provided the conditions for scale and related competitive 
advantages. FDI starts to emerge, but at this point in the life-cycle it is relatively 
unimportant. As Dunning explains, this lack of foreign investment preparation may be 
due to numerous factors, including low per capita income levels, weak protection of 
IPR, and scarcity of skilled labour and the under-development of a transportation and 
communications infrastructure  
 
3. Stage three occurs when exports of the particular good take-off, with the likelihood 
that domestic demand is growing at a reduced pace. Strong export performance allows 
rising imports of capital goods, further expanding capacity and capability. Inward FDI 
also increases as advanced country production ceases because of the loss in comparative 
advantage. As development in the Asian country proceeds, it is likely that skills and 
infrastructure will improve, with the entire industrial sector becoming a much more 
viable commercial proposition. 
 
4. Stage four is the maturity phase, with growth in demand and production slowing in 
the face of market saturation, rising cost, and rising competition from other late-comers 
to the industrialisation process. Significantly, inward FDI also starts to reduce as MNCs 
search for other more profitable production bases in Asia. 
 
5. The final life-cycle stage is when production costs become so high that inevitably 
there is a loss of comparative advantage. As a consequence, production will locate to 
other Asian countries in a lower development group. Import of the goods will now 
come from the emerging Kooshinkoku. The local Asian economy must then look for the 
opportunity to develop other higher value industrial comparative advantages.  
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There are numerous interpretations of the technology five-stage life-cycle theory, 
including the nature of transition between stages, the extent of foreign competition, the 
sequential and concurrent nature of the cycles, and the degree of supportive government 
intervention. With regard to the latter point, as the domestic economy grows under an 
import-substitution strategy, the depth and sustainability of development is dependent 
upon government support. This may be in the form of credit if local finance markets are 
immature, and might also include training, support for capital goods acquisition and 
technological know-how, participation in trader fairs/exhibitions, and possible loans for 
R&D funding. Whilst protectionism defines an import-substitution regime, it is also 
critical that competitive forces are encouraged. Finding such a balance will not be easy, 
but is essential if a speedy transition is required from import substitution to export 
promotion. This was a positive feature of the South Korean and Taiwanese technology 
development models, but India, by contrast, suffered from decades of stagnant 
economic growth due to overpowering bureaucratic regulations and trade protection, 
stifling industrial competitiveness. 
 
Akamatsu’s early writing’s emphasise a development process that moves smoothly 
from one country to another; the follow-on Asian countries continuously trying to 
catch-up with the lead state, with the latter locked into a global competitive race, 
seeking to close the technology gap with Western economies. Thus, Akamatsu’s 
description of this regional ‘trickle-down’ development process conforms to a 
‘harmonious paradigm’.7 Cheap imports undermine local production, and eventually 
domestic investment migrates from this declining industry to new ‘sunrise’ sectors. A 
dynamic comparative advantage evolves at differing levels of technological capability 
across the Asian countries. In this way, the technological hierarchy is maintained, with 
Japan firmly installed as the lead goose. 
 
Another assumption of the flying geese model is that the Asian region will experience 
rising levels of economic integration and interdependence, as countries become 
increasingly dependent on each other for cheap imports and exports. This inter-industry 
trade will be driven by the spectrum of differential comparative advantage levels 
achieved across the regions in the specialisation of complementary goods. The role of 
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FDI is important because it acts as the vehicle for technology transfer, as per Vernon’s 
model. The technologies transferred, moreover, will act to elevate recipient country 
comparative advantages through relocation of technical, managerial and financial 
resources. Although inter-industry trade occurs between countries at different 
development stages producing complementary goods, the inevitable next step is for 
industrial production to take-on greater levels of technological sophistication and 
complexity, reflecting intra-industry trade. In other words, Asia’s producers become 
part of a regional (Japanese) global supply chain. The production and export of 
intermediate products, eg microelectronic wafers, in the case of Taiwan, will be 
encouraged, reflecting an international integration of manufacturing activities at an 
intra-industry level. One final, but significant, point is that if intra-industry trade is 
heavily influenced by MNC investment, it invariably  carries with it the disadvantage 
that production is low value added, with limited stimulus  given to the creation of local 
value chains. Thus, if/when local industry loses its competitive advantage, foreign 
MNCs possess the potential to relocate capacity to other countries enjoying relatively 
high cost efficiency. This process acts to temporarily retard development through what 
is termed industrial ‘hollowing-out’, as occurred in Singapore in the 1980s. 
 
The origins of Akamatsu’s flying geese model lie in his analysis of the historical 
evolution of Japan’s textile industry. His comparative framework of analysis was the 
development of European capitalism and, of course, at the heart of Europe’s first 
industrial revolution lay the technological development of Britain’s textile industry. In 
the global scheme of economic affairs, Akamatsu viewed Japan as assuming an 
intermediate position, as the technology leader in its own geographical sphere of 
influence.8 Furthermore, he conceptualised that economic and trade interrelationships 
between countries in this sphere of influence would give rise to … “an awakening of 
less developed areas of the world to modern economic development.”9  The process of 
development would be effected through periods of ‘heterogenization’ and 
‘homogenization’. In the former period, divergent relative costs lead to a change in 
production structure based on an evolving international division of labour in 
complementary outputs. By contrast, the homogenization period may be characterised 
as a process of substitution and competition between countries whereby imports lead to 
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domestic output that later feeds through into exports. Moreover, development occurs 
via the traditional route of, firstly consumption goods industrialisation, later extending 
to capital goods production. Here, again, the development experiences of South Korea 
and Taiwan are instructive. 10 
 
Ginzberg argues that, intuitively, theory links to the positive role that foreign imports 
and investment have in the process of development. Importantly, he argues that: 
 
“…contact with foreign artefacts  and culture, and in particular imports…may 
trigger off a process of development through a succession of steps which present 
not only technological and economic aspects (on both the cost and demand side), 
but also learning and cognitive dimensions.” 11 
 
Kojima elaborated on this process by emphasising that, especially for Japan, domestic 
structural transformation occurred through government interventionist policy 
identifying a ‘leading growth sector’, a la Schumpeter.12 Here, industrial upgrading 
occurs periodically, accentuating a sequence of growth by stages, in each of which a 
certain industrial sector can be identified as the main engine of structural transformation 
to a higher level of value-added.13 Arguably, no Asian country to date has achieved such 
a rapid process of structural upgrading as has been experienced by Japan since WWII. 
Japan moved rapidly through the various stages of industrial transformation: from 
Heckscher-Ohlin industries (textiles, 1950-mid-1960s), to scale-driven non-
differentiated Smithian industries (steel and shipbuilding, late 1950s-early 1970s), to 
assembly-based differentiated industries (automobiles and white-goods, late 1960s), to 
R&D-driven Schumpeterian  industries (computers, telecommunications and aircraft, 
mid-1980s), and to the most recent stage, knowledge-intensive industries (bio-
technology and nano-technology, mid-1990s). 14  These waves of industrial 
transformation are conceptualised in Figure 3.1. 
 
The key to Japan’s technological success was not just access to foreign technologies but 
absorptive capability. Certainly, there was imitation of design, but subsequently the 
process was local adaption and improvement, particularly in efforts to raise the 
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potential for commercialisation. Associated improvements included attempts to raise 
productivity through improved production organisation, lean production, Kaizan, and 
Figure 3.1: Phases of Industrial Transformation 
 
Source: adapted from Ozawa,T, ‘Pax Americana-led Macro-Clustering and Flying-Geese-Style Catch-up 
in East Asia: Mechanisms of Regionalised Endogenous Growth’, Journal of Asian Economics, 13,(2003), 
p702. 
 
Just-in-Time techniques. This whole process of technology import/licensed production, 
absorption, and modification, led to sustainable local production and ultimately to 
export, as depicted in the flying geese model. Moreover, in the Japanese case, 
innovational pressures accompanied the process of industrial transformation. This 
innovational aspect was facilitated by Japan’s industrial maturity, as reflected by both 
flexibility and specialisation in industrial structure. The role of specialist suppliers was 
critical to the success of the Japanese model. They are characterised by networks of 
competitive but also cooperative suppliers of parts, components and sub-assemblies. 
The final good (prime) contractors would outsource selected vertical integrated stages 
of production to SMEs located in the value chain, as Ozawa notes… 
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“…because of the ‘dual’ (or actually multi-layered) industrial structure of 
Japanese industry (where large, medium and small firms coexist in close 
affiliation), process fragmentation (vertical specialisation) has become all the 
more fine-tuned to make use of different labour costs and technological 
capabilities of suppliers at divergent levels of Japan’s industrial hierarchy …as 
Japan moved up the ladder of structural upgrading, each tier of industry became 
vertically differentiated  in technological sophistication, value added, product 
quality, and factor intensity. For example, in…the assembly-based automobile 
industry, cars are differentiated by high-end versus low-end models, and its 
parts, components, and accessories by high value-added key components versus 
low value-added peripherals…each higher tier of industry, thus, offering to 
developing countries opportunities to participate in some low-end segments of 
production and service which are commensurate with their levels of 
technological sophistication and wages. In other words, developing countries 
with advantages in labour-intensive standardised goods can now join not only in 
lowest-tier (Heckscher-Ohlin) light industries but also in the low end of each of 
the higher-tier industries. Thus, an intra-industry vertical division of labor 
occurs across borders, along with an inter-industry horizontal division of 
labor…”15 
This evolutionary process (see the ‘Western’ model of technological development, 
section 2.3.1, chapter 2) of industrial transformation and technological upgrading 
defines Akamatsu’s flying geese paradigm. Progressive restructuring of Asia’s lead 
goose, Japan, has been a powerful influence on the industrialisation pattern of other 
East Asian Countries. As Japan lost comparative advantage in low productivity tiers 
(low- end goods at each tier), it transplanted via FDI those disadvantaged industrial 
activities to other Asian economies (first to the NICs, then ASEAN 4, and most recently 
to China) where production was competitive.16 
 
In summary, then, Akamatsu’s flying geese model has relevance to the development 
processes of underdeveloped countries. In recent decades, the US (and increasingly 
European advanced countries) has acted at the global level as the initiating mechanism 
for the transmission of technology to the developing states.17 In this respect, the US 
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represents the lead goose, via its MNCs, in transferring technology to other countries. 
Importantly, though, the higher the technology level of the recipient country, the higher 
the technology package that is transferred: Japan, as a high technology country, 
therefore, continues to play a pivotal role in Asia’s technology dissemination cycle. As 
it moves up the technology ladder, often via US-sponsored infusions of technology 
through licensed production (technology offsets) and increasingly international strategic 
alliances, Japan will cascade down to other Asian countries those vertical production 
process where it has lost its comparative advantage. Figure 3.2 diagrammatically 
illustrates this regional transformation process. As mentioned earlier, the flying geese 
model aligns with Vernon’s IPLC thesis, with both models depicting ‘dynamic’ 
transformational processes rather than any form of classical equilibrium model. Across 
Asian economies characterised by differing levels of economic development there will 
be homogenisation, though not replication, of industrial structure. Alien technologies, 
both product and process, will be transferred, but will differ not only because of the 
different stages of technological sophistication, but also because of the variegated 
culture mix; that is the unique ‘cocktail’ of foreign and indigenous business cultures. 
The nature and pace of technology diffusion from Japan to other states will be 
determined by the latter’s possession of skills, efficient cost structures, scale potential, 
innovational capacity, and ‘2nd-mover’ prospects. The catalyst for technology diffusion 
occurs after the recipient country establishes domestic demand through imports of the 
technology. What follows will be local licensed production and, ultimately, exports. 
Import substitution strategy will likely be pursued once local production begins, 
reflecting the need to protect the vulnerable ‘infant’ industry. Throughout this process 
of regional industrial transformation, there exists the possibility of ‘leap-frogging’ 
certain of the vertical stages of production, but it is impossible for any follower to close 
the technology gap with the ‘lead goose’ in one giant leap. A measured pace in the 
acquisition of skills and technology necessarily means that …“taking the existence of 
international trade for granted, the industrial development of less advanced countries, 
will as a matter of course, take the form of a wild geese pattern from crude goods 
towards elaborate goods.”18 
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Figure 3.2: Asia’s International Division of Labour 
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Source: Okita, S, ‘The Flying Geese Pattern of Development’, 4th Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
Conference, Seoul, (1985). 
Note: “Wild Geese are said to come to Japan in Autumn from Siberia and back to the North before Spring, 
flying in inverse V shapes, each of which overlaps to some extent”, Akamatsu (1961), pp 205-6. 
3.3 Flying Geese Model Applied to the Development of Asia’s 
Commercial Aviation Industry  
Although the Flying Geese Model is normally discussed in generic terms, it can be 
applied to the development of a particular industrial sector. Indeed, as was stated 
earlier, Akamatsu himself originally applied the model to the development of Japan’s 
textile industry. 19  Work has also been undertaken on applying the model to the 
development of Asia’s electronics sector.20 Taking these applied applications as a cue, 
the present study seeks to apply the flying geese model to the development of Asia’s 
commercial aviation industry, including (in Chapter 5) the case of China. This 
comparative analytical framework does not strictly conform to every aspect of 
Akamatsu’s theoretical approach. For instance, the contemporary technology trickle-
down from Japan does not occur, because FDI investments in commercial aviation have 
been channelled directly from Western OEMs, such as the US, Britain and France. 
Moreover, globalisation has changed the nature of the production process. During the 
era in which Akamatsu wrote, national production would have meant exactly that, an 
aircraft comprising parts, components and systems produced within the country. 
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Commercial aircraft production, therefore, would have been confined to the advanced 
industrialised countries possessing the necessary resources. Today, a commercial 
airliner is likely to have systems and assemblies sourced from numerous countries; for 
instance, engines from the UK, avionics from France, and systems from the US or 
Germany. Intra-industry linkage ‘between’ Asian countries remains a feature of the 
development process but alongside rather than detached from advanced country foreign 
investment. 
 
Akamatsu’s flying geese model, then, can be applied to Asian commercial aerospace 
industrial development, but FDI is driven by foreign Western OEMs, with the nature of 
technology transfer influenced, as in the original the flying geese model, by the relative 
technological maturity of the recipient Asian countries. The degree of technical 
competence and market attractiveness, thus defines the technology hierarchy 
characterising the Asian commercial aviation context. Therefore, at this regional level, 
the widely held view is that Japan remains undisputedly, the lead goose. The followers, 
in order of industrial and technological capacity, are South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Until recently, China would not have been included in this Asian 
aviation flying geese model, given its lack of production capacity, but this no longer 
holds. China has quickly transformed itself into a major regional aerospace player, and 
this rapid sectoral development needs to be recognised. So, the analytical approach 
adopted in this study will, firstly, be to examine the industrial status of Asia’s aviation 
countries according to the revealed technological hierarchy mapped by reference to the 
Flying geese model. Figure 3.3 illustrates this horizontal ‘V’ shaped hierarchy, with 
Japan as the lead goose, followed by South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Additionally, an attempt will be made to profile the development characteristics of 
China’s emerging commercial aviation sector. China is not formally included in Figure 
3.3 as it represents a focused case study in chapter 5. In any case, with a lowly 2006 
sales volume of RMB7.27bn (US$1.06bn), it only just makes the tail-end of the Flying 
Geese Model. 21  Chapter 5 will focus on analysing the extent of industrial 
indigenisationthat China has achieved in the development and production of 
commercial passenger aircraft. China’s dynamic profile in this study’s applied (see 
Chapter 6) aviation Flying Geese Model can then be judged. 
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          Figure 3.3: Flying Geese Model Applied to the Aviation Industry 
 
Source: Author 
 
3.3.1 Lead Goose: Japan 
Japan presently has a strong diversified domestic aerospace industry. It comprises 
several key players, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries 
and Fuji Heavy Industries. Apart from these major prime contractors, Japan possesses  
high numbers of small and medium size specialist sub-contractors, such as Showa 
Aircraft Industry, Yokogawa, Jamco, Matsushita Avionics and Systems and Sumitomo 
Precision Products. Although the sector comprises space, commercial aircraft, and 
military planes, it is the latter area where Japan’s aviation origins are to be found. 
Japan’s military production heritage is pre-WWII. Through cooperative industrial 
Agreements, with particularly the US defence and aerospace industry in the1930s, 
Japan essentially became self-sufficient in aviation production by the start of the Pacific 
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War. By war-end, Japan was already testing proto-types of military jet fighters and the 
roots to successful aerospace production were sown. Post-war, the principal thrust of 
Japanese aircraft production continued to be directed towards military output. Licensed 
production of US systems, including F-86 fighters and T-33 trainers, commenced in the 
early post-war decades.22 These early beginnings were consolidated by later technology 
transfer in the licensed production of F-4 fighters and F-15 Eagle fighters. Mitsubishi 
was heavily involved in these military programmes and was the prime contractor in 
1996 for the ‘semi’ indigenous F-2 fighter. Some 40% of the subcontract work was 
channelled to US defence contractors, not least because the F-2 was to all extents and 
purposes an upgrade of the US F-16 fighting Falcon aircraft.23 Nevertheless, many of 
the high tech. systems integrated into the F-2 were Japanese supplied, including 
advanced electronic equipment, such as phased-array radar, composite materials and 
other state-of-the-art technologies. Additionally, Japan excelled in helicopter 
production. In the mid-1990s, Japan developed its first indigenous rotary-wing aircraft, 
the light observation (OH-1) helicopter. Here, it was Kawasaki Heavy Industries that 
was selected as the prime contractor, but, significantly, in Japanese aerospace 
programmes, much of the subcontract work is always supplied to the other primes, such 
as Mitsubishi and Fuji. 
 
Japanese commercial aircraft production, not just military combat aircraft production, 
suffered from the Allied Occupation Forces ban on aircraft manufacture from 1945 to 
1952. This delayed Japan's efforts to create and expand local capacity. However, right 
from the start, Japan had ambitions of developing an indigenous aircraft industry. Very 
quickly, in the late 1950s, it launched its first post-war 'Japanese' commercial aircraft, 
the 60-seat propeller-driven YS-11. The aircraft was in production from the late 1950s 
to the early 1970s, and ...  
“Even though the aircraft was technically sound, it was a commercial failure, 
with less than 200 eventually being sold. Nakamoto argued that the downfall of 
the YS11 was caused by the global market's preference for the jet engine 
alongside the Japanese aerospace companies' lack of marketing capability. The 
other point, which remains a characteristic of emerging aerospace production 
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across the world, is that whilst the YS11 was a domestic design, it relied heavily 
on imported or co-produced engines. Avionics, and other major subsystems.”24  
 
Japan’s ambitions to develop domestic commercial airliner capacity did not disappear, 
however. They resurfaced again in the 1990s when discussions between government 
and industry took place over plans to develop a Japanese-built YXX 150-seat plane and 
a YSX 50 to 100 seat plane.25 These discussions did not lead to any tangible results, and 
until recently Japan's policy approach has been directed more towards international 
cooperation. 
 
Japan's push for international aerospace cooperation intensified efforts that had begun 
as far back as 1986. This was when Article 1 of the country's Aircraft Industry 
Promotion Law was revised from... “promotion of domestic development of aircraft and 
aeroengines and the subsequent reduction of the trade deficit”… to…  “promotion of 
joint international development of aircraft and aeroengines and the subsequent 
facilitation of international business exchange.” 26  However, increased industrial 
cooperation does not mean that Japan had abandoned its ambitions of a fully Japanese 
aerospace industry. The fact is that many leaders in government and industry still have 
the goal of indigenous production of aircraft and engines, but the strategy is that it 
would be pursued through long-term international collaboration. 27  According to 
Samuels, Japan's search for technology, centres around three distinct but interrelated 
values: 
    Autonomy or indigenisation (Kokusanka): Japan's capability to design and 
produce its own aircraft without dependence on foreign countries. 
    Diffusion (Hakyu): involvement in the adaption, assimilation, and diffusion of 
technologies, often acquired from foreign countries. Technology spin-off of the 
aerospace industry's exacting technologies can lead to advancement in other 
horizontally and vertically structured industries, such as electronics, machinery, 
materials, shipbuilding and automobiles.  
    Nuturance (Ikusei): a description applied to efforts by the Japanese 
government to manage industry competition and ‘nurture’ technological 
development.28 
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The structure of Japan's aviation industry is essentially the same as during WWII. Four 
companies dominate the sector, but the share of aerospace in overall corporate activities 
is low, accounting for only 15% of revenues in the late 1990s.29 Ishikawajima-Harima 
specializes in engine production, and MHI and KHI are involved in the production of 
engine components. MHI, KHI and FHI specialise in the manufacture of airframes and 
related components, and as mentioned earlier, KHI and MHI also have a significant 
involvement in helicopter development and production. 
 
These four big industrial conglomerates have participated in numerous major 
international aerospace programmes over recent decades, propelling Japan to the 
premier ‘Asian’ position in global aerospace rankings. Japan’s principal strategic 
alliance has been with Boeing, driven by the need to risk-share, enhance technological 
capability, benefit from market entry, and participate in profit distribution. The first big 
venture was the late 1970's 767 programme, in which Japanese firms took a 15% 
production share. 30  The Boeing 777 followed in 1991, with the Japanese share of 
aircraft structures accounting for 21% of total production.31   More recently, in 2004, the 
Japanese Aircraft Development Corporation (JADC - comprising MHI, KHI and FHI) 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement for Japan's participation in the development and 
production of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Japanese firms will be responsible for 
supplying the main and centre wing box, forward fuselage section, main landing gear 
wheel well, and the main and wing fixed trailing edge, accounting for approximately 
35% of the 787 structures.32 In addition, Japanese firms have been heavily involved as 
subcontractors in the Airbus family of aircraft, including the A300, 310, 320, 330, and 
340 aircraft. As at October 2004, some 21 Japanese companies were participating in the 
development of the A380, the flagship of the Airbus Fleet.33 In the field of aero-engines, 
Japan's aerospace firms are participating as subcontractors/partners in the development 
and production of General Electric and RR Trent 1000 engines for the Boeing 787 and 
similar engines for the Airbus A380. Moreover, Japan has participated as a full partner 
in the global consortium of aeroengine producers that developed and produced the 
V2500 engine.  
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3.3.2 The Lion State (Singapore) 
Singapore gained Independence from Britain in 1965 and immediately set about 
building its economy. Given the small size of the country it was inevitable that strategy 
would be directed towards integrating Singapore into the global economy. Demand 
would be export-oriented, with domestic capital accumulation provided by FDI. In 
similar vein, the development of Singapore’s aerospace industry has followed the 
country’s macro model. Partnership was important, though at the international level it 
was not the dominant feature. The fact is that once capacity had been established, the 
goal of local skill generation as a means of securing operational efficiency and market 
competitiveness were equally as important. 
 
Singapore’s principal aerospace company is ST Aerospace. It started operations in 
1975, just 10 years after the country’s Independence. Within two years, it had entered 
into a joint venture with Eucocopter and began to participate in the fabrication of 
helicopters. During the following three decades, ST Aerospace experienced rapid 
growth and development in the range of its activities. There were several reasons for 
this expansion of activity. Firstly, the company was able to benefit from the 
technological synergies of being part of ST Engineering, a diversified industrial 
conglomerate. Although quoted on the Singapore stock exchange, ST engineering is a 
Government Owned Enterprise (GOE), jointly-owned by the public (49.2% 
shareholding) and the government-owned body, Temasek (50.8%), and capitalised at S$ 
10.24bn (February 2008) making it the nineth biggest company in Singapore. 34 
Aerospace is one of ST Engineering’s four Strategic Business Unit (SBUs), the others 
being Electronics, Kinetics and Marine. Moreover, Aerospace accounts for a sizeable 
proportion of the conglomerate’s total sales. In 2007, out of total sales of S$5.05 bn, ST 
Aerospace at S$1.835 mn, accounted for 36% of corporate revenue.35  
 
The second reason behind ST aerospace’s rapid expansion, and building on the earlier 
discussion of technological synergies, ST aerospace fuelled its growth by linking with 
the other SBUs in developing industrial expertise in defence production. In this regard, 
ST aerospace, whilst growing through International Cooperation Programmes (offsets) 
from substantial MINDEF orders for foreign-supplied combat aircraft, the aerospace 
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division was able to promote in-house expertise by sourcing elements of the electronics 
and other systems capabilities from sister commercial SBUs.36  
 
Thirdly, the complementary industrial division of labour characterising ST 
Engineering’s organisational structure was no accident, but rather a deliberate planning 
policy to ensure that the breadth and depth of high engineering skills could be fostered 
to enable divisions to bid for work in their defined sectoral areas, supported by the 
assurance that specialist capacity would be available within the company for high value 
systems inputs, such as electronics. This capacity-building was in parallel with the 
specialist activities evolving within the division. For ST Aerospace, one of its core 
areas of specialisation is maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). 37  This was 
facilitated by the company’s close support links in the rapid growth of the successful 
domestic airline, Singapore International Airlines (SIA). Indeed, ST Aerospace’s 
support contracts for the rapidly growing SIA, facilitated its the former company’s 
initial penetration into the commercial aerospace market in 1990 with the launch of its 
subsidiary, ST Aviation Services (SASCO).38  
 
Fourthly, ST Aerospace’s expansion was facilitated through a Japanese-type approach 
to technology development, pursuing a dual-use strategy to exploit market opportunities 
in both the military and commercial aerospace sectors.  
 
Fifthly, ST Aerospace’s growth was not constrained by the limited size of Singapore’s 
domestic market. A feature of the business’ growth strategy was that its customer base 
had become truly international as the quality and cost competitiveness of its outputs 
improved. Similarly, as the business expanded, so acquisition of relevant overseas 
businesses was undertaken, transforming ST Aerospace into a global aerospace 
operation.39  
 
Finally, as this profile makes evident, ST Aerospace has never sought to develop and 
produce complete aircraft. The conglomerate’s strategy was much more modest, 
focusing instead on the high value services associated with MRO, modification, 
upgrade and technology insertion.40 
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Although ST Aerospace has expanded its capabilities in mid-life upgrades, such as in 
the upgrade of Turkish F-5 combat aircraft with an Israeli corporate partner, aircraft 
conversion work, including, for instance, the conversion of a Boeing 767 passenger 
aircraft to a cargo plane, and manufacturing work, such as the rear fuselage for 
Eurocopter’s EC120 helicopter, the Division’s principal business focus is MRO and 
related services. Thus, ST Aerospace possesses ‘total airframe’ capability, with global 
operational capacity in such diverse places as Mobile and San Antonio in the US, 
Shanghai in China, and Panama in Central America. 41  This capability in the 
maintenance and modification of commercial airframes covers almost the entire product 
range of Airbus, DC, MD and the Boeing family of aircraft. There is also engineering 
and related development work, including design, re-engining, avionics design and 
upgrade and R&D work. Component and engine support is also provided, covering 
support activities for nearly all narrow-body aircraft engines, comprehensive support 
for all Royal Singapore Air Force military engines, with a capacity of 350 engines and 
85,000 components through-put annually.42 Again, as with airframing maintenance, and 
repair, engine total support has a global reach, including Scandinavia and China. ST 
Engineering’s Fleet Management service offers engine maintenance based on a 
contemporary cost effective ‘availability’ support model; that is, maintenance-by-the-
hour, as and when appropriate, ensuring that engines are always available to fly 
according to schedule.43 On this basis, ST Aerospace has global support contracts on 
450 engines and 600 aircraft under total component support (both engine and aircraft 
contracts serviced via a global network of partner companies across the world).44 Due to 
the Division’s emphasis on quality, reflected by certification to industry recognised 
standards, such a ISO9001 and ISO14001 and major civil aviation approvals, including 
FAA, EASA and CAAS, ST Aerospace has become, in a remarkably short period of 
time, the world’s third biggest MRO company. 45 
 
ST Aerospace’s rapid growth can be put down to a strong and visionary strategic plan 
and an emphasis on the development of human resources. As shown in Figure 3.4, the 
staff strength of the ST Engineering Group in 2008 numbered 18,648, with the 
Aerospace SBU registering the largest share of employment at 7,063.46 The speed of the 
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Aerospace SBU’s growth is reflected in the fact that its engineering labour force has 
increased by 55%, from 4,567 staff in 2001 to 7,063 in 2008.47 The company places a 
high premium on training and skill enhancement, working closely with local 
Figure 3.4: Staff Strength: ST Engineering Group 
 
Source: Interview and Corporate presentation (21 August, 2008). 
 
university engineering departments, For instance, ST Aerospace sponsors a scholarship 
programme at Nanyang Technological University for high-flying local engineering 
students. 48  Of course, the engineers within the business also necessarily undergo 
rigorous training programmes with overseas OEMs, such as Boeing, Airbus, Rolls-
Royce and General Electric. Enhanced labour skills have enabled ST Aerospace to 
engage in work characterised by increasingly high value-added processes. Thus, the 
company has adopted a niche strategy of specialising in the innovative, high technology 
fields of systems integration, including the growth area of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles), both in the civil and military sectors.49 Linked to this high value engineering 
expertise is necessarily a corporate commitment to operate at the technological frontier. 
An important key performance indicator (KPI) in this regard is patent registrations: ST 
Aerospace having 12 filed and 10 granted.50  
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* Includes ST Dynamics & ST Synthesis
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Much of the credit for the remarkable development of Singapore’s aerospace industry 
must, of course, lie with ST Aerospace, its management and its workforce. However, 
one of the significant features of the Singaporean development ‘model’ is the 
interventionist support strategy of the government. Such support has played, and will 
continue to play, an important role in the development of the industry. In this respect, 
the government’s Economic Development Board (EDB) has been instrumental in 
promoting a local high technology environment, conducive for the development of 
knowledge-intensive aerospace operations. Given the relatively high cost of Singapore 
qualified engineers, implicit in the EDB strategy is the need to encourage increased 
local aerospace skill-intensity to accommodate higher value innovational work 
programmes.51 Thus, the EDB has economy-wide schemes for training local workers. 
There is a policy emphasis given to such schemes, not least because manufacturing in 
Singapore accounts for a high 25% of GDP.52 Moreover, the prevailing policy view is 
that manufacturing drives the demand for services, which the EDB has been 
aggressively promoting.53 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, ST Engineering is not only a major employer, at 
around 19,000 workers, but has enjoyed considerable output growth over recent 
decades.54 Aerospace, for instance, has since 1990 experienced a compound growth of 
10% in manufacturing output and 13% in ‘nose-to-tail’ MRO activities.55 Aside from 
the institutional focus given to the upgrading of local engineering skills, the EDB for 
the past two decades has pursued a strategy of developing industrial and technological 
clusters.56 Such clustering, both horizontally (competitor firms) and vertically (supplier 
firms), is held to maximise innovational endeavour through close proximity of 
constituent enterprise and access to a reservoir of appropriate skilled labour. 
Contemporary aerospace clusters in the UK, France and, indeed, China, also draw into 
the engineering network, local universities possessing specialist aerospace expertise. 
Singapore has similarly sought to promote local industrial clusters. A good example of 
this is the reclamation of land from several islands to condense into one island, located 
off the south-east coast of Singapore and called Jurong Island. The island houses a 
focused cluster of chemical and related downstream petro-chemical industries. There 
are other clusters focused on electronics, biotechnology and transportation, and also 
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aerospace. The aerospace cluster is located at Selator, Western Singapore. The EDB is 
building up Selector as an aerospace park and it is planned that the park will eventually 
become home to many of the world’s major aerospace companies. Whist it is possible 
to argue that Singapore, given its small size, is itself a cluster of high tech. industries, 
Singapore’s EDB seeks to regionalize (within Singapore), by sectoral specialization, the 
various emerging industrial and knowledge clusters.57 It has had much success in this 
regard, helped by the fact that Singapore attracts foreign investment because of the 
country’s attractive, flexible, FDI regime. Singapore imposes no ‘local content’  
requirements on MNCs investing in its local economy, and to ease their entry still 
further, foreign firms are offered generous assistance packages, including tax 
incentives, relocation assistance as well as subsidized schemes for the training local 
workers.58 
 
Aside from ST aerospace relocating its MRO activities to Seletar, numerous specialist 
aerospace SMEs have also relocated. Moreover, other foreign MNCs that have sited 
factories, at Seletar,59 include General Electric and Honeywell. One planned arrival is 
Rolls-Royce. This global aero-engine manufacturer plans to open an operation at 
Seletar focused on assembling the Rolls-Royce’s Trent family of engines. The unit will 
be the first facility of its kind in Asia, and Rolls-Royce selected Singapore for the 
following reasons: the country has a dynamic business culture, possessing sophisticated 
skills and a global business outlook, (Singapore’s trade, for instance, is three times its 
GDP); it possesses excellent engineering skills, and these come with high levels of 
productivity at relatively low cost; the knowledge-base is science and technology 
oriented; the government forms a key part of a tripartite relationship (including also 
business and trade unions) and has adopted a company-friendly business model, such 
that Singapore is characterised for its … ‘ease of doing businesses’. This approach 
ensures that all stakeholders work together to achieve competitiveness with respect to 
both cost and quality, even during difficult times. Singapore also boasts a robust legal 
framework to protect IPR, and a far-sighted government that in 2004 designated 
technology-lead sectors as A*,60 sponsoring their growth, and aiming by 2010 to have 
lifted Singapore’s R&D to a new level of 3% of GDP.61 All these factors influenced 
Rolls-Royce’s decision to establish a major facility in Singapore, which will become its 
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biggest MRO centre in Asia. 62  Moreover, importantly, Singapore’s small size was 
irrelevant to Rolls-Royce reaching this decision.63 A final contributory factor was Rolls-
Royce’s long successful business relationship with Singapore, stretching back to 1995. 
This was when Rolls-Royce won its biggest ever overseas order: Singapore 
International Airline’s (SIA) acquisition of 60 Boeing 777 aircraft, powered by Rolls-
Royce Trent 800 engines.64   This required the British company to enter into a joint 
venture with SIA for Singapore-based MRO operations on its Trent Engines. This MRO 
base has now grown to be the biggest in the world for such engines, and Singapore 
$700m turnover has expanded so quickly that a huge expansion programme has now 
begun.65 
 
Rolls-Royce views Singapore as its Asia business hub. The company places emphasis 
on technology partnerships, including those between SIA Engineering in Aero-engine 
repair and overhaul and the use of ST aerospace as a subcontractor in the manufacture 
of aero-engine components.66 In addition to the Trent engine assembly operation, an 
Advanced Technology Centre (ATC) will also be established at Seletar. This follows an 
agreement with Singapore’s Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) 
and its Research Institutes. The work will cover a broad portfolio of technologies, but 
initially the focus will be on high performance computing for aerodynamic design, 
materials science and modeling for fuel cells. 67  Rolls-Royce offers scholarships on 
Nanyang Technological University’s Aerospace Engineering degree and also works 
with the EDB for training, both locally and overseas, of its Singaporeans engineers and 
other professionals. As at 2008, no Rolls-Royce patents have been registered in 
Singapore.68 But technology development is a long-term investment and critical mass is 
necessary. In 2008 Rolls-Royce employed nearly 2,000 staff, including 50 engineers at 
the embryonic ATC and 1,500 employees in the company’s joint ventures.69  It is 
planned that this number will double in the next three years.70 The local business culture 
‘fits’ Rolls-Royce’s way of doing business, encouraging heavy investment at Seletar. 
By 2011, it is planned that the MRO operation will reach a through-put of 250 engines 
annually, requiring the testing of 20,000 parts prior to certification and return of the 
engines to Boeing and Airbus.71 The MRO facility and the ATC are the first of their 
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kind in Asia and fits into to Rolls-Royce’s Global Strategic Plan to run the company in 
the future from London, New York and Singapore.72  
3.3.3 Malaysia 
The development of aerospace capacity in Malaysia goes back to the1970s, having its 
origins in the push for local defence industrialisation. Following Independence in the 
1960s, the country’s defence and aerospace requirements were sourced directly from 
abroad, most often from Britain. However, in the 1970s sovereignty issues started to 
gain a higher priority, and this naturally impacted firstly on defence capacity but later to 
linked commercial operations. For instance, the Aircraft Repair and Overhaul Depot 
(AIROD) was established in 1976 as a public sector enterprise to service Royal 
Malaysia Air Force (RMAF) aircraft. The major purpose of such investment was to 
create industrial capability to provide first-line logistical support to Malaysia’s Armed 
Forces via through-life maintenance, repair and overhaul. 
 
Development of domestic operational capacity really took off, however, in the 1990s. A 
major catalyst for the increase in investment in aerospace was the appointment of Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad, as Prime-Minster, and the 1991 publication of his Malaysia Vision 
2020 policy.73 This was a high-level plan to reorient Malaysia’s economy away from 
labour-intensive industrial development, towards instead the development of high-
technology sectors, particularly aerospace. The ‘Vision’ statement was aimed at 
accelerating Malaysian technological development, enabling the country to join the 
ranks of the advanced countries by 2020. Vision 2020 added to an existing number of 
government policy initiatives (including the New Economic Policy, Industrial Master 
Plan, the Five-year Plans and  the Science and Technology Policy) to foster knowledge-
intensive, high value, technology development in Malaysia. 
 
The arrival of Dr Mahathir led to greater focus on Malaysia becoming a regional power, 
defined to include foreign policy, economic strength and military capability. 
Accordingly, the defence budget was increased, and a sizeable proportion of the spend 
allocated to supporting the emerging aerospace sector.74  There was a policy view at the 
time that the procurement of military aircraft along with the associated technology 
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offsets in components production and MRO, would ‘spin-off’ into related commercial 
aerospace areas to promote a local civil aerospace industry. This dual-use policy drove 
the creation of a Malaysian aerospace capacity-building programme. AIROD, for 
instance, as has already been mentioned, began operations in 1976, and was later 
incorporated as a private company in 1984 after merging with local-based Lockheed 
Aircraft Systems, finally becoming a fully-owned Malaysian company in 1995. In the 
mid-1980s, the company employed about 250 engineers, mostly former RMAF 
personnel.75 In 2008, the workforce had grown to over 1,200 qualified and experienced 
engineers. 76  Whilst AIROD remains essentially a defence aerospace company, it 
represents the bedrock, along with a few other major aerospace enterprises, of 
Malaysia’s emerging aviation industry. The development of these other primarily 
commercial aviation firms will be examined in more detail, below. 
 
One of these commercial aviation businesses is SME Aerospace (SMEA). The company 
began operations in 1990, formed through an offsets venture with BAE to produce 
weapons pythons for the then recently purchased Hawk Fighter. 77  Since that time, 
SMEA has built-up its capacity and diversified its product range to produce aircraft 
parts, components and subassemblies, integrated into BAE systems’ global military and 
civil supply chain. SMEA continues to supply Hawk pylons; indeed, is the principal 
supplier, having consolidated its manufacturing capability through investments in extra 
tooling, and laboratory and testing equipment. This is, therefore, an example of a 
successful offsets programme, where all subsequent pylon contracts have been won by 
SME through competition.78 Product quality was a given; it was competitive pricing that 
secured the contracts.79 There are 426 parts on each pylon, and whilst SMEA engineers 
have provided training to Indian Hawk engineers, both in Kuala Lumpur and Bangalore, 
the Indians have as yet been unable to absorb the technology requirements.80 SMEA 
now supplies pylons for integration into the 66 Hawk fighter/trainers India has recently 
purchased from Britain.81 In fact, these sales represent a portion of SMEA’s pylon 
output, which is in 100% export driven.82 In addition to the 24 sets of pylons delivered 
to India, SMEA also currently has supply contracts with South Africa, Australia and 
Bahrain.83 The work is skill-based fabrication with thus little in the way of a supply 
chain as only steel is required, and this is imported from overseas suppliers. The CNC 
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cutting machine tools are locally sourced, with approval required from BAES, 
Remarkably, SMEA’s strategy is to remain focused on this relatively low-value 
fabrication activity. The alternative of moving into high technology areas of 
specialization is not appealing to the company, due to the competitive niche that the 
company finds itself, and the aversion to risk that higher technology activities would 
impose. 84  Thus, SMEA has no design office, no design teams, as graduates are 
expensive, and the designers previously employed on the now terminated ‘national’ 
MD3 aircraft project have migrated to CTRM, another Malaysian aerospace company.85 
This labour–intensive emphasis on metal machining and fabrication rather than 
component manufacture keeps technology low, but also keeps cost structures low. 
SMEA does not use graduates, but rather technicians from local schools are employed 
and inhouse trained in the basic skills. Moreover, some 80 low-cost, but skilled, 
Indonesian workers currently form part of the company’s 600 strong workforce.86 This 
employee total shows a rapid increase over the 100 workers employed in 1991.87 A 
major reason for this growth in labour has, of course, been the company’s expansion in 
activities.  
 
In the past, SMEA had ventured into aircraft production, including such projects as the 
MD3, and a later programme to build the Eagle aircraft which was terminated in 2005. 
It seems that local aircraft production in Malaysia has proved too difficult to make 
money.88 So the strategy, as earlier mentioned, was to focus on fabrication, and whilst 
the introduction of CNC machining reduces maintenance (as the metal part is no longer 
the product of several welding operations but is rather a whole unified part), it does not 
mean that sheet metal fabrication will disappear. Thus, SMEA supplies trailing edges, 
sub-spar assemblies and aft pylon fairings for the Airbus A320 and A340 aircraft, as 
well as vertical horizontal fins for helicopters. 89  SMEA also specializes in work 
packages for aircraft conversion, such as the transformation of 15-20 year old Boeing 
747s into cargo aircraft. Here, the company supplies metal kits to Boeing, which then 
ships them to ST Aerospace, Singapore, for conversion work on ageing Boeing 
airliners. Such kits are also supplied to Boeing for onward shipment to its conversion 
facility in Xiamen, China. The kits are not produced in China because Chinese 
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aerospace/aviation factories are state-owned and thus production costs are higher than 
those of SMEA.90 
 
Composites Technology Research Malaysia (CTRM) is another leading Malaysian 
aerospace company. It incorporation in 1991 was driven by the Vision 2020 
government plan that aimed to target the development of aerospace as a strategic 
industry. In the early 1990s, the company specialized in the design and production of 
aircraft parts as well as the leasing and sourcing of aircraft through its subsidiary 
companies. By 2008, CTRM had diversified into composite design, manufacturing and 
assembly of non-aerospace industry, particularly in automotive, defence and industrial 
products.91 However, the principal focus remains on aerospace. The CRTM group of 
companies (Aviation, Aero composite, Composites Engineering, and Unmanned 
Systems Technology) is 90% Ministry of Finance owned and 10% owned by Malaysian 
energy company, Petronas.92 
 
The initial 1990’s production focus of CTRM was on the manufacture of hockey 
sticks.93 The unique feature of this product was that they were made from composite 
materials. Composites were also used to produce cargo containers, centrifuges for 
medical purposes, and reinforced structures. At the same time CTRM personnel were 
stationed in Perth, Australia, after acquiring the Eagle Australia aircraft production 
facility. A particular benefit of this project was the Malaysian’s acquisition of technical 
know-how and composite manufacturing skills. In the mid-1990s, the production of the 
Eagle aircraft was relocated to CRTM’s Malacca plant, gaining certification by the 
FAA in 1999. Also, during this period, the company teamed-up with Lancair to gain 
further technical know-how. Growth in global composites subcontract work occurred in 
the early years of this century. CTRM won composite contracts for the A300 fixed 
trailing edge, the A320 leading and trailing edges (46 components), seven further work 
packages for the A320, and became the first Asian partner for A380 design and 
manufacturing work.94  The rapid expansion of work for Airbus meant that CRTM 
quietly became its 15th biggest airframe supplier, the 5th biggest in composites, and 
biggest for Airbus UK (prior to the UK’s withdrawal from the Airbus consortium, with 
much of the work being taken over by Spirit Aero structures (Europe). 95  More 
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diversified subcontract work also came CTRM’s way. This included composites 
contracts on the European Heavy lift A400M military aircraft. Nacelle work on the 
V2500 and Boeing 787 engine cowlings, production of Lotus Europa automobile body 
panels, Boeing 787 composites contracts and major contracts with the Malaysian 
MINDEF, including Radome’s for the Malaysian Air force and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles in the civil and military sectors.96 
 
CTRM growth in its diversified product portfolio has led to a near four-fold increase in 
its workforce, from 393 staff in 2001 to 1,196 in 2008.97 Going further back in time, 
there were just 79 workers in 1999 and managerial staff numbered below 10 when the 
firm started operations in 1991. 98  The Senior General Manager, Mr. Zulkarnain 
Mohamed puts CRTM’s success down to ‘ACD’ (Quality, Cost and Delivery).99 The 
aim has always been to achieve high levels of competitiveness through the development 
of a business culture based on trust and partnership. Competitive success can be seen by 
CTRM’s growth in sales revenue from Ringgit 34m to over Ringgit 300m growth in 
2008.100 Remarkably, for a government-owned company, success has been achieved 
without using government funding. Only commercial finance has been used to run the 
business. Furthermore, none of the contracts awarded has been via offsets. Instead, 
international business has been won on a competitive basis.101 Thus, CTRM won the 
A380 and A400M contracts partially because it has proved itself as a capable high 
quality supplier on the BAES, Boeing, Airbus and other global aviation production 
programmes. 
 
CTRM’s business requires highly skilled composites engineers. Much of their training 
is conducted inhouse, though there is no company training school. Some workers do 
attend local vocational colleges and, additionally, internships, and up to 10 scholarships 
are offered annually to students at the University of Technology, Malaysia. Often, 
foreign OEMs require CTRM staff to attend specialist training programmes overseas. 
For instance, Goodrich, a US contractor on the global V2500 aero-engine programme, 
required CTRM staff to attend a US two week training course to teach best practice 
manufacturing concepts.102 Finally, in collaboration with Airbus, CTRM has established 
a small R&D centre, staffed by five qualified engineers. The R&D spend against sales 
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revenue is currently 1%.103 This is a modest investment, but the senior management has 
plans to register patents, in the future.104 
 
The final major commercial aviation company located in Malaysia is the Kuala 
Lumpur-based helicopter manufacturer, Eurocopter. This is a French-Spanish-German 
operation that has over 20 assembly plants worldwide, claiming to be the world’s 
biggest producer of helicopters.105 Eurocopter’s successful growth strategy has been 
based on the supply and subsequent buyback of helicopters from customers that then 
benefit by a new rotary aircraft replacement programme. This forms part of an 
aggressive market penetration strategy focusing on capturing high market share through 
competitive pricing structures. The consequence of this approach is a positive, but low 
2% (earnings before interest and tax) return on a Euro 18bn turnover.106 
 
Eurocopter Malaysia is a Southeast Asian symbolisation of Eurocopter’s global growth 
strategy. The Malaysian operation began in 2004 through a defence offset programme 
linked to Kuala Lumpur’s procurement of six Fennec military helicopters. The 
Eurocopter facility concentrates on MRO work across the broad range of its helicopters. 
Eurocopter corporate is not interested in MRO work and is content to transfer such 
capacity to regional subsidiaries, such as its Malaysia operation. 107  There is some 
manufacturing, limited to the supply of around 60 components for EC135 helicopter 
production overseas. For MRO and subcontract production work, Eurocopter has 
developed a supply chain of some 17 Malaysian firms.108 These include CTRM and 
Itramatik, involving purchases of metals, composites, wiring and training simulation. 
As at 2008, there was no R&D investment and no design facility.109 For some essential 
testing services, Eurocopter outsources the work. For instance, wind tunnel tasks are 
subcontracted to the University of Technology Malaysia’s research facility at Johor 
Bahru.110  
 
Employee training is given a high priority because contracts are highly competitive, 
requiring high levels of productivity including maintenance provisions specifying that 
payments are disallowed if helicopters do not fly. There is a training school, but it runs 
on an ad hoc basis, offering courses, as and when. Each Eurocopter approved course 
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will accommodate approximately 25 Malaysian trainee staff.111 There will also be on-
the-job training given for specific tasks, and, additionally, selected skilled workers will 
go to France for specialist training. Finally, Eurocopter Malaysia runs a one-year 
internship programme. Since 2005, the firm has offered 50 internships to engineering 
graduates from Malaysian universities.112 The track record of job offers to internees, 
following the ending of their internships, has been the employment of at least two 
Malaysian graduate design engineering positions annually, amounting to a total hiring 
by end-2008 of 15 internees.113  
 
Other global OEMs have a marketing presence in Malaysia, but no manufacturing and 
no MRO operations. Agusta-Westland, for instance, is Eurocopter’s major competitor 
in the helicopter field. The Italian-owned company is reluctant to invest in Malaysia. 
Presently, there are no incentives for long-term investment in the country: pre-banking 
of offset credits is not allowed,114 and the big disincentive for OEMs is that Ministry of 
Finance regulators insist on only short-term, normally one year contracts, to encourage 
local companies to participate in the supply of work.115 Moreover, a major problem in 
Malaysia’s aviation business is the lack of transparency, where communication and 
availability of information is limited, thus increasing the importance of local 
connections. Notwithstanding the challenges of Malaysia’s business environment, 
Agusta-Westland has a team of 15 staff in the country. Whilst most of the company’s 
civil and military airframes are produced in Poland, due to low labour cost, there are 
plans to set-up a MRO capacity in Malaysia, and possible also to offer training through 
the establishment of a joint-venture with a local company. 116  Agusta-Westland’s 
cautious approach to FDI in Malaysia is based on the weak business case and 
acquisition volumes that do not justify offset investment and the creation of local 
capacity. With just single-digit ‘helo’ sales to the fire service and navy, the small 
production runs carry a level of business risk that is too high in the short-term 
Malaysian contractual environment.117   
 
Aside from Augsta-Westland, the other major OEM with a sizeable presence in 
Malaysia is BAES. The British company until quite recently had a major in-country 
commercial aviation focus through its participation in Airbus industries. It continues to 
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act as a subcontractor on the Airbus programme, but has increasingly shifted its 
attention to military aerospace ventures. BAES has had considerable success in the 
Malaysian aviation market and this has been recognized by the Malaysian authorities.118 
BAES argues that it has regularly outsourced work packages to Malaysian aerospace 
companies, including AIROD, SMEA and CTRM; indeed, without BAES offsets, 
CTRM would unlikely have begun operations.119 However, as with Agusta–Westland, 
BAES, needs to have a clear business case for transferring technology into Malaysia, 
rather than the current practise of outsourcing work to Malaysian subcontractors. Either 
way, the need for viable and sustainable business opportunities is essential for an 
effective long-term relationship to develop. The BAES team in Malaysia has worked 
hard to achieve this goal, putting down its ‘perceived’ success to patience, a 
commitment to creating real partnerships, transparency, plenty of people on the ground, 
and most of all time.120  
 
Finally, from a macro perspective, the Malaysian Government established in 1993 a 
centralised public sector organisation to support technological development. It is called 
the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT) and whilst 
having a more focused technological objective, it operates according to the same goals 
and processes as Singapore Economic Development Board. As with EDB, Malaysia's 
MIGHT has developed policies to promote development of a local aviation sector. The 
starting point was 2001 when the Malaysian Aerospace Council was created to promote 
investment, employment training and productive expansion in the following areas: 
MRO; parts component manufacture; systems integration; and aerospace training and 
education.121 A partial aerospace strategy has been developed that aims to direct effort 
and resources towards three key strategic goals: technology innovation; cost-
effectiveness; and the development of ‘indigenous’ manufacturing capacity.122 Special 
incentives have been introduced through the 'Industry Investment Act' to encourage 
investment aviation-related MRO and manufacturing activities. A principal feature of 
these incentives is tax concessions, including tax holidays and investment relief. These 
policies have had some success, with for instance, Malaysia Airlines' 30% joint venture 
with Honeywell Aerospace Services (M) Sdn Bhd and GE Engine Services Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd, but the volume of foreign OEM entry into the Malaysia aviation sector, to 
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date, has been limited.123 Thus, overall, whilst Malaysian aviation sales have grown 
impressively, reaching Ringgit 24bn in 2007, the sector's industrial 'depth' remains 
shallow.124 A sense of this is gained by the fact that local contribution to value added is 
a lowly 1%, indicating a focus on low skill, labour -intensive activities rather than on 
research, design and development capabilities.125 
3.3.4 South Korea 
South Korea began aircraft production in the late 1970s with production of 500 MD 
helicopters under a license agreement with McDonnell Douglas of the US  However, 
South Korea’s aerospace development push really only began with the government's 
1999 decision to consolidate the three major aerospace companies into what was called 
Korean Aerospace Industries Ltd. (KAI). 126  This newly formed aerospace entity 
comprised Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Heavy Industries and Hyundai Space and 
Aircraft Company. The government granted KAI special privileges. To begin, KAI was 
given exclusive rights for all the government's military logistics and aerospace  projects, 
designating KAI as an ...“exclusive business organization for the Korean Aerospace 
Industry”... and also as a …“specialized company for the Korea Aerospace Industry.” 127  
Thirdly, the government further agreed to provide 50% of the total development cost of 
any commercial aerospace project. 128   In 2000, KAI embarked on a focused R&D 
programme working in partnership with Korea's Agency for Defense Development, the 
Korea Aerospace Research Institute and the Defense Quality Assurance Agency. 
 
However, since 1999, South Korea’s aerospace sector has been dominated by defence 
activities. Aside from the 500 MD helicopters, the F5E/F, F-16k and F-15 fighters have 
all been license-produced in big numbers. Additionally, a further helicopter license-
production programme commenced, focusing on the more sophisticated American UH-
60 rotary aircraft. Moreover, over recent times, progress has been made in the 
development of indigenous aircraft. This is reflected by the successful launch of the 
KT-1 piston-propeller type basic trainer and also the advanced jet trainer T-50; the 
latter being jointly developed with Lockheed Martin and looking remarkably similar to 
the silhouette of the US F-16 aircraft. The commercial side of KAI’s operations, by 
comparison, is modest.  KAI and Korea Air have participated in commercial business 
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areas through large commercial airline work programmes, including, for instance, the 
Boeing 787 and the Airbus A350.129 Overall, the Korean aircraft industry has grown 
rapidly over the last decade. In 2007, the production of Korean aircraft reached around 
US$1.5bn and exports of US$300mn.130  In 2004, Korea ranked eleventh in global 
aerospace manufacturing capacity, and is aiming to achieve sixth place by 2012, 
supported by Korean government aerospace industrial support. 131  South Korean’s 
aerospace industrial strategy has assisted this development process by supporting 1) 
systems assembly under license agreements with foreign advanced companies: this 
being followed by 2) airframe parts and subassembly manufacturing; 3) sub-assembly 
development; and 4) systems development via indigenous capabilities. 
3.3.5 Indonesia’s Aerospace Dream 
The home of Indonesia’s aerospace industry is Bandung. Production began in 1976 with 
the establishment of the state-owned company, PT IPTN. Dr Habibie, the then Minister 
of Technology, viewed PT IPTN as one of the key ‘strategic’ industries that would 
support the development of civil and military aerospace related industries in Indonesia. 
Demand through the build-up of the Indonesian air Force and national airline, Garuda, 
would promote local aeronautical engineering skills and capacity. Work would go to the 
PT IPTN operation via offset contracts. In fact, the contractual arrangement proved 
successful and on the Boeing commercial programmes. PT IPTN became part of the US 
OEM’s global supply chain, with Indonesian produced components being shipped to 
Mitsubishi, Japan, to be integrated into higher value subassemblies, for onward 
shipment to Seattle and integration into Boeing’s final assembly operations.132 PT IPTN 
also benefitted from production work on the locally produced CN235 military 
transport/civil passenger aircraft through its joint venture with CASA of Spain.  
Additionally, there was commercial work through offsets with Airbus, Eurocopter and 
Bell Helicopters. Defence offsets work was also evident through F-16 contracts with the 
US producer, General Dynamics.133 
 
The 1997-8 Asian-Pacific economic and financial crisis led to a relative decline of PT 
IPTN’s operations. The IMF in its US$50bn loan conditions forced the Jakarta 
government to remove the PT IPTN subsidy, and, as a consequence, in the years that 
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followed, the company suffered a long-term contraction of capacity. What made the 
situation worse was the government’s ideological switch to right-wing liberalist 
policies, whereby competitive pressures became the major policy thrust for developing 
Indonesia’s aerospace sector. The policy emphasis on ‘competition’ was in line with not 
only IMF policy, but also the general economic thinking of the late 1990s and into the 
new century. This might not have been a problem, if the government through its aircraft 
purchases had worked to sustain PT IPTN aerospace capacity, but its procurement 
approach, based on ‘open-competition’, ensured that aircraft orders went to overseas 
suppliers, with no requirement for offset work to be channeled into the PT IPTN 
Bandung complex.134 
 
The consequence of a competition-led business environment has been that the 
Indonesian aerospace sector has struggled. Its position has been made worse by 
MINDEF’s 2006-8 defence doctrine of Minimum Essential Force, caused by 
‘affordability’ pressures, institutionalising Indonesia’s Air Force to a minimum level of 
aircraft inventory. The aircraft industry in Bandung has responded to these difficult 
conditions by seeking to re-brand itself, changing its name from PT IPTN to PT 
Dirgantara (PT DI). However, aircraft production volumes remain low, over the past 
three years there have been just four sales of CN-235 aircraft to the Indonesian Navy, 
around 20 to Iran, and just the prospect of sales, to Bangladesh.135 The business focus 
has instead been on MRO work, and diversification into surveillance aircraft and 
simulators.136 The government has stated that it will not allow PT DI to collapse, but the 
problem according to a senior PT DI director is that…“the government does not 
understand the aerospace industry.”137 There appears urgency to the problems that PT 
DI faces, reflected in the dramatic reductions of the company’s workforce. In 2003, 
6,600 employees were retrenched, reducing levels to around 3,300 from over 9,000 
previously employed.138 By 2008, employment had risen slightly to 3,700 due to the 
scale of maintenance work and other diversified work in such areas as precision tooling 
for Mitsubishi hovercraft and simulator equipment.139 The paradox of PT DI is that, 
whilst the company struggles to maintain its aviation profile with the Indonesian 
government, at the same time, it has developed an international reputation as a quality 
aviation parts supplier to Western OEMs. For example, PT DI produces level II 
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components for the Airbus A380, A340 and A320 aircraft, including a contract to 
produce 18 components per leading edge for the A380, amounting to 300 sets on a 
contract expiring in 2014.140 There also continues to be composite work on the rear tail 
fins of USAF F-16 combat aircraft.141 Other aviation work is undertaken for Boeing and 
Eurocopter. Moreover, in the composites area, PT DI works as a subcontractor for the 
Malaysian firm, CTRM.142 Importantly, all these aviation contracts have been won on a 
competitive basis, and none involve offsets deals.143 Success in competitive tending also 
extends to the military field, where PT DI has recently won a contract on the EADS 
A400M programme for systems design, adaption and flight dynamics. 144  PT DI 
possesses capability in aircraft design, wing structures and engineering services. It is 
also working on a small 20-seat aircraft, the C312, a licensed production for CASA.145 
Yet, there is limited capital available for development investment. Even so, the 
company is committed to product development and allocates 10% of its profit to R&D, 
but profit is probably small.146 There is a training school for college-level engineering 
trainees, but aerospace skills continue to be lost, with skilled workers being transferred 
from aircraft production to hovercraft and ‘Flying School’ diversification ventures. 147 
 
Thus, while PT DI is able to demonstrate high levels of competence in its subcontract 
activities with foreign OEMs, it faces many challenges in developing its indigenous 
aerospace production capabilities. It is a strategic industry, but in reality this has no 
meaning. There is no protection and no government support.148 Nearly all material must 
be imported, including composite materials (kevlar, fibre glass and carbon fibre).149 The 
company is saddled with big debts owed to the government on a failed local project, the 
N250 aircraft, with no possibility of paying off these debts.150 There are also difficulties 
in the long-run in terms of evolving an international ‘brand’, and in the short-run, with 
the challenge of managing adverse movements in the US$: Rupiah exchange rate.151 
Moreover, a local supply chain has not been created, such that whilst PI DI has over 
500 general (civil) suppliers from the local economy, a high value added network of 
SMEs has not yet been formed.152 Finally, although the government is procuring at least 
six Russian SU-30 fighter aircraft, the Russians have provided credit for this 
procurement, but no offset work has been agreed for the Bandung aerospace complex.153 
So even though President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, stated in 2009 that Indonesia’s 
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defence/aerospace sector will be supported, industry lacks confidence that a supportive 
policy will be introduced.154 
3.4 Summary 
The analysis in Chapter 3 has sought to provide a regional contextual backdrop to the 
China case study analysis of general industrial development and focused aviation 
development to be undertaken in, respectively, chapters 4 and 5. Such a comparative 
analysis will assist in benchmarking China's industrial and technology progress to that 
achieved by other latecomer Asian economies. This is interesting for two reasons. 
Firstly, given that all countries face the same problems (and benefits), a comparative 
analysis will highlight relative success stories with respect to capacity creation and, if 
possible, indigenous development. However, it is helpful to highlight not only 
development successes but also the failures. Importantly such analysis may reveal 
differences in policy approach, factors conditions and micro and macro strategy. 
 
The second reason why a comparative appraisal of Asian aviation activities is a useful 
exercise is because the original Akamatsu Flying Geese Model did not take into 
consideration the possibility that China would one day form part of an integrated Asian 
model. So, in this sense, the inclusion of China (Chapter 6) into this study's evaluation 
of NICs and ASEAN4 aviation manufacturing company performance increases the 
realism of the flying geese study methodology. Since the 2nd batch of Akamatsu's 
writings was published in the 1960, China has evolved, slowly at first, but then rapidly, 
as an industrializing country. Reflecting on this growth, it is possible that China may 
have ‘broken the mould’ in overcoming many of the challenges Asian countries face in 
developing aerospace capacity, but this investigation will be left to Chapter 5. 
 
A factor common to all Asian countries pursuing aviation activities is that the diffusion 
of technology comes not from Japan, but rather from the US and Europe. In this respect, 
Akamatsu, did not conceptualise the impact that globalisation would have on 
developing country economies, particularly on trade and MNC investment patterns. 
Globalisation has acted to break-down many of the barriers to trade that previously 
existed. It also means that if markets are sufficiently attractive to the (MNC) OEMs 
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then the latter will go 'directly' to particular Asian markets and negotiate deals: market 
entry for technology access. 
 
Thus, this chapter offers findings from empirical study of commercial aviation 
development in selected Asian countries. Amongst the NICs only South Korea has 
developed an aerospace capacity, but fieldwork in Korea was not undertaken because 
commercial aerospace forms a tiny proportion of overall Korean aerospace 
manufacturing capacity; the majority of investment being channeled into the military 
aerospace sector. Japan was also not included in the empirical fieldwork of Asian 
aviation companies. Approaches to Japanese companies were made, and in particular to 
Mitsubishi, but it appears that the author’s Chinese citizenship and Japan's sensitivity to 
aerospace activities meant that the invitation to visit Japanese aviation plants was not 
forthcoming.  
 
A profile of the companies included in the Asia fieldwork is shown at Table 3.1. The 
results of the fieldwork and desk research are mixed, as detailed in Table 3.1. Only 
Indonesia of the countries surveyed has developed capacity to produce airliners. Japan 
and Malaysia have tried but failed, and Singapore and South Korea have deliberately 
specialised in the provision of services, MRO and spares. Japan has recently announced 
plans to renew it attempts to design and develop a commercial passenger aircraft, but 
scale limitations have deterred the ambitions of other countries.  
 
All the Asian companies surveyed have developed capacity through collaborative 
contracts with foreign OEMs. In many cases, work was first sourced through offset 
deals. Once the skills and capacity had been created then 'spin-off' work in the 
commercial area was begun. Over a longer period, this was also probably the case for 
the Japanese aerospace companies, which are dual-use in nature. However, at different 
levels of technological sophistication, all countries were constrained by the difficulties 
of technology access. On the one hand, overseas aerospace contractors were reluctant to 
release technology, and on the other, local efforts suffered because of minimal R&D 
expenditure. Although not producing aircraft, Singapore and Japan, have benefited from 
high volume and high technological quality of work via specialisation on MRO  
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Table 3.1: Asia Aviation Industry Survey: Company Profiles 
  
Singapore Malaysia Indonesia 
ST Aerospace 
Rolls-
Royce,  SME  CTRM Eurocopter PT Dirgantara 
Company 
Profile 
Year of 
Establishment 
1975 1995 1993 1991 2002 1976 
Ownership 
Type 
Temasek 50.8% 
Public 49.2% 
UK, PLC Private Limited Private 
Limited 
full foreign-
owned 
owned by the government 
of Indonesia 
Employment 
(2007) 
7,491 1000 592 1196 133 3,720 
Business Focus MRO, 
Conversion mid-
life upgrades 
Engine, 
MRO 
Production of parts 
& components for 
civil, military, 
fixed wing and 
rotary aircraft 
Composites MRO aircraft design, 
development and 
manufacturing of civilian 
(and military) regional 
and commuter aircraft 
Output Value 
(2008) 
S$1,838mn 
(US$1248.6mn) 
n/a RM76mn 
(US$21.7mn) 
RM297mn 
(US$84.9) 
US$46.9mn n/a 
Skill 
Generation 
Company 
Training 
School 
Technical 
Training Centre 
nil nil nil yes nil 
R&D Possession of 
R&D facility 
 (450 technical 
staff) 
nil nil nil small 
design 
office 
nil 
R&D spend 
(US$2008) 
2.5% of sales nil nil nil US$45,000 nil 
  
Patents 12 filed; 10 
granted 
nil nil negligible nil nil 
Local 
Supply 
Chain 
Number of 
subcontractors  
OEMs plus 20 
certified local 
vendors 
few 4 5 for metals 
and tooling 
5 nil 
Source: Author, abstracted from various primary and secondary sources 
 125
activities and high technology components and subassemblies, respectively. Thus, 
while Singapore and Japan have enjoyed relatively higher value added production, 
generally for Malaysia and Indonesia, this has not been the case. 
 
All companies surveyed placed a premium on skill enhancement and training. Yet, 
there were variances in company approaches. The global OEMs, such as Rolls-Royce, 
were drawn to Singapore, because of highly skilled local engineering labour. Rolls-
Royces' strategy has been to exploit these resources, short-term, and to enhance them 
through high tech training centres, long-term. ST Aerospace has placed a similar 
premium on efforts to up-skill its aeronautical engineers, By contrast, Malaysian and 
Indonesian aviation companies, whilst recognizing the importance of human capital 
investment, in reality provide training through 'sitting with Nellie' on the shop floor 
and ad hoc basic inhouse courses via cooperation with local colleges. Eurocopter 
(Malaysia) has gone beyond this, however, through promoting design skills in 
partnered university internship programmes. Graduate intake into the aerospace 
companies was limited. University specialisation in aerospace existed, but only at low 
levels of expertise. The exception appears to be in Singapore, where ST Aerospace 
works closely with local universities along with the OEM companies established in 
the country. BAES in Malaysia has also been keen to invest in the local university 
sector. Through discussions in the field, it seems that the technical level of training 
and education was kept low by the 'undemanding' nature of the aviation production 
work. For instance, one Malaysian company maintained a full order book by focusing 
on low value-added machining and fabrication of simple structures. This production 
niche was unattractive to the overseas' OEM, but profitable to the Malaysian 
company. 
 
R&D in nearly all the Asian companies surveyed was minimal, if not non-existent. 
R&D was viewed as important, but not affordable given the low volumes of work 
along with the focus on services rather than manufacturing. No evidence of patents 
was discovered during the fieldwork, except in the case of ST Aerospace, where 
innovation was likely driven by incompany technological synergies (skills pooled 
across the complementary divisions within the company). Patents, however, are often 
an expression of corporate institutionalised investment. Within a company, such 
innovation is likely to be the result of formal R&D investment, but innovational 
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benefits may occur outside the business in less formal ways from relationships with 
suppliers. 
 
The industrial advantages gained from working with local suppliers were known to all 
the Asian aviation companies visited, but for Malaysia and Indonesia, local specialist 
supply chains had not developed. By contrast, as in other fields, Singapore had 
developed extensive plans to promote local high technology clusters, a policy move 
the government was supporting. As was emphasized in Chapter 2, subcontractors 
cannot be created overnight, and the one essential ingredient is sufficient demand, but 
in Malaysia and Indonesia, this had not been achieved. 
 
In summary, then, it would appear that Singapore, like Japan, has been successful in 
developing aviation capacity, because of the focus on a long-term government 
strategy. The creation of sufficient demand through emphasis on quality and cost, ie 
competitiveness, focused on niche services and/or manufacture. Singapore's success is 
also symbolic of its emphasis on human capital investment, and upgraded skills often 
correlate with innovation and technological development. Singapore’s focus on the 
need to promote industrial clustering of local and also foreign high technology 
aerospace engineering companies provides further evidence of Singapore's 
institutional and corporate commitment to local aviation development. 
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Chapter 4 China’s Economic Transformation and the 
Emergence of a Fledgling Aviation Industry 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: The Crisis of China’s 
Command Economy, 1949-79 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore China’s broad-based development planning 
approach; the first of the three macro-level development and planning processes, 
outlined in Figure 2.10. The relation between development and planning is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 below, and highlights the need for government strategy to foster high levels 
of economic growth to effect sustainable development. From the beginning, the central 
thrust of government policy was to promote transition from an agrarian economy to an 
industrial model. Rapid diversification would be achieved through a fast pace of 
industrialisation, and facilitated by foreign direct investment. 
Figure 4.1:   Development Planning 
 
Source: Author, abstracted from Figure 2.10. 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the development of modern China, but there is a question 
as to when modern China, along with its modern industries, began to evolve. The 
aviation industry is to all extents and purposes a post-WW II development phenomenon, 
and, indeed, this will represent the time-parameters, here; however, it is appropriate to 
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note that modern China’s industrial and technological progress was cast by the profound 
historical events that occurred centuries prior to the 20th century. To some extent, major 
influences on China’s development trajectory happened during the 16th and 17th 
centuries. This was when China began to be exposed to European influences and 
religious pursuits though the arrival of scholars, explorers and missionaries. In 
particular, it is said that the Jesuits introduced the Western sciences of astronomy, 
mathematics, geography, cartography and architecture.1 Equally, through, the Opium 
War of the later 1830s represents an important milestone in China’s development. This 
‘cataclysmic’ event was the point of departure for the ensuing century of foreign 
imperialism, subjugation and impoverishment of the Chinese people.2 The war kick-
started not only the immediate overseas scramble for ownership of China’s vast 
untapped resources, but set the scene for the 20th century Marxist economic revolution 
as a reaction to colonial exploitation. 
 
Foreign influence really only began to impact on China’s economy after the  
Opium War, following the rise in port trade, the demise of Manzu power, and 
coincidental with military modernisation and the beginnings of industrialisation. Whilst 
imperialist influence retarded local innovation and scientific development, growth and 
development of the China’s business community was not deterred. By contrast, the first 
half of the 20th century witnessed the ideological awakening of China. Ideological 
fermentation was viewed as a vehicle for nationalism and reunification. However, it had 
the opposite effect, engendering almost continuous conflict: the KMT-CCT conflict;3 
the civil war of 1946-1949, and, whilst divorced from China’s internal policies, there 
was, of course, the bloody Sino-Japanese war 1937-1945, with all these wars having an 
identical negative impact on the  vitality of China’s economy. 
 
A similar story of chaotic, uncertain and contradictory development planning, occurred 
after the People’s Republic was established in 1949. Wild and unpredictable swings in 
policy occurred from, for instance, the early, warm, strategic and economic Sino-Soviet 
socialist embrace, to the ‘Four Modernisations’, then onward transition to the building 
of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (Zhongguo Tese De Shehui Zhuyi,中国特色的
社会主义) and, finally, to the contemporary policy, evolved from Deng Xiaoping’s 
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unique Market-Socialism ‘model’ of development.4 The process of accelerated FDI only 
really took-off, post-1979 following Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy, but any study 
of modern China’s industrial and technological progress would be flawed in the absence 
of a contextual understanding of the historical building block shaping China’s economic, 
cultural and governmental development. Moreover, it is important to note that China’s 
tortuous development journey did not occur in isolation from its Asian neighbours. 
Nearly all the countries in the Far East suffered at the hands of the colonialists and in 
similarity with China, suffered from a lack of local business autonomy, low levels of 
innovation and limited domestic skill enhancement. The purpose of this chapter, then, is 
to review the regional context, identify the economic challenges and development 
planning responses of the Far Eastern States before focusing on the study of China 
seeking industrialization via the technology transfer mechanism of FDI. 
4.1.1 Asia’s Evolving Dynamic Comparative Advantage  
Over the early post WWII period, large number of formerly colonised Asian nations 
sought independence. India was one of the first and the biggest to enjoy independent 
rule (1947), and its path to independence was relatively peaceful. Vietnam, by contrast, 
suffered a long and painful extraction from foreign colonial rule. The ravages of the 
Second World War through Japanese aggression changed forever the political and 
nationalist landscape in the Far East. Oppression would no longer be tolerated, and a 
whole swathe of countries, covering Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and later 
Malaysia and Singapore, obtained political and economic sovereignty.  
 
Economic self-reliance was an important part of the package. No country could be 
independent unless it achieved economic self-reliance. For some Asia countries, the 
goal of self-sufficiency is as true today as it was in the 1950/60s. Even in an era of rapid 
globalisation, the driver for economic nationalism and industrial sovereignty is a policy 
beacon that continues to shine brightly. India, China, the Koreas, and Japan, are all 
countries possessing sufficient internal demand to make feasible such a goal. Yet whilst 
most countries in Asia, including China, pursued similar development planning models, 
emphasising necessarily the strategy of import-substitution, the development impact 
across countries differed wildly. China, as will be detailed later in this chapter, veered 
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chaotically from a heavy engineering development embrace with the Soviets, to 
balanced agricultural development (walking on two legs - Liang Tiao Tui Zoulu 两条腿
走路 ), to finally, balanced development policies, incorporating the intellectually 
destructive Cultural Revolution (Wenhua Da Geming文化大革命). Similarly, India, with 
an equally huge internal ‘pent-up’ demand, aggressively import-substituted foreign 
products with home-grown manufactured goods. However, New Delhi put in place 
inflexible and highly bureaucratic planning approaches that stifled local innovation and 
productive efficiency. Import-substitution promoted Indian production, but that was all, 
and few, if any industrial comparative advantages evolved, irrespective of the low 
labour cost benefits enjoyed by Indian manufacturers. In the Indian case, import- 
substitution strategy, begun in 1951 at the time of the country’s First Five-Year Plan, 
was a failure. Manufacturing capacity was created through technology access from 
foreign collaborators, but the lack of competitive and innovational dynamism meant 
Indian firms continued to depend on foreign suppliers for the next generation of 
technology design. It was only after economic liberation in 1992, and, the subsequent 
push towards export production, that the Subcontinent’s economic development finally 
began to make real progress. 
 
During the initial development phase, newly independent Asian countries all mostly 
followed the import-substitution development planning process. For the small states, 
however, this was of limited duration because of the urgent need to achieve a critical 
mass of sustainable demand. Thus, for Singapore, Malaysia, and even Taiwan and South 
Korea, the push for Rostow’s economic take-off was pursued via export-driven basic 
manufacturing industries, including toys, cycles and simple electronic goods. With the 
passage of time, specialisation evolved in computer goods, microelectronic parts and 
consumer durables, such as TVs and radios. In the process, skills were raised, local 
production promoted, and, through trading links with overseas Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs), opportunities for assembly production in key re-export fields 
were exploited. 
 
The lead country at the head of this Asia-Pacific development push was, remarkably, 
Japan. It was remarkable, because the Japanese economy had been more or less 
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destroyed by US bombing in 1945. However, the skill-base was intact, and hence 
surprisingly quickly in the 1950s, and beyond, the Japanese authorities successfully 
transformed their industrial focus away from a war economy towards commercial 
production. To begin, the policy thrust emphasised technology access through learning 
of foreign technologies rather than FDI. The Japanese development model was 
characterised by its dependence on ‘copying’ rather than original design. Due to export 
production, though, Japanese industry succeeded or achieving scale and thus a 
competitive unit production cost. Japan’s development model was dynamic, moving to 
higher levels of technology and value-added once industrial competitive advantage was 
lost to other nations in the region, including ship-building to South Korea, computer 
assembly operations to Singapore, and semiconductor fabrication to Taiwan. Moreover, 
Japan’s long-term sustainable development performance, undoubtedly, had a cultural 
dimension, built on a substructure of other powerful factors. These included a stable 
political order; a strong but strategically managed currency; supportive trade unions; a 
policy emphasis on technology and capital investment, especially human capital; 
interventionist development policies focused particularly on the promotion of high 
value-added strategic industries; and a capitalist economic model, elevating  profit as 
the key driver in the search for efficiency and, ultimately, indigenous technological 
development. 
 
Clearly, even from this brief overview of Asia-Pacific’s development push, most of the 
countries aimed for economic as well political independence. Of course, political and 
economic self-reliance are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that you cannot have one 
without the other. Due to similarities in the levels of underdevelopment, it is 
unsurprising that Asia-Pacific’s emerging states had common features in the 
development planning process. Two of the more important features were import-
substitution and an emphasis on diversification away from agriculture via 
industrialization, hence leading to a premium on technology access. Japan proved to be 
the development and technology leader in the pack of Asia’s emerging developing 
nations. However, given China’s ‘late-comer’ status, there are similarities between its 
development paradigm and that of Japan’s. Thus, whilst China’s development planning 
since the creation of the People’s Republic has been chaotic and stuttering, compared to 
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Japan’s ordered and systematic progression, both countries have focused on state 
support of high technology strategic or ‘back-bone’ industries, such as microelectronics, 
energy, and transportation, including space and aviation. Evaluation of progress in 
China’s aviation manufacturing capacity will be reserved until chapter 5. At this 
junction, attention will concentrate on China’s so called chaotic development planning 
path. 
4.1.2 Origins of China’s Industrialisation and Foreign Investment Strategy 
To understand the post-1949 period of industrialisation and development, it is necessary 
to go back several hundred years and identify the critical defining features in China’s 
evolution. The first point to note is that the process of modernisation in China has 
always included a cultural dimension. Technological development was more than 
simply a process of physical capital accumulation, it also necessarily included human 
relationships, both with peers, and, importantly, the deference accorded to those of 
superior standing in society. Thus, just as European capitalist civilization grew up, 
inextricably, related to the dominant liberal philosophical tradition, so China’s four-
thousand-year-old civilization was dominated by the Confucian view (Rujia Sixiang儒
家思想) of humanity and society.5 
 
However, the last four centuries of Chinese development have been characterised by 
turmoil, rebellion, civil war, external conquest, as well as the cyclical movement from 
technological supremacy to economic decay. In contrast to the 16th and 17th centuries 
when China, as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ was the innovational centre of manufacturing 
activity, it stagnated and suffered rapid economic decline in the 19th century.6 The 
agricultural sector was huge and entire Chinese economy was tied to grain and food 
production. Industry had to wait until the start of the 20th century for its ‘economic take-
off’. 
 
Confucian principles held that correct rules and attitude were the basis of economic and 
political power and social stability. Men rule because they are ‘virtuous’. The virtuous 
man ~ ‘Junzi’(君子) or ‘gentleman’~ generated respect through proper behaviour, lesser 
mortals responding via obedience and submission. Everyone had a ‘proper’ place in 
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Chinese society, a view aptly explained in a statement by Mencius, a disciple of 
Confucius: 
“Great men have their proper business and little men have their proper 
business…Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. 
Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their 
strength are governed by others.”7 
 
If such relationships were properly ordered and people behaved as appropriate to their 
station in life, then society would be harmonious and prosperous. However, Li 
(harmony 礼 ) can only exist when appropriate relationships of inequality were 
developed. This philosophy could be taken one step further, though, because it is not so 
much Li (礼) that is important, but Hsiao (孝); that is, harmony is only possible if 
obedience is given to those who are owed respect because of their position.8 This 
hierarchical social philosophy partly explains the iconic Chinese reverence given to the 
great leader, Mao Zedong in the middle of the 20th century.  This cultural model, to a 
great extent, still reflects the social relationships in China’s ongoing 21st century 
industrial and technological transformation. 
4.1.3 Sino-Soviet partnership 
The People’s Republic of China was formally established on October 1, 1949. From this 
point, China’s political ideology reflected the Marxist writing of Mao Zedong in his 
work, entitled: New Democracy. 9   China’s economy would be built around three 
principal sectors. 
State economy:  with government placing under public sector control all the major 
industries, the key extractive industries, and the utilities. 
Agricultural sector: whereby transition from small holdings to big collective farms 
would be encouraged by the authorities. 
Private economy:  where ‘pockets’ of capitalist undertakings, mostly small and 
medium size enterprises, would be tolerated. 
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Mao felt that the public sector should lead the Chinese economy towards full socialism. 
This would be achieved via ‘Democratic Centralism’, implying the coexistence of these 
three sectors of the economy under the leadership of the people defined as the 
proletariat and the Communist Party.10 However, Mao was clear that in the development 
of a scientific, socialist culture there was a role, selectively, for useful elements of 
foreign cultures. Hsu makes the point that the culture of China’s New Democracy 
should be national and anti-imperialistic, able to advocate the dignity and independence 
of the Chinese Nation.11 Hsu refers to the fact that Mao argued China’s hard-won New 
Democracy …“belongs to our nation and bears the characteristics of our nation.”12 
Mao’s words are significant because they appear to suggest that he felt foreigners could 
contribute to the economic development of Communist China. 
 
The ‘New Democracy’ concept did not last long, however, pressured by its inherent 
contractions. It was replaced in 1953 with a move obvious bias towards socialism, 
encapsulated in the launch of a programme called social transformation (Shehui 
Zhuanxing 社会转型).13 A further, third phase, called Socialist Construction (Shehui 
Zhuyi Jianshe 社会主义建设) was begun in 1956, setting in place the Moscow-Peking 
economic axis.14 This was badly needed, as in 1949, economic policy substance and 
direction were non-existent, and, as a consequence, the economy was close to collapse. 
Flooding was widespread, and added to this, was the disruption to China’s agriculture 
and infrastructure caused by the long civil war. Thus the obvious outcome was inflation. 
To address rampant inflation, supply bottlenecks had to be overcome and economic 
growth expanded. Through the introduction of wage and price controls, the launch of a 
new currency (Jen-Miu Piao) and the imposition of a new taxation system, China’s 
economy were brought back under control within two years. The next step was land 
redistribution. This was implemented speedily, such that by 1953 some 700mn mou (1/6 
acre) of land had been redistributed from ‘land-lords’ to 300mn peasants.15 This then led 
the way to agricultural collectivisation, so that by 1954, around 96 percent of all China’s 
peasant households had become members of semi-socialist producers’ cooperatives, 
well on the way to the Soviet collective farm concept.16 
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China did not focus solely on socialist reform and development of the agricultural sector, 
but simultaneously sought industrial expansion. Development planning was shaped by 
China’s policy aimed, metaphorically, at ‘walking on two legs’. This referred to the 
need to expand agriculture and industry at the same time. China’s development 
approach was Leninist and this viewed industrialization as focusing on capital goods 
and heavy engineering. It was an approach captured in Lenin’s statement… “There is 
only one real foundation for a socialist society, and it is largely industry.” 17  For 
countries with large economies, such as the Soviet Union, China, and India, a capital 
goods development strategy is unsurprising. These countries clearly possess the demand 
and scale to achieve low unit costs of production, potentially enhancing the pace of 
industrialization. As with the Soviet planning model (See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), 18 
China also employed the use of Five-Year Planning periods. Its First Five-Year plan 
was expected to be in place by 1953, but because of lack of expertise, especially 
planning skills and technologies, it was not until February 1955 that the First Plan was 
implemented. There was thus just 2.5 years of the Plan remaining, but it proved a great 
success ‘over-filling’ targeted growth by some way. Industrial growth and capital goods, 
investment expanded rapidly, not least because of Soviet assistance. The social 
transformation of the First Five-Year Plan was very much based on Sino-Soviet-
Socialist industrial partnership reflected by the fact that out of the Plan’s required 
construction of 694 industrial projects, 156 of them were built with Soviet Aid.19 The 
success of the First Plan gave the Chinese government the confidence to be even more 
ambitious with Second Five-Year Plan, 1958-62. The aim was to increase agricultural 
and industrial production over the period by a huge 75 percent and economic growth by 
50 percent.20  
 
The Chinese planners were buoyed with the success of their early development strategy. 
Building on this success, the National People’s Congress announced the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ (Da Yue Jin大跃进) programme. This called for substantial increases in the 
output of the intermediate and utility industries, such as steel, coal and electricity. There 
was no limit to Mao’s industrial ambitions at the time. He even talked about overtaking 
Britain industrial capacity by the early 1970s.21 Looking back, the Great Leap was 
successful in raising output to higher and higher levels. So in that sense it was a success, 
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yet, it has been subject to criticism because quality was sacrificed for quantity. For 
instance, in steel production much of the output expansion came from the huge growth 
in backyard furnaces. The problem was that there was little quality control exercised in 
these informal sector operations. Accordingly, some 3m of the 11m tons of steel 
produced in China in 1958 was pronounced unfit for industrial use.22  This failure of 
industrial planning mirrored the experience of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Output 
targets were met, often superseded, but little attention was given to quality, productivity 
and process or product innovation. 
 
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, China’s economy was growing rapidly. This growth 
was supported by a powerful alliance with the Soviet Union that went beyond economic 
fields and included military production and infrastructural projects. These close Sino-
Soviet relations were, of course, driven by a common ideological purpose, but also by 
the pragmatic requirement to build up China’s sovereign capability to defend 
development, particularly against Western imperialism. The 1950 Moscow-Beijing 
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance became the foundation for China’s foreign policy 
posture for the development of its military-industrial capability, and, significantly, for 
the early development of its strategic industries, including iron and steel, shipbuilding 
and aviation. To facilitate this process, the USSR transferred hundreds of thousands of 
scientists, engineers and military advisers to China, contributing to the latter country’s 
rapid economic, industrial and military transformation. In parallel with China’s growing 
power, Beijing was determined to assume regional leadership in Asia. Whilst peaceful 
coexistence with neighbours was central to its foreign policy, China was always ready 
to support regional states in their ideological struggle.  For example, China’s 
willingness to send one million ‘volunteers’ to North Korea to repel what was perceived  
to be US military aggression.23 
 
The first decade, of Sino-Soviet collaboration was thus characterised by a growing 
strength in relations but also by increasing strains.  The stresses included China’s efforts 
to forge an economic development strategy different from that of the Soviet economic 
system, particularly the divorce of Communist party organisation from industrial 
management. China also suffered a backlash from the rural–based proletariat against the 
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speed and excesses of agricultural reform and collectivisation. However, the underlying 
tensions came to a head at the close of the 1950s, through the growing problem of 
territorial disputes on the northern Sino-Soviet border. These military tensions were not 
sudden but had festered since the end of War II when Soviet troops entered Manchuria 
and dismantled and dispatched to the USSR industrial facilities as ‘war booty.’ 
Subsequently, Stalin encouraged Outer Mongolia’s Independence and maintained 
control over Manchuria’s railways and docks (Port Arthur) until the mid-1950s. 
4.1.4 Parting of the ways: China’s search for its own development model 
Thus, whilst the Stalinist model of economic development had proved useful in a 
number of ways: in harnessing resources, giving central direction and gaining 
substantial transfers of technology from the Soviet Union, nationalising all productive 
means through an optimal blend of Fengjian and Junxian – a mixture of public and 
private. Of centralisation and decentralisation,24  and, finally, industrial growth rather 
than agricultural development, was understood as the prerequisite for imposing China’s 
military capacity and defending the nation’s newly won position of international 
equality.25  A Sino-Soviet split was inevitable. It occurred in 1960 leading to the forced 
departure of thousand of Soviet technicians and advisors. From that time, China began 
its search for a unique Chinese development model. However, it was not easy, as Maoist 
thinking was heavily influenced by the May 4th generation of leaders, 26   … “the 
intolerant sectarianism of Marxism–Leninism, and, in particular, the view that the 
average citizen of China – seen as the heir of an irretrievably useless and backward 
tradition - was deeply prone to error unless properly led.”27  
 
China’s new development way, then, reflected increased dictatorial powers, inertias 
inevitably sourced from the head of the Communist Party. It is now recognised that 
development planning, if that is what it was, from 1958 to 1976 was a disaster, 
commonly referred to as the ‘twenty lost years’.28 It was an uncertain era, with policy 
moving from one radical reform process to another. The symptoms of economic demise 
were becoming more and more evident, such as falling productivity, poor innovational 
performance, and reduced agricultural output, due to lack of capital investment. The 
institutional response was to launch, somewhat surprisingly given Mao’s contempt of 
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the proletariat’s intellectual capacity, an invitation to the masses to provide an agenda 
for open discussion of national issues, especially economic reform. Termed the 
‘hundred flowers’ (Bai Hua Ji Fang 百花齐放) campaign, it was launched under the 
banner, that ‘a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend’. 29 
 
The period of ‘openness’ did not last long, though, concerned by the flood of criticism 
and popular uprisings in Eastern Europe, particularly the 1956 Hungarian revolution, 
Mao brought the hundred flowers campaign to an end in 1957. It was replaced by a 
strong anti-rightist campaign, leading to repression, a lack of policy diversification, and 
economic collapse. The period also coincided with the Great Leap Forward a confused 
and contradictory policy responsible for the terrible famine that reportedly killed 
upwards of 40mn people.30 The Great Leap was designed by the basis that agricultural 
effectiveness was influenced solely by labour utilization. The need to raise capital 
investment in this sector was a non-issue. Instead, improved productivity and increased 
output would come from the introduction of People’s communes. It was an extreme 
form of farm collectivization, characterised by people living and eating together in huge 
‘messes’. Workers would receive part of the output rather than be paid wages. All 
property was public property, and as a result, the family system disintegrated. 
Dissenters were seen as ideological radicals and despatched to labour camps. The ‘leap’ 
failed to increase farm yields; instead, they declined.31 Higher and higher output was the 
priority, irrespective of the manner in which it was obtained. As a consequence, local, 
prudent, and traditional forms of farming were abandoned. Inappropriate crops were 
planted and ‘fallow’ years not undertaken. There was not even control over the number 
of wells dug, leading to excessive number of wells, and thus causing sharp declines in 
the water table.32 
 
China’s agricultural problems eventually began to impact on the manufacturing sector, 
not least because of food shortages and the disruption to normal education, medical care, 
and general public welfare. As a consequence, in 1961 the ‘Great Leap’ was officially 
ended, and China’s search for its own appropriate economic path towards socialism 
restarted. However, from this point, technology development was at long last given the 
policy high ground. 
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Although the role of technology was finally elevated in development planning, the 
emphasis on its acquisition was derailed by yet another bizarre twist in Maoist 
revolutionary reform.  This had regard to the 1966 Cultural Revolution, reflecting 
Mao’s growing distrust of the Communist Party elite since the traumatic ending of the 
Great Leap forward policy. Mao had become convinced that the apparent failure of his 
socialist dream was because of this elite’s pursuit of self-vested interests, such as power 
and short-term economic gains. His policy response was a re-run of the May 4th Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao intended to refresh the zeal, and change the 
culture by empowering the youth with revolutionary socialism. The Red Guards 
emerged and attacked all interpretations of capitalist ideas, including intellectual 
writings and traditional Chinese thoughts and practises. Contemporary ideology was the 
only way forward, and its source could only be the thoughts of Mao Zedong. This 
inevitably created a personality cult, fuelled by Mao’s ‘little book’.   
 
By the late 1960s it was clear that the Cultural Revolution had brought chaos to China, 
setting its development-push back by decades. The ‘revolution’ had also led to 
enormous loss of life, the destruction of generations of national assets and cultural 
artefacts, and not least national humiliation in the face of an incredulous international 
community. Although to begin, these attacks by the Red guards on China’s cultural 
identity, and seats of learning, only impacted on the urban centres, it was inevitable that 
the rural sector would be affected eventually. Approaching the close of the 1960s, 
agricultural output began to decline as the chaos of the cities began to affect rural life. 
 
Although the leaders of the Cultural Revolution, Mao, his wife (Jing Qing) and Lin 
Biao, were for several years in denial at the unfolding social and economic catastrophe, 
eventually and gradually the excesses of the Revolution were addressed. In the process, 
‘scapegoats’ were sought. At the grass-roots level, literally millions of Red guards were, 
jailed or sent to prison farms. Mao and his wife tried to place blame on Lin Biao, who 
attempted to flee the country, but died in the mysterious plane crash. Confusion, chaos 
and economic stagnation prevailed until 1976, when Zhou Enlai, a senior Chinese 
Communist Party official died, and later that year Mao passed away. Shortly afterwards, 
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the Cultural Revolution came to an official end, when the Party leadership arrested Jing 
Qing and other members of the notorious ‘Gang of Four’. 
4.1.5 Transition from Communism to Capitalism … 
The year, 1976, was a disaster for China, as not only had many of the country’s senior 
politicians died, but there was also a series of major natural disasters, including an 
earthquake that destroyed the industrial city of Tang Shan33 and the flooding of the 
Yellow River, seven times. However, out of this disorder, a new order emerged, taking 
China out of this long, dark period. 
 
A number of important events occurred after the passing of Mao that set the stage for 
China’s phenomenal 1980’s economic transformation. These events included:  
• Normalisation of relation’s between China and the rest of the world, particularly 
the US. This process had begun with US President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 
1972, and therefore the slow but inexorable progress toward the US-China 
agreement on the establishment of full diplomatic relations, January 1979. 
• True normalisation would not have been possible if just political and not 
economic accords had been agreed. China was keen to cultivate commercial, 
scientific and technological cooperation with the US. However, progress in these 
fields, especially trade, and the granting of ‘most-favoured nation’ status, was 
blocked over the problem of frozen US-China assets since the Korean War.34 
After much negotiation, the unfreezing of China and North Korea’s assets, was 
agreed in late 1979, thus paving the way for a trade pact that was signed two 
months late. 
• Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, a revered party member with wide political 
support. Deng’s aim for political dominance was based on his grasp of 
economics, building his power base by the appointment of young and able 
economic ‘radicals’. 
• Normalisation of relations with the West allowed China to concentrate, finally, 
on economic development, without the distraction of international military 
tensions, and regional escapades.35  
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• Additionally, the normalisation of trade between China and other countries, 
including Japan, enabled China to gain access to modern western technology  to 
drive a new era of development planning, assisting China’s new ‘long march’ 
towards the Four Modernizations. 
 
These Four Modernisations (Sige Xiandai Hua 四个现代化) had been written into the 
Party Constitution in 1977-1978.36 The aim of the four modernization was to transform 
China into a modern state by 2000, with the thrust of policy, prioritising the 
modernisation of agriculture, then industry, followed by science and technology, and 
lastly, national defence. At the 1978 first session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress, Chairman Hua introduced an ambitious Ten-Year Modernisation Plan that 
would direct huge capital resources at these four key sectors. In the industrial sector 
alone, investment would be greater than for the entire previous 28 years, estimated at 
US$400bn, with the target rate of annual economic growth at 10 per cent.37 Hua planned 
for the completion of 120 major projects, including 10 iron and steel complexes, six oil 
and gas fields, 30 power stations, eight coal mines, nine non-ferrous metal complexes, 
seven major trunk railways, and five key harbours.38  Similarly impressive investment 
funding was allocated to the other three sectors within a broad modernisation 
programme. 
 
Whilst the implementation of the Four Modernisations was far from smooth, with the 
authorities struggling to contain inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and the cultural 
difficulties of moving from economic disorder to ordered development, the policy 
nevertheless represented a platform for economic and technological advancement. 
However, a totally new paradigm was required. The Maoists had always emphasised the 
importance of self-reliance… 
“Politically, ‘wholesale Westernisation’ meant loss of sovereignty and national 
humiliation, a total sell-out of China’s independence and self-determination … 
Ideologically, ‘wholesale Westernisation’ was meant to praise what was foreign 
and belittle what was Chinese … Economically, ‘wholesale Westernisation’ was 
aimed to spreading a blind faith in the Western capitalist material civilization as 
to turn the Chinese economy into a complete appendage of imperialism.”39 
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The acceptance of economic self-reliance would not change, but Deng Xiaoping 
recognised that to achieve this goal, access to foreign technology would be required. 
Deng and his associates were at the helm of a new ‘technological’ Great Leap. The 
Chinese leader assumed that science, technology and the dynamics of technological 
change were basically politically neutral and classless, and that they could be 
transplanted without any injury to Chinese social and cultural institutions.40 Thus, the 
political and economic stage was set for Deng’s ‘Open-Door’ policy and the rapid 
economic transformation of China via its unique ‘market-socialist’ (Shichang Shehui 
Zhuyi市场社会主义) planning model. 
 
The 1978 reforms began in the countryside. After a decade of chaotic Maoist 
agricultural collectivisation policies that sought to raise grain production and keep 
prices low, reform was deemed necessary to allow farmers …“to catch their breath.”41 
Output targets were held and prices raised in a gradual way, with above target deliveries 
rewarded though higher prices. Liberalisation policies were gradually introduced, but 
the most dramatic development came from the Chinese farming community itself, de-
collectivisation of land via contracting-out of individual lots of land to farm households. 
This was a major reason for the rapid increase in China’s grain output reaching 407m 
metric tons in 1984, more than one third higher than in 1978.42 
 
There were opportunity-costs associated with this short-run adjustment process of 
injecting greater efficiency into China’s agricultural community, such as the  emphasis 
on investment and the scaling-bank of the country’s ambitious ‘leap outward’ 
technology import (Zouchu Guomen走出国门)  programme. However, the liberalisation 
process had begun, and was proving so successful that the process of stabilisation was 
extended to the broader commercial economy. It was a process of de-centralisation that 
was to last for approximately 15 years (1978-93). This first phase of China’s reform 
experience facilitated the introduction of liberalisation, concentrating on agriculture and 
basic industrial segments, promoting rudimentary competitive processes, decentralised 
control and resource management, and reform with minimum associated risk. As can be 
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seen from Table 4.1, these attributes contrasted sharply with the reforms that 
characterised China’s second development phase from 1993 onwards. 
Table 4.1: Contrasting Systems of Economic Reform 
1980’s reform   1990’s reform 
Zhao Ziyang: Cautious, consensual 
decision-making  
Zhu Rongji: Rapid, personalized 
decision-making 
Introduce markets where feasible; focus 
on agriculture and industry  
Strengthen institutions of market 
economy; focus on finance and 
regulation 
Dual-track strategy  Market unification, unite dual tracks
Particularistic contracts with powerful 
incentives  Uniform rules: ‘level playing field’ 
Competition created by entry; no 
privatization  
State-sector downsizing; beginnings 
of privatization 
Decentralize authority and resources  
Recentralize resources, 
macroeconomic control 
Inflationary economy with shortages  Price stability, goods in surplus 
‘reform without losers’   ‘Reform with losers’ 
Source: Naughton, B, The Chinese Economy-Transitions and Growth, MIT Press (2007), p91. 
4.2 TECHNOLOGY PLANNING: Kaifeng Zhengce and the Role of 
FDI in China’s Industrial Transformation 
For the past three decades, China has been seeking to expand and deepen economic 
development, particularly industrialisation, through local technology planning. It 
represents the second of the three macro-development and planning processes defined in 
Figure 2.10. The correspondence between the technology dimension in Chinese 
development and planning is illustrated in Figure 4.2, below. Technology planning 
emphasises the importance that China’s policymakers attached to inward technology 
transfer. 
 
Moving beyond the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ policies of the 
1970s, there was an emerging paradox surrounding China’s technological 
transformation. This had regard to major industrial and technological programmes 
occurring at the same time as the re-development of agricultural small-holdings and 
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Figure 4.2:   Technology Planning 
 
Source: Author, abstracted from Figure 2.10. 
 
small manufacturing enterprise. It is remarkable that the ‘bottom-heavy’ household-
based economy survived the 1949-78 economic turbulence associated with China’s ‘big 
push’ industrialisation strategy, surviving the excesses of the Maoist economic 
revolution. Nevertheless, it did, and the 1978 reforms supported the development of 
both small and large scale sectors; the informal and formal players benefiting in equal 
measure from rapid industrialisation. 
 
It is on the development of the large industrial sectors, however, that this study focuses. 
Whilst agriculture and light industry played, and continues to play, an important role in 
China’s development, Beijing’s technology planning regime concentrated on the 
promotion of strategic ‘strategic’ industries. This was partially because of their powerful 
contribution to PLA military capability, and, additionally, because they represented both 
the growth poles of a modern economy and the basis for self-sustaining industrial and 
technological growth. This section, then, examines the early reforms introduced in 1978 
at the time of Deng XiaoPing’s ‘Open Door’ policy. It will emphasise the policy on FDI, 
welcoming foreign investment to facilitate access to foreign technology. The section 
goes on to explore the costs and benefits of FDI in the Chinese context, prior to 
examining a principal form of technology transfer, licensed production, which is of 
particular relevance to the development of China’s fledgling aviation industry. Licensed 
 150
production is characterised by technology ‘offset’, an under-researched but nonetheless 
critical vehicle for technology transfer to developing countries. Once the technology has 
been transferred, the need is then to outline the Chinese way of corporate development 
and the importance attached to long-term planning, networking and partnership. 
4.2.1 Post-1978 Market Reforms for Fostering Technology Development 
Remarkably, China’s market economy model that emerged from decades of radical and 
disruptive Maoist Socialist economics occurred without any ‘big bang’. Liberal polices 
were introduced to encourage entrepreneurship, risk taking and the search for profit. 
The approach was uneven, unbalanced, and in some respects disorganised. It worked, 
however, because the Chinese planning authorities recognised from the start that China 
was a developing country where economic development was, and remains, the priority, 
rather than solely political transformation. However, there was no development blue-
print; the reformers simply seeking to address allocation weaknesses and bottlenecks as 
they existed or appeared. Under this approach, no distinction was made between the 
resource inadequacies of under-development and the inefficiencies of the command 
economy. Chinese reformers simply applied the market formula to revealed weaknesses 
in the system as a means of getting the economy working. Barriers were reduced or 
removed to create opportunities for local investors, and foreign firms were encouraged 
to transfer capital and operate in special economic zones. What emerged over time, was 
a unique mixture of socialist planning apparatus and ‘unplanned’ market principles and 
policies.  
4.2.2 ‘Open-Door’ (Kai Fang) Industrial and Technology Reforms 
The catalyst for China’s market transition was Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 ‘open-door’ 
policy. This heralded an economic reform programme designed to remove the dead 
economic hand of Marxist ideology, replacing it instead with an enlightened ‘dual-
track’ system (Shuan Gui Zhi 双轨制).43 This describes the industrial and technology 
planning approach adopted by China as one which considers central planning and 
market reform as a combined entity. From 1978, the dual-track system allowed dual 
prices; that is, state controlled prices for essential goods. The state prices were typically 
higher, unregulated, market prices. Additionally, the dual-track model permitted the 
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central planning authorities to prioritize investment into predetermined key sectors, such 
as energy, infrastructure and transportation. It is important to note that these two forms 
of resource allocation system were not mutually exclusive; rather they operated in an 
interdependent way. State enterprises traded with non-state companies, and increasingly, 
foreign business became an integral part of this socialist (planned) and market 
(liberalised) Chinese economic model. 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s reform process centred on re-establishing the importance of learning 
within the culture of China. Science and technology was the third of the four 
modernisations and was considered an essential pre-requisite for successful 
modernisation. At the national science conference (March 1978) a draft outline National 
Plan for the development of Science and Technology was presented by Vice-premier 
Fang Yi. The Plan emphasised the need to close the technology gap with the advanced 
countries through directing investment towards 27 priority fields.44 Underpinning this 
planning was the recognition that education had to be the driving force for change. 
 
For over a decade, China’s traditional deference to the significance of education was 
undermined by Mao’s chaotic Cultural Revolution and the later, somewhat 
contradictory views, espoused by the Gang of Four. In this regard, note the Gang of 
four’s claim:  
… “the more a person knew, the more reactionary he would become … [The 
Gang of Four] … preferred labourers without culture and praised an ignorant 
reactionary clown who handed in a blank examination paper as the model of a 
‘red expert’. On the other hand, they vilified as ‘white and expert’ those good 
comrades who studied diligently and contributed to the motherland’s science and 
technology. For a time, this reversal of right and wrong and confounding of the 
people with the enemy caused deep confusion in many minds.”45 
 
China’s leaders knew that for the reform process to promote development there would 
need to be a push on industrialisation.  Technology would be the critical input in this 
effort, with technology planning focused on technology access. In this regard, Cliff 
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argues that three factors influence the success of technology planning: technology effort 
(R&D and the associated policy strategy); human capital investment (reflecting the 
sustainability of technological capability); and institutions and incentives (determination 
of the size and focus of the knowledge effort).46 
4.2.3 China’s Research and Development Push 
Developing countries, such as China, are defined by their lack of R&D expenditure. In 
the initial development period, agriculture would be dominant, manufacturing would be 
limited, and technological capability scarce. Typically, it would be decades before R&D 
expenditure occurs, but even then, R&D/GDP ratios would average around just 1% of 
GDP.47 For instance, it was not until the 1980s that Taiwan and South Korea managed 
to break through the 1% threshold. For the advanced countries, such as Japan, Finland 
and Sweden, R&D ratios are above 3% of GDP. Table 4.2 details the R&D ratios for a 
selected group of countries.48 It is clear that China, along with other so called BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, have ratios at or below the 1% level. 
Similarly, the number of Chinese researchers per 1,000  
Table 4.2: Comparative R&D metrics for selected countries 
  
R&D outlays  
(percent of GNP) 
Researchers  
(per thousand total employment) 
China (2003) 1.1 1.2 
Mexico (1999) 0.4 - 
Brazil (2000) 1.1 - 
India (2001) 0.9 - 
Taiwan (2003) 2.5 7.1 
Korea (2003) 2.6 6.8 
All OECD (2000) 2.2 6.6 
France (2002) 2.2 7.5 
United States (1999) 2.6 9.3 
Japan (2003) 3.2 10.4 
Sweden (2001) 4.3 10.6 
Source: Naughton, B, The Chinese Economy-Transitions and Growth, MIT Press (2007), p392. 
employed is low compared to other countries. From Table 4.2, China’s ratio is the 
lowest by a large margin of the countries shown. However, these are relative measures, 
and if absolute values are examined, then significantly, China has the world’s fourth 
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largest R&D spend, after the US, Japan and the European Union;49 and possesses the 
world’s highest number of researchers per 1,000 of employment.  
4.2.4 Human Capital Investment 
Rising investment into human capital is needed to sustain local technology effort. Skill 
enhancement represents one of the key attributes of technological development and this 
has been recognised by the Chinese planning authorities. Growth in the number of R&D 
workers has been remarkable, such that by 2004, China had 1.16 million people 
employed in this sector, and of these, 920,000 were scientists and engineers.50 Science 
and engineering graduates currently make up around 45% of all graduates. It is not just 
that China is producing around one million science and technology graduates annually; 
it is also that the pace of increase is accelerating.51 Clearly, if this continues, then China 
will have the greatest science and technology resource (and research) base in the world. 
 
Caution is required, however, in the interpretation of the above figures. This is because 
the volume of R&D effort and the volume of researchers say little about the quality of 
these inputs. On the other hand, China has succeeded in pushing the boundaries in 
selected high technology areas, such as intercontinental ballistic missile development 
and space travel; these being fields where huge resources have been targeted for often 
military reasons. Yet, R&D for the average enterprise in China is more a pseudonym for 
training and basic maintenance activity. 
 
Aside from China’s efforts to foster local science and technology training and education, 
there is a sizeable and growing involvement of foreign research/training opportunities. 
This has two levels. Firstly, there are the huge numbers of Chinese professionals trained 
and educated overseas. Official Chinese data indicate that more than 700,000 Chinese 
studied abroad from 1978-2003 and that 172,000 returned after graduation.52 Although 
only one in four Chinese professionals returned to China after graduation, it is likely 
that the numbers returning will increase as the momentum of technological change in 
the country expands opportunities for highly skilled personnel. Moreover, even if 
China’s overseas graduates do not return, they will still play a critical role in the 
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development of international research and innovation networks that incorporate Chinese 
enterprises.53 
4.2.5 Institutional Technology Policy 
China’s institutional focus on the development of science and technology goes all the 
way back to the 1950s. From a very early stage in the country’s development push, 
powerful research establishments were created, including the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. As previously mentioned, however, much of the research effort was diverted 
towards strategic objectives, including the bias towards heavy engineering. The focused 
research effort and emphasis on capital goods production emulated Soviet science and 
technology planning in the 1920/30s. Both the Chinese and Soviet models operated in a 
consistent way within the command economy system, with Moscow’s important role in 
technology transfer and collaboration with Chinese enterprises in the 1950s extending to 
influencing the structure of China’s national R&D system. It was thus a centralised and 
unwieldy system of government-owned R&D centres unrelated to market pressures or 
incentives. When the separation occurred between the Soviet Union and China in the 
early 1960s China was left without access to technology or MRO support from critical 
technology suppliers. Over the next 15 years, therefore, China’s R&D framework 
deteriorated and capability stagnated. Activities fell back to ‘reverse’ engineering of 
aging foreign designs and the maintenance of existing systems. As a consequence, the 
technology gap between China and advanced countries widened, not reduced as 
originally planned. 
 
‘Open-door’ policy liberalisation measures impacted on China’s R&D system just as 
they did on other sectors of the economy. Firstly, there was a change in the structure of 
R&D funding. Naughton notes that from a position in the 1980s, where government 
research accounted for two-thirds of total R&D expenditure, this had changed by 2000, 
such that 60% of R&D activities were carried out at the enterprise level; this being a 
similar share as their counterparts in market economies.54 
 
Secondly, in addition to the changed structure of funding, there is evidence that 
enterprise-level R&D expenditure was having an impact on organisational performance, 
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including technology absorption capability. Hu et al, for instance, found that firm-level 
R&D and foreign technology transfer are positively associated.55 Additionally, Fisher-
Vanden et al linked firm R&D to the development of product technologies able to 
exploit China’s abundant labour resources, whilst at the same time minimising the use 
of scarce resource.56 Also, a number of big commercial organisations were beginning to 
invest substantial amounts of money into R&D. For instance, in the information 
technology field, Huawei and ZTE  are undertaking R&D spending of 14.7% and 7.6% 
against gross revenues, respectively.57 
 
Thirdly, government policy, post-1978, has been acting to encourage R&D and high 
technology activity in China. This has been done through numerous policies, mostly 
implemented since the late 1990s, and aimed at incentivising high technology activities. 
This has been done through a broad-based policy implementation approach, in which an 
important aspect has included the widening definition of ‘national industry’ to 
incorporate firms with a large measure of foreign investment. Associated with this 
policy change was the greater flexibility of the Chinese authorities in granting foreign 
investments, thus accelerating the pace of inward technology transfer. Aside from 
inducements to attract foreign capital, there has been a substantial programme of 
government support measures designed to promote high technology development. These 
measures included: tax exemption on R&D investments; subsidized credit for SMEs 
engaging in high technology exports; government procurement prioritised towards local 
high technology firms; introduction of local technical standards, representing an import 
barrier to foreign firms exporting to China; and the implementation of provisions 
enabling Chinese high technology enterprises to access capital by listing on the local 
stock exchanges. 
 
Government, policies such as those above, have been aimed at energising business 
endeavour in China’s high technology sectors, supported by government expansion of 
R&D activities. Much progress has been achieved, evidenced by China’s incursion into 
a broad range of high technology areas, such as microelectronics, telecommunications 
and aviation. Challenges remain, however, not least the need to raise local value added. 
It is right that China develops policies to move local firms up the value chain, as 
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characteristic of modern business is to become embedded in international value chains, 
both as a supplier and as a customer. Lenovo, for instance, has created a strong 
international brand by focusing on the promotion of local technological development, 
but, at the same time, it has outsourced much technology work through international 
subcontracting networks to Taiwan. 58  Of course, working the other way, foreign 
companies, like Motorola, will subcontract work to Chinese companies. However, the 
efficient operation of these international technology networks is based on trust, 
particularly in the protection of IPR, and also a commitment on the part of government 
to liberalise international trade. 
4.2.6 International Trade: ‘Reform and Open’ (Gai Ge Kai Fang) 
There was no doubt that liberalisation by itself, would have had a reduced impact on 
China’s technological development without policies aimed at opening up the economy 
to the economic opportunities offered through international trade. The planning 
authorities viewed the opening up of one of the world most ‘closed’ economies and 
progressive domestic liberalisation as a complementary process. However, dramatic de-
regulation was required to move China away from a command economy model towards 
a hybrid transitional approach leaving intact, national (typically inefficient) 
government-owned enterprise, but also introducing limited exposure to international 
trade. Yet, this is not to state that since China was formed, it has had no trade; 
international transactions did take place, though in the 1950s, trade was mostly with 
other Communist states. Indeed, around 48% of China’s trade in this period was with 
Soviet Union alone.59 Later, however, following the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations, 
China’s trade stagnated, it picked up in the late 1970s with oil exports and technology 
imports from the US and Japan, but inefficiencies of the command economy meant that 
China’s trade position remained fragile. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows clearly China’s upward trajectory in exports and imports (against GDP) 
from 1978. However, to secure this ‘explosive’ growth in trade, China first had to 
overcome its rigid command economy trading regime, characterised by the following 
conditions: government-controlled foreign trade monopolies that dominated the flow of 
imports and exports; a Chinese currency (RMB) that was centrally determined and non-
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convertible; and foreign exchange that was only released through special authorisation. 
Thus, in 1970-71, China’s total goods trade (exports plus imports) represented only 5% 
of GDP.60 Moreover, the Communist system was not designed to support an efficient 
trading system. It was more to do with achieving growth and output targets. Cost was 
not a factor under this approach, nor was allocative efficiency. China’s post-1978 
‘openness’ policies had transformed its trading performance. The command economy’s 
strategy was, as discussed in Chapter 2, focused on capital-goods industrialisation 
through an import-substitution growth strategy. In this respect, trade was simply to 
facilitate import-substitution. This was done in two ways: firstly, importing goods that 
could not be produced by local Chinese firms, thus overcoming domestic bottlenecks, 
and, secondly, by importing machinery and other process equipment to promote import-
substituting industrialisation. Exports were therefore down-played, of little importance, 
except in providing the scarce foreign exchange to support imports. This disconnected 
trading regime had the effect of reducing economic growth in the post-1978 period, 
because rising technology imports quickly exhausted China’s limited foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Figure 4.3:   China Export and Import (Share of GDP) Performance,  
1978-2005 
 
Source: Naughton, B, The Chinese Economy-Transitions and Growth, MIT Press (2007), p378. 
 158
In response to the above barriers to China’s efforts to promote trade, urgent policies 
were introduced to reform the country’s foreign trade regime. Almost immediately, in 
the latter years of the 1970s, policymakers launched two Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ): one in Guandong - close to Hong Kong, and the other in Fujian – close to 
Taiwan. The SEZs provided beneficial investment opportunities, tax concessions, faster 
customs procedures, and duty-free importation of components and related supplies. The 
idea was that the SEZs would facilitate trade by exploiting the demand and trading 
networks existing in nearby Chinese-speaking capitalist markets. Hong Kong, for 
instance, was already a major trading power in 1978, exporting as much as mainland 
China at that time.61 Whilst the SEZs were created to attract investment and create 
capacity, their ultimate purpose was to act as Export-Processing Zones (EPZ). Under 
this capitalist system, Guangdong, especially, grew rapidly in the 1980s/1990s, but 
without compromising the broader Communist economic system built around the 
monolithic state-owned enterprises. 
 
After these early modest initiatives, China’s policymakers began to liberalise the wider 
trading framework. Significant reforms were gradually introduced from about the mid-
1980s onwards. To begin, the exchange rate ‘problem’ had to be addressed. Under a 
command economy, China had maintained a strong (over-valued) currency, ensuring 
that import prices were low to reduce to cost of necessary imports. The move to open-up 
trade required that the exchange rate be weakened, placing greater emphasis on exports 
through a depreciated currency. China’s manipulation of the RMB was a necessary 
feature of transforming its trading system from one focused on import-substitution to 
export promotion. Alongside currency depreciation, the numbers of Chinese businesses 
allowed to participate in international trade grew rapidly. These included both SOEs and 
profit-driven private enterprise. Incentivization was also fostered by the Chinese 
authorities. Exports grew not only because foreign exchange could be retained by 
exporters above government determined targets, but also because of the broader ability 
of firms to earn profit; indeed, this reflecting profit maximisation through greater 
efficiency. Costs were suddenly important, and, equally, world prices slowly began to 
provide the economic signals for domestic production, as opposed to the command 
economy model where prices were planned. As with all other industrialising nations, 
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China sought to protect the domestic economy from external competitive forces. Not 
least, the planners were keen to promote designated key economic sectors, and so 
barriers were erected. Such barriers were designed to protect and promote local industry 
through direct tariffs, non-tariff barriers and import quotas. 
 
The early stages of the trade liberalisation were aimed at consolidating the process of 
import-substitution alongside modest export expansion. However, China’s planners 
were aware of the highly successful exporting models of Asia’s newly industrialising 
economies, such as Taiwan and South Korea, and they thus sought to copy these export-
driven models. Accordingly, export VAT rebates were introduced in the late 1980s and 
preferential interest rates on loans to exporters were introduced shortly thereafter. These 
measures helped to promote Chinese export growth, but the really important reform was 
the development after 1986 of China’s ‘coastal development strategy’. Nearly all 
businesses in the coastal provinces were allowed to trade and engage in processing and 
assembly contracts. For the first time, overseas investors were allowed to enter into the 
export-processing system, ‘owning’ the imported components and raw materials that 
were imported duty-free. Fairly rapidly, administrative flexibility was introduced, 
enabling foreign enterprises to avoid the bureaucracy and administrative complexity of 
China’s import controls and regulatory framework. Most importantly, foreign 
businesses benefited from tax concessions and were not required to trade via the state 
Foreign Trade monopolies to import their manufacturing inputs. 
 
From these early and cautious liberal reforms, China’s trading system began to open-up, 
and move towards a fully open economy. China had ambitions of joining the world 
Trade Organisation (WTO), making its initial application to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (the organisation that preceded the WTO) in 1986. However, the bid 
proved unsuccessful, and it was not until December 2001 that China was finally 
accepted as a full number of the WTO club. The delay was partially political, linked to 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and partially economic, given China’s threatening 
expansion in economic power over the intervening years. A new trading era now had 
begun, however, with China committed to fully opening up its economy, reducing trade 
barriers to foreign goods, capital and investment, and committing itself to the protection 
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of foreign companies’ intellectual property rights. China’s eventual WTO 2001 
membership was yet another step towards technological self-reliance. Inward 
technology transfer via the vehicle of foreign direct investment was expected to 
accelerate the process of Foreign Direct Investment that had begun with Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1978 open-door policy. 
 
Foreign investment began to move into China in a big way from the early 1990s. FDI 
flows have been above US$40bn since 1996, and higher than US$60bn since 2004; 
indeed, in 2007 inflows had risen to above US$67.3bn.62 Such flows are the biggest of 
any developing country, though far short of advanced country FDI. Technology 
planners have been required to ‘manage’ these capital inflows. FDI has been directed 
towards manufacturing, providing capital, technology and skills. Some of the FDI has 
been centred on high tech. operations, such as semiconductors, telecommunications,  
optic fibres, information technology, and aviation. In this respect, FDI has been viewed 
by China’s policymakers as far more important than portfolio capital, venture capital or 
commercial bank finance. Partially, this is because of the broader economic benefits, 
such as technology transfer, associated with FDI. Also, whilst much of the FDI has 
moved within the ‘bamboo curtain’, ie, FDI flows moving into China from the Chinese 
business diaspora in Asia-pacific, there have also been significant strategic FDI 
transfers from the rich countries. 
 
China’s contemporary period of technological development only really took root 
following the 1978 policy reforms. These reforms impacted on FDI, and, as discussed in 
the last section, provided opportunities  to foreign investment enterprise in the 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces that ‘kick-started’ the FDI process in China. However, 
these capital inflows were marginal throughout the 1980s, with the Chinese authorities 
liberalising regulations in a cautious way; the Chinese fearful of foreign economic 
domination. Then, in 1992, FDI jumped, beginning an exponential rise that has only 
recently begun to moderate in 2008, probably as a consequence of the present global 
recession. 
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There is not one answer to explain why FDI surged after 1992, but probably the most 
likely reason is that sufficient time had passed since the 1989 Tiananmen incident, and 
the uncertainty that had been created in the foreign business community had started to 
fade. Moreover, confidence had been restored by Deng Xiaoping’s important 1992 
‘Southern Tour’ aimed at re-establishing the reform agenda and reassuring foreign 
business that China was a safe and efficient country to invest. The liberalisation culture 
was now finally embedded in the dualistic market system. Infrastructure had been built 
up, and further reform was promised. In particular, the scope of FDI opportunities was 
planned to increase. Many new sectors would be opened up to FDI, and beyond that, 
foreign businesses would be able to sell their output in the domestic market. For the first 
time, then, there would be a more balanced focus between export-oriented production 
and domestic market expansion.  
 
At the heart of policy efforts to promote FDI were the SEZs. They acted as a bridge 
from the traditional command economy that still dominated China, and the liberalisation 
process then beginning to characterise geographical pockets of capitalist production 
around China’s coastal areas. The SEZs provided an open economic environment 
conducive to foreign firms doing business in China. China’s SEZs were not 
fundamentally different from the export processing zones (EPZ) that had been created 
across Asia since the mid-1960s. The common ground between these two types of zones 
was that they emphasised an export-bias for firms within the zone but without altering 
the protectionist import-substitution regime in place for the rest of industry. 
 
China’s SEZs grew in importance and number. ‘Open-Cities’, including Shanghai, were 
begun, offering most of the investment benefits attached to SEZs. Additionally, 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZs) were started, located 
especially along the coastal provinces, allowing flexibility to attract foreign businesses. 
Even though Chinese law at that time only allowed foreign ownership within the SEZs, 
around 18 new ETDZs were created in 1992-93.63  By 2007, there were over 5 SEZs 
and 49 ETDZs in China. 64  Furthermore, China’s encouragement of FDI was now 
extending into the interior, towards the relatively underdeveloped Western regions. 
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Today, every Chinese province possesses a SEZ of one type or another, providing a 
more balanced planning framework across China. 
 
The SEZs have without doubt facilitated foreign investment in China. The advantages in 
place are attractive, including low taxes, the facility to convert currency, and the 
unrestricted opportunity to repatriate profit. In addition, the SEZs operate in a 
decentralised way, with flexibility to bypass time consuming state regulations, speeding 
up business decision-making. IPR protection remains a challenge, but WTO 
membership ensures that the authorities are committed to strengthening the measures to 
protect IPR. Hand-in-hand with such liberalisation has been the changing structure of  
Figure 4.4:   Modes of FDI in China  
 
Source: Naughton, B, The Chinese Economy-Transitions and Growth, MIT Press (2007), p412. 
 
FDI. Immediately after 1978, most of the limited foreign investments entering China 
were contractual joint-venture operations. Profit would be shared on a mutually 
acceptable basis. Joint development projects were also prominent, but both these forms 
of foreign investment declined over time. Replacing them were equity joint ventures. 
These created a legal identity, suggesting a long term relationship or partnership in 
directing the venture. China felt this type of foreign investment would encourage greater 
access to foreign technology; however, the reality was that foreign business was more 
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interested in seeking short-term profit, so inevitably tensions between the partners 
would surface. With China’s progressive move towards more open and market-based 
structures, policies have evolved to promote FDI through wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations, and, as Figure 4.4 shows, this has now become the dominant form 
of FDI Model in China. 
4.3 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: China’s Push for 
Indigenisation 
The previous section examined the strategic frameworks for technology access to 
support Chinese industrialisation, where the emphasis, certainly since the 1980s, has 
been on FDI. However, attempts to access foreign technology go much further back to 
the late 1950s and 1960s, when China encouraged strong collaborative links with Soviet 
industry, particularly in the heavy engineering sector. More recently alongside FDI, 
China has put work in its factories, technology offsets; this applying especially to the 
defence and aviation sectors. As part of this process of inward technology transfer, 
China, as with other Asian development states, such as South Korea and Japan, has 
introduced parallel policies to develop the technological base of its economy. Of course, 
it is helpful to encourage short-term economic multiplier benefits of employment and 
income generation, but if the long-term goal is indigenous industralisation, but further 
policies are required. 65 Consequently, China has targeted local and foreign resources 
towards higher technology output on the basis that such high value activities are 
consonant with progression towards local technological development. This section thus 
completes the cycle from development planning (broad-based economic development 
strategies), to technology planning (Five-Year Plans to diversify the economy away 
from agriculture and labour-intensive production to manufacture, facilitated by FDI), to 
technology development (policy emphasis on the development of ‘local’ high 
technology industries that are high value, knowledge-intensive and innovative), see 
Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5:   Technology Development 
 
Source: author, abstracted from Figure 2.10. 
4.3.1 China’s Technology Development Policy   
Beijing’s ambition to foster technological self-reliance has long been linked to the need 
to promote science and technology. This point is subtly emphasised in the statement by 
Liu Huaqing: 
… “without advanced science and technology and people armed with advanced 
science and technology, modernisation is empty talk.”66 
 
This has been a consistent theme since 1949, China’s year of independence. Indeed, it 
was programmed into the country’s First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). The aim was to 
develop infrastructure for China’s S&T system. Rapid progress was achieved, such that 
by 1955, a total of 840 scientific and technology research institutes had been set-up 
compared to only 40 scientific research institutes in 1949. 67  In January 1956, the 
Chinese government issued its First Plan on the Development of S&T – the ‘Long Term 
Plan of Science and Technology Development in China from 1956 to 1967’ (often 
abbreviated to simply the ‘12-year Programme’, Shiernian Kexue Jishu Fazhan 
Yuanjing Guihua 1956-1967 年十二年科学技术发展远景规划). Some 616 key technology 
projects in the 12-year programme covered major technological areas that were critical 
to China’s industrialisation ambitions, including computer and automatic technology.68 
In March 1962, China’s National Commission of Science and Technology issued the 
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‘Plan of Scientific and Technological Development from 1963 to 1972’ (‘10-year 
programme’, Shinian Kexue Jishu Guihua Gangyao 1963—1972年科学技术规划纲要). This 
Plan ran in parallel with China’s military priorities and contributed to the development 
of nuclear weapons, missiles and satellites. The later 8-year programme (1978-1985) 
continued to focus on the creation of a comprehensive S&T capability. During this plan, 
108 research projects were undertaken in the fields of agriculture, energy, materials, 
computers, lasers, space, high energy physics and genetic engineering.69 Into the 1980s, 
China’s S&T policy began to focus on reform and dynamism. The big S&T policy 
initiative was the ‘Decision on the Reform of Science and Technology Management’ 
(1985 Decision), and the 1995 ‘Decision on Accelerating Scientific and Technological 
Progress’ (1995 Decision). These two important policies played an important role 
influencing China’s technological development over the last two decades. The 1985 
decision began a series of reforms in the S&T system with regard to its structure, 
funding and human resource management. One important change was that research 
institutes previously reliant on government funding now had to bid for private sector 
funds. Building on these reforms, the 1995 Decision focused on the need to strengthen 
the relationship between S&T and economic growth. Thus, the 1995 Decision 
emphasised 11 critical policy areas, including: implementation of the idea that science 
& technology are primary productive forces in all fields; improvement in the quality and 
efficiency of industrial growth through advances in S&T; development of high 
technology industries; training of a contingent of highly qualified S&T workers to 
enhance the nation’s technological level; and further opening-up China to the outside 
world to extensively launch international scientific and technological cooperation and 
exchanges.70 The thrust of the 1995 policy was to reinforce a long list of earlier growth-
biased S&T initiatives shown in Table 4.3: 
 
The development of China’s early S&T infrastructure was remarkable in the breadth of 
its scope. However, it was a system modelled on the Soviet approach, which was highly 
institutional and bureaucratic.  The biggest failings have regard to the separation of 
institutional research (including government research institutes and universities) away 
from the production units. 
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This lack of cohesion meant that although indigenous S&T leading to innovation had 
been at the heart of China’s S&T policy since 1949, little local technological 
development had occurred up to the new Millennium. To overcome this problem, 
Beijing began to emphasise the lack of contradiction between indigenous development 
of S&T and international cooperation along with the importation of technology. It was 
believed that international cooperation with advanced countries would be a short-cut to 
narrowing the technology gap between China and the advanced nations. This S&T 
approach also aligned with the more general economic model emphasising China’s 
open-door philosophy.  
 
To further improve indigenous S&T, the Chinese government stated in the early 1990s 
that the goal for total R&D spending (public and private) was to reach 1.5 per cent of 
China’s GDP by the year 2000. 71  To use public funding effectively, the Chinese 
government must give priority to basic research and high technology research and let 
normal commercial technologies be driven by market forces. 
Table 4.3: China’s Growth-Biased S&T Policies  
 Policy Year
- National Key Technologies R&D programme 1982
- High-tech R&D Programme (863 Plan) 1983
- Spark Programme (Promoting Rural Economy)  1986
- Torch Programme (Developing New High-Tech 
industries 
1988
- National New Product Programme (high-tech) 1988
- National Medium and Long-Term S&T 
Development Programme 
1990
- Climbing Programme (Basic Research) 1991
- National Programme for Key Basic Research 
Project (973 programme) 
1997
Source: Adapted from Wang Pei, The Challenge: Promoting China’s Defence Science and Technology 
Capability, MOA, No 18, Thesis, (2004), pp40-1. 
 
In the ‘95 decision’, Jiang Zeming advocated … “stabilize on one side, but let the other 
side be free” (“Wenzhu yitou, Fangkai Yipian” 稳住一头，放开一片).72 The one side 
which needs to be stabilized refers to basic research and applied basic research. The 
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other side to be free refers to applied research. This notion means the government 
should emphasize basic research and let the market, support applied research. This 
philosophy has three-fold underpinnings: first, basic research is very important because 
it lays the foundation for applied research and refers to the long-tem, sustained 
development of S&T; second, most enterprises are reluctant to invest in basic research, 
due to the high risks inherent in basic research, thus to guarantee the sustained 
development of S&T, the government should support and fund basic research; third, “let 
the other side be free” can facilitate a close combination of applied research and 
economic growth. In implementing the “stabilize on one side, but let the other side be 
free” policy, China continued to reform its S&T systems in the 2000s, with a view to 
accelerating technological development. 
 
In 1986, China introduced the 863 Plan which was aimed at raising the degree of ‘dual-
use’ civil-military integration in the Chinese economy. This was followed by further 
measures in the following decade, such as Plan 973. In the present century, the pace of 
China’s technological development has increased rapidly. This is partly to do with 
increasing corporate R&D, partly to do with governmental sponsorship of R&D and 
partly because of the mix of government measures to raise local absorptive and 
innovative capability. The Chinese government’s industrial policy has very much 
targeted priority sectors and traditionally, that has meant public-owned manufacturing 
enterprises. In reality, during the past 10 years, China’s industrial policy has been 
integrated into technology policy.73 The country’s push for technology development has 
been supported by a spectrum of incentives designed to develop a sovereign and 
sustainable knowledge-intensive economy. However, sovereignty may not necessarily 
be translated as business-under-Chinese-control. China’s ‘national industry’ has been 
redefined to include foreign investments and also small and joint-venture start-ups. 
 
Promotion of high technology industry is arguably the central economic development 
policy of the Chinese government during the present decade.74 This is reflected by the 
way in which long-term development of human capital is promoted and via high tech-
exports, particularly those in which China owns the IPR. Alongside foreign investment 
the Chinese authorities have promoted local technology development through the use of 
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tax breaks on R&D expenditure, subsidized credit, and domestic high-tech firms 
enjoying government procurement preference, the introduction of corporate governance 
provisions to sponsor venture capitalists, and the creation of competitive advantage by 
manipulation of technological standards. The focus on technological self-reliance has 
been a constant theme in the history of Chinese development. It has come to the fore 
again, since the late 1970s, when China’s open-door policy allowed greater access to 
advanced technologies through increased foreign investment. A point emphasised by 
Hutschenreiter … 
“ The role of FDI in technology transfer to China has been significant. 
Technological knowledge has been transferred through the import of 
intermediate and capital goods but also more directly through the transfer of 
technology, know-how and advanced management practises related to the 
implementation of FDI projects and the operation of foreign-invested firms. 
Especially before China’s accession to the WTO, the approval of FDI projects 
was often made conditional to some disclosure of technology.”75  
4.3.2 Post 1978 Innovation Strategies 
The first phase of policies aimed at raising technology and innovation occurred during 
1976-77, therefore slightly pre-dating the launch of the ‘open-door’ period. The purpose 
of technology policy at that time was to modernize Chinese industry through major 
imports of overseas capital goods, the so-called ‘foreign leap forward’ (Duiwai Yinjin对
外引进), but the strategy was found to be wanting because of the shortage of foreign 
exchange to sustain high levels of expensive foreign imports.76 The second phase of 
innovation strategy was promoted in the two decades following 1978. It was called the 
‘market for technology’ (Jishu Shichang 技术市场 ) strategy, identifying FDI as the 
principal vehicle for technology transfer from the advanced countries.77 This strategy 
has been, and continues to be, successful in raising the volume and value of FDI into 
China, and in the process changing the structure and efficiency of local enterprise. 
However, foreign companies have been reluctant to transfer the ‘core’ technologies … 
“Foreign firms in China typically perform some parts of the manufacturing process in 
China, with little technological innovation or product design … [thus]… foreign 
companies as a whole are currently less R&D intensive than domestic Chinese firms.”78 
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Finally, the third phase of reform-biased Chinese leadership launched the ‘revitalising 
the nation through science and education’ (Zhishi Jingji Yu Kejiao Xingguo知识经济与科
教兴国) Policy in 1995. The point about this third phase of technological reform was that 
it signalled recognition by China that dependence on foreign technology for achieving 
technological sovereignty and competitiveness was no longer sustainable. China’s 
technology sovereignty could only be achieved via its own technological capabilities. 
 
A major milestone in China gaining traction in technology development was the 
publication of the 2006 ‘Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science 
and Technology.’(Guojia Zhongchangqi Kexue he Jishu Fazhan Gaihua Gangyao国家
中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要).79  The Plan established the objective, priorities and 
instruments that would be used in securing China’s short-term goal of becoming an 
‘innovation-oriented’ society by the year 2020, and in the longer-term becoming a 
leading global innovation economy. The objectives to be to reached by 2020 are that … 
… “China’s R&D intensity will be increased to 2.5% of GDP (2.0% by 2010), 
innovation will contribute to 60% of economic growth, and China’s reliance on 
foreign technology will be reduced to below 30%, and overall, China will be 
among the top five countries worldwide in terms of key innovation output 
indicators … [this]…latest plan specifically emphasised the need to develop 
capabilities for ‘indigenous’ or ‘home-grown innovation’ with a view to creating 
the conditions for achieving a leading position in a number of S&T based 
industries.”80 
 
China’s 2006 Technology Development Plan (2006-2020) emphasises that improving 
indigenous innovation capability is essential for adjusting economic structure and 
increasing competitiveness of the state.81 The Plan refers to the concept of Zi Zhu 
Chuang Xin, which has four components: 1) genuinely original innovation; 2) integrated 
innovation; 3) the fusing together of existing technologies in new ways; and 4) ‘re-
innovation’, involving the assimilation and improvement of imported technologies.82 
 
China’s raised focus on indigenous technological development is significant in two 
respects: firstly, it appears to suggest that the country is pursuing its own brand of 
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techno-nationalism, as per the Japan’s approach during the course of its industrialisation 
process. However, in the pursuit of this goal, China will find it difficult to overcome the 
challenges faced by a globalising economic environment; and secondly, linked to the 
first point, the plan is interventionist in nature, marking a departure from the more 
typical reform process of a liberal, market-driven resource management model. Thus, 
the 2006 Plan identified 16 ‘special’ projects for developing local capacity for critical 
technologies. These key technologies include core electronic devices, extremely large-
scale integrated circuits, wideband wireless communications technology, advanced 
large-scale pressured-water reactors, the breeding of new transgenic biological varieties, 
innovational pharmaceutical products, and, importantly, giant aerospace technology.83 
The Plan also targeted advanced research in eight ‘cutting-edge’ technological areas, 
including biotechnology and advanced energy, marine, laser and aerospace technologies. 
The polices required for the implementation of the 2006 plan were also identified, and 
besides those that have already been discussed in this chapter, such as enhancement of 
civil-military education, the following issue, public funding for the absorption of 
imported technology was highlighted and will now be discussed in further detail. 
 
Policies to support absorption of imported technology are numerous, but two 
contemporary initiatives are worthy of consideration, namely, the promotion of 
industrial clustering and enhanced integration into the global manufacturing and 
innovation production networks system. 
4.3.3 Industrial and Technology Clusters 
‘Clusters’ is a term which explains a set of close industrial relationships, and their 
development is a policy which over the last decade has attracted policymakers’ 
attention. 84  As a concept, however, it has existed for generations. Clusters are an 
exciting development because they are believed to foster innovation through local 
knowledge spill-overs. They are particularly relevant to high technology industries, such 
as telecommunication and aerospace.85 The commercial aerospace and aviation sectors 
have become very competitive and there has thus been a growing emphasis on cost 
reduction. One way of achieving this is for the civil aircraft OEMs to outsource to 
suppliers of subassemblies, including engines, structures, landing gear and avionics, 
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with the OEMs focusing on their core competences of designing, integrating and 
marketing of aircraft. This has led to a rationalisation of the supply base around regional 
and international geographical areas of expertise. Academic writing on clusters 
distinguishes between ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ forces; the former, explaining 
agglomerations of high-technology enterprise and the latter focusing on dispersion of 
industry across regions and nations. 86  Cluster analysis is linked to industrial 
agglomeration and arguably derives from Alfred Marshall’s seminal late 18th and early 
19th century studies on the agglomeration of small-and medium-sized companies in the 
same or related industries.87 A major finding from these studies is what has been termed 
‘Marshallian externalities’. This is where technological leakages occur from the 
agglomeration of specialist suppliers, universities and research institutes. These 
knowledge spill-overs combined with the pool of specialised labour and other resources 
are a major explanation for the clustering of high-technology firms. 
 
The notion of centripetal forces helps to explain the basis of domestic/regional industrial 
agglomeration. However, due to globalisation pressures, increasing academic attention 
is focusing on centrifugal forces. This is where open-trade and the search for cost and 
market efficiencies has promoted an international dispersion of industrial activity. This 
generates trans-national externalities, with production and services relocating to areas 
where there are locational efficiencies. Here, knowledge flows across borders via FDI 
and international strategic alliances and technology collaborations. Clearly, this process 
links to both Vernon’s international product life cycle thesis and to Akamatsu’s Flying 
Geese Model, as both these theories seek to explain the logic and dynamics of 
technology transfer based on an evolving comparative advantage. 
 
Commercial aircraft production is a high value-added sector where scale, timing and 
government support for high tech. R&D are all critical considerations. For a country, 
such as China, which seeks to promote a knowledge economy it makes sense for 
policymakers to promote centripetal industrial policies and encourage domestic 
industrial clusters at major aircraft production centres, such as Tianjin.88 At the same 
time, Western aircraft OEMs will be involved in the development of centrifugal forces, 
either voluntarily in the search for outsourcing opportunities or involuntarily through 
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customer demands for offsetting investment. This entire process thus helps to explain 
the simultaneous interaction of both centripetal and centrifugal forces; that is the 
development of aviation industrial clusters comprising both domestic prime contractors, 
such as AVIC and international OEM prime and subcontractors, such as EADS and 
Roll-Royce. Aviation clusters, such those in Toulouse (France), 89  Warton (UK), 
Montreal (Canada), Nagoya (Japan) and at an incipient stage, Tianjin (China), reflect 
such developments. 
4.3.4 Global Aerospace Networks 
As a spur to indigenous technology development and innovation, the creation of 
industrial clusters has an important role to play. However, from the above discussion, 
what also appears to be important is the development of global production networks, 
particularly as applied to the commercial aircraft industry. Whilst Asia possesses no 
local equivalent to Boeing or Airbus, aviation companies in Japan, South Korea, China, 
Singapore, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Indonesia, have become important 
suppliers of components and subassembly work to the big foreign aviation OEMs. 
These Asian companies have been successful in their efforts to access the commercial 
aircraft industry’s global supply chains for a number of reasons, including the 
supporting role of Asian government via a ‘developmental’ state regime, the high 
productivity and low cost advantages of Asian economies and the economic leverage of 
Asian airlines, including particularly Chinese and Singaporean, to influence aircraft 
development and pressure supply from domestic MRO and even production suppliers. 
The Chinese government’s ownership of national airlines in the 1980s is an example of 
how a developmental state approach can influence global networking, in this instance, 
via the mandating of offsets. For example, in 1985, China agreed a deal with 
McDonnell Douglas to co-produce the MD-82 and MD-83 with Shanghai Aviation 
Industry Company, and later in 1990 to co-produce the MD-90.90 Whilst these particular 
deals proved a failure, throughout the 1990s, China has become a significant 
subcontractor to both Boeing and Airbus. For instance, Shanghai Aviation Industry 
Company, Shenyang and Xian, manufactures horizontal stabilisers, fuselage 
components and vertical tails for the latest generation of 737.91 Moreover, although 
Japan takes the lion’s share of the subcontracts on the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, reaching 
 173
35% of value-added, China also has a share in the Boeing 787 global production 
network. For instance, Boeing has awarded a US$600mn contract to three Chinese 
companies to build the rudder, the leading edge of the vertical fin and wing-to-body 
fairings for the Dreamliner. 92  Similar networking arrangements have been agreed 
between China and Airbus: firstly, linked to China’s huge 2005 purchase of 150 Airbus 
A320s is the opening of an assembly line in Tianjin; secondly, Airbus has committed to 
sourcing about 5% of the A350 from China.93  
 
Technology development, then, is the final stage in the economic, industrial and 
technological development of countries. China is passaging through all these stages, 
and because of scale, cost and skill advantages has made impressive progress in 
building-up local technology capacity. It has relied heavily on FDI to access 
technology, but the belief is that with capacity will come capability. The 
development of the commercial aircraft industry provides on excellent case study 
of China’s technology development. The fact is that a point has now been reached 
in the development of China’s aviation industry, where the Chinese government 
has begun to invest heavily in the design and construction of a ‘Chinese’ 
commercial aircraft, and analysis of such indigenous industrialisation is the 
purpose of Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 Case Study of China’s Aviation Industry 
5.1 Aerospace as a Strategic Industry 
Aerospace, and within this sector, aviation, is viewed by most country government’s 
across the world as a strategic industry: it has broad implications for 'national power' 
and is therefore strongly correlated with national and political interests.1 Firstly, it is a 
'dual-use' industry, so that its growth and technological deepening not only impacts on 
civil commercial aerospace capability but also contributes to the development of the 
military aerospace sector. The EU considers aerospace a strategic industry because it is 
viewed as a technology driver.2 Necessarily, the host country government must develop 
the technology level of its 'infant' local aerospace prime contractors, but these primes 
will literately act as an engine of growth, especially to 'pull' along subcontractor high 
technology firms. Moreover, the aerospace industry fulfills the criteria for sectors that 
act as growth poles within the economy. Thus, in India, for instance, the aerospace 
sector is considered by the New Delhi government to be amongst the most important of 
the 16 defined priority development sectors.3 According to India's Finance Minister, 
Yashwant Sinha, the country is focusing on sectors which are important, nationally, like 
infrastructure and core industries, where exports take place or where technology is 
needed in its foreign investment policy.4 Thus, India considers aerospace a tool for 
economic development with a significant role in national security and international 
relations, representing one of the most significant technological influences of our time.5 
Equally, China considers its aerospace sector as 'part of a larger technological 
transformation.'6 At least partially, this relates to the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ 
that is taking place in China.7 China is concerned with the development of the domestic 
aerospace sector, because it is linked to military modernization, infrastructural 
development and international prestige.8 Through its aerospace activities, China plans to 
meet the growing demands of economic construction, national security, and science and 
technology development. 9  Aerospace is viewed as an integral part of the state's 
comprehensive development strategy, described by President Hu as a ... “significant 
symbol of the nation's strength.”10 Moreover, within the broad field of aerospace, an 
important point to note is that China is one of the few countries in the world that has the 
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economic potential to sustain a home-grown aviation industry. By reference to Table 
5.1, China has an estimated requirement for 2,639 passenger aircraft by 2025; this 
makes it the world's biggest emerging aviation market, and in the next 20 years will see 
the country become the second largest market in terms of demand for passenger aircraft 
after the US.11 From the demand perspective alone, it therefore makes economic sense 
for China to develop its own commercial aviation industry. Indeed, according to 
Dougan, China wants self-sufficiency in manufacturing civil aircraft,12 elaborating his 
argument, thus:  
... “If China possessed a large and effective air transport service network, and 
more importantly, could supply this network with equipment made domestically, 
it would mean the country could become an economic and technological global 
power able to compete worldwide in a range of other associated industries and 
'high-tech' product groups. The possession of an effective civil aviation industry 
is thus exactly the type of broad-based 'hi-tech' industry that China's leaders 
desperately want to possess, for its own sake, and also …[because of what it 
signals]… about the country's overall level of technological and economic 
development. For these military/strategic, economic and emotive reasons, civil 
aviation is important to the Chinese government.”13  
  
Given this contextual backdrop, then, the purpose of this chapter is to critically analyze 
the development of China's aviation industry. The first section surveys the origins and 
early development of the industry, particularly its linkages with overseas collaborators. 
The accelerated build-up of domestic aviation capacity during the post-1978 reform 
period will then be explored. This provides the foundation for an in-depth analysis of 
the degree to which indigenous industrialization has been achieved. After a broad 
evaluation of the present economic status of the aviation industry, its technological 
development will be analysed according to the three performance metrics, value-added, 
technological innovation and the creation of local supply chains.  
5.2 1st Phase: China's Early Aircraft Building Pretensions 
The Chinese have long cherished an ambition to fly. Almost from the beginning of 
time, Chinese fairy tales narrated stories of the splendour of flying, perhaps akin to the 
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West’s fables of Peter Pan.14 The first actual attempt at flight in China can be traced 
back to the Seventh Century BC when the famous craftsman Gong Shubon flew a 
Magpie made from bamboo and wood.15 Later, in AD19, as recorded in the 'history of 
the Han Dynasty - the Biography of Wang Mang', a man was witnessed flying dozens 
of metres with two huge bird wings, and feathers all over his body; this being the 
earliest recorded flying/gliding experiment using human force.16 Around the same time, 
some two thousand years ago, China invented kites, and these were regularly used for 
military purposes, including aerial signal lights and manned reconnaissance from 
AD420. 17  In AD559, a man glided downwards from a high place using a kite, 
suggesting that flight could be realized with the use of man-made fixed wings, a fact of 
some significance for the later invention of aircraft.18  Other ancient Chinese aerial 
vehicles included hot air balloons and bamboo dragonfly;19 the latter being called the 
'Chinese Gyro' by European scholars, representing the origins of the present-day lifting 
propeller. 20 
  
The modern era of Chinese aviation really began during the Qing dynasty when in 1887 
Hua Hengfong successfully flew a manned hydrogen balloon. 21  However, the 
momentous event occurred in 1910 when the Qing government established an aircraft 
manufacturing plant at Nanyuan, a southern suburb of Beijing, with the first aircraft 
flying the following year.22 Following the 1911 'revolution' that overthrew the Qing 
Dynasty, the famous Dr Su Yatsen promoted the expression ... “saving the nation with 
aviation.23 This phase acted as clarion call around which resources were channeled to 
create a Chinese capability in aviation. In 1911, Dr Sun established the country's first 
Air Force. He called on overseas Chinese to return and engage in flying skills along 
with the relevant technologies of manufacturing. One of the returning Chinese was Feng 
Ru, who successfully designed and produced aircraft in the US, bringing two of his 
designs back to China.24 Another returnee was Tan Gen, who was one of the earliest 
designers and producers of water-based aeroplanes. His return in 1915 led to the 
establishment of the Guandong Aviation College.25 Yet another Chinese citizen, Yang 
Xianyi, a graduate from an aviation college in the US, supervised the construction of a 
two-seater biplane reconnaissance-trainer in 1923.26 
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A major theme in aircraft production studies is the close relationship between military 
and civil aviation activities and this was the course taken in the early development of 
China's aircraft industry. Thus, after the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911, the 
Beijing government constructed an aircraft factory in 1912, and later a similar 
establishment in Qinghe, Beijing. Somewhat later, a Naval Aircraft Engineering 
Department in Fujian Province designed and manufactured a folded-wing 
reconnaissance aircraft.27 
  
With the passage of time, the Chinese government began to build-up aircraft production 
capacity through the use of technology transfer. There were two approaches: one was 
through hard transfer, and the other through soft. Examining, firstly, China's promotion 
of hard technology transfer, the starting point was really the Kuomintang government's 
established aircraft repair factories at Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuchang in 
1934 and 1935 by using foreign investment, materials, equipment and technology.28 
Through these means, copy production and aircraft assembly was begun. For instance, 
the central Hangzhou Aircraft Factory, a joint-venture with a US partner, copied and 
assembled about 300 US aircraft across an eight-year period.29 Similarly, the Central 
Nanchang Aircraft Factory was another joint-venture aerospace enterprise established 
with four Italian companies for the license production of Italian aircraft. However, the 
factory was relocated to Nanchuan after Japanese bombing and started copy production 
of Russian 'pursuit' aircraft as well as basic gliders.30 There was also indigenous design 
of the Zhong Yun-1 and Zhong Yun-2 transports, though neither entered into batch 
production.31 During the War of Resistance (1937) against the Japanese invasion, there 
was much US assistance given to China, including training in aircraft design for local 
technological personnel and the production of American piston engines. 
  
Soft technology transfer came in the form of Chinese engineering scholars going abroad 
for training and then returning to China to contribute to the aviation industry's 
development. Thus, one of the many Chinese students that went overseas in the 1930s 
to study aviation was Wang Zhu, who worked as an aircraft designer at the US Boeing 
Company.32 He returned to develop the Chinese aircraft industry, as did Qi Xuesen, co-
inventor of the Karman-Tsien mathematical formula used in the dynamic design of high 
 181
subsonic aircraft. Moreover, throughout the 1930s, aviation courses were started at 
Chinese universities, such that by 1949 the numbers of Chinese aviation graduates had 
reached about one thousand.33 
  
Thus, by the time of China's Independence in 1949, a 'sovereign' aircraft industry had 
not been established, but the beginnings of capacity and a skill-base had been put in 
place. The problem of dependence on overseas supply of parts and technology for both 
civil and military aircraft had begun to be recognised. However, China faced a lack of 
capital, had minimal aerospace skills, no supporting infrastructure to support aircraft 
development, and, finally the War of Resistance against Japan had seriously weakened 
the already fragile local aircraft industry’s foundations. 
5.3 2nd Phase: Early Post-Independence Sino-Soviet Collaboration 
Creating a national aviation industry was viewed immediately after Independence as an 
important step, because as a strategic industry, it would benefit both economic 
development and national defence capability. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou 
Enlai were concerned with the fast construction of an aviation industry, not least 
because the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was established in November 
1949 and just a year later saw the outbreak of the Korean War and US forces stationed 
close to the Chinese border. Korean hostilities gave greater urgency to the development 
of aviation capability and in December 1950, very soon after the war had begun, the 
policy decision was taken that China should quickly move to develop a national 
aviation industry. This decision led to an aphorism based on the practicalities of 
Chinese culture ... “from repair to copy production, and from copy production to design 
and manufacturing.”  (Cong Xiuli Dao Fangzhi he Zixing Seji Zhizao从修理到仿制和自行设计制
造).34 
 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union was meant to be the catalyst by which China's 
aviation industry would literally 'get off the ground.' The partnership began when a 
Chinese delegation visited the USSR in January 1951 to seek technical assistance. This 
resulted in October 1951 in the signing of an ‘Agreement for USSR to Render 
Technical Assistance’. Somewhat earlier, in April 1951, China set-up the Bureau of 
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Aviation Industry under the Ministry of Heavy Industry. Wasting no time, in the 
September of that year, the Ministry took over 18 aerospace factories from the Air 
Force, and from a zero baseline, the bureau now had around 10,000 workers under its 
control.35  The 18 factories were essentially focused on repair services and Premier 
Zhou's direction was that ... “When the repair factory is designed certain considerations 
should be given to the arrangement and planning for transferring it to manufacturing in 
the future.”36 Accordingly, a follow-up agreement was signed with the USSR in 1953 to 
create 13 'backbone' aviation factories in China focusing on the production of aircraft, 
aeroengines, and air borne equipment using high-premium machining equipment. 37 
Necessarily, the Soviet Union would supply the heavy machinery and funding was 
allocated in China's First Five-Year Plan. The Plan was far-reaching in the sense of 
ensuring the financial and manpower resources to procure 'completely knocked down' 
aircraft kits shipped from the Soviet Union. As in the 1930s, the policy-thrust was once 
again aimed at the build-up a cadre of highly skilled Chinese aeronautical engineers. 
For instance, Liu Xiao Peng, who had trained in Britain, became a key aircraft 
designer.38 He was heavily involved in the development of China's first generation of 
attack aircraft. Another British trained aeronautical engineer and a member of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society, Shen Yuan, was appointed Vice-Principal of the Beijing Institute 
of Aeronautical and Astronautics.39 Central Planning was critical in creating the skilled 
human resources: skilled technical staff were transferred from other sectors to the 
emerging aviation industry; around 800 Soviet experts were transferred to China as part 
of the Sino-Soviet agreement, and many were involved in training Chinese personnel; 
and some 350 Chinese trainee engineers were sent to the Soviet Union to study 
astronautics during the ten years of this collaborative effort. 40  Additionally, three 
aviation universities were established in 1952, along with large numbers of associated 
technical colleges in the years that followed. 
 
Sino-Soviet collaboration was important in ‘kick-starting’ China's aviation industry. It 
led to the final stage in the development process, that of manufacturing, albeit that the 
original designs were Soviet. For instance, in 1954 the Yak-18 primary trainer, with the 
Chinese name, CJ-5, rolled off the production lines at the Nanchang Aircraft Factory.41 
Two years later, one of the most advanced fighters in the world at that time, the MIG-17 
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began to be produced at the Shenyang Aircraft Factory under the Chinese name, J-5, 
China then became one of the few countries in the world with the capacity to produce 
jet aircraft; 42 however, many of the high-technology systems still had to be imported 
from the Soviet Union. The Nanyang Aircraft Factory became an important production 
centre in China's expanding aviation industry, producing the country's first civil aircraft, 
the Y-5, derived from the Russian AN-2 multi-purpose small transport plane.43 By 1960, 
China has established an impressive manufacturing capacity. In relatively short space of 
time, the industry has produced around 1,086 aircraft for the PLAAF, including its first 
jet fighter trainer, the JJ-1. 44  The beginnings of a R&D capability had also been 
constructed, including six Research Institutes, three Design Institutes and 19 Research 
and Design offices covering flight testing, aerodynamics and aircraft accessories. 45 
There is no doubt China's indigenisation efforts began in the 1950s, but it was almost 
totally dependent on the massive inflow of skilled manpower, technical assistance and 
technology transferred from the Soviet Union. 
  
By the late 1960s, however, the Sino-Soviet partnership was over. Political and 
ideological differences led to a complete breakdown in relations and the total 
withdrawal of Soviet aircraft design and building assistance from China. The challenge 
was immense. China was now technologically isolated, given that it was also continuing 
to suffer a Western embargo on aerospace technology from the time of the Korean War. 
The government's response was to pursue a 'forced' policy of self-reliance and for 
aviation this meant ... ‘adjustment, consolidation, replenishment and improvement’ 
(Tiaozheng Gonggu Chongshi Tigao调整，巩固，充实，提高).46. The reality of this edict 
was that aircraft production activity was ‘dumbed-down’ to focus on spares production, 
maintenance, and modification and refinement of existing Soviet-designed aircraft.47 
The push for self-reliant development was not abandoned, however, now being 
managed by the 1963 Ministry of Aviation Industry and some degree of success was 
achieved in subsequent years. The J-6 fighter, the J-5A all-weather subsonic fighter, and 
the high-attitude high-speed J-7 fighter, began to be produced across 1964-66; indeed, 
around 1,055 aircraft were produced during this period.48 The process of adapting from 
the Soviet withdrawal seemed to be working well, but then China had to face the 
disruptive consequences of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Much of disruption came 
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from a reduction in trained technical personnel, caused by the Revolution’s negative 
impact on education and training. Moreover, another unrelated problem faced by the 
aircraft industry during this period was the ‘Third Front’ policy, involving the shift of 
aviation production inland towards the mountainous regions. In case of war, aircraft 
factories had to be located well away from the coastal areas, but their reconstruction in 
remote underdeveloped regions meant that scarce capital was wasted. 
5.4 3rd Phase: Development of Aviation Capability through 
Western Cooperation 
Following the disruption of the 1960s, and early 1970s, a significant event occurred in 
1975, the beginnings of Western technological cooperation in the aviation sector. This 
occurred with China's purchase of Britain's Rolls-Royce Spey engine.49 It filled a gap in 
turbofan engines for the emerging Chinese commercial aviation industry, and had far-
reaching implications for Western aerospace contractor participation in the development 
of China's civil aviation industry. The next major development milestone was the 1978 
Third  Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party, and its 
advocating of policies for ... “reorganisation, reform adjustment and improvement” 
(Tiaozheng, Gaige, Zhengdun, Tigao) along with the celebrated 'opening-up' of China 
with the outside world.50 The Ministry of Aviation’s main focus was on reorganization 
to achieve quality through technology transfer, advancing the aphorism … ‘scientific 
research going ahead of the rest.’51  
 
In powering forward the development of China’s aviation industry, three strategies were 
adopted, namely: self-reliant aircraft construction; subcontracting activity, most notably 
through offsets; promotion of international joint-ventures; alongside a general 
welcoming approach towards FDI in China’s growing aviation sector. Although these 
strategies are distinct, they are not discrete, in the sense that they overlap and are not 
sequential in their impact. 
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5.4.1 Self-Reliant Aviation Development 
China was impatient to achieve its aviation ambitions and was keen to develop 
commercial aircraft capacity, but it would first have to be ‘weaned’ from almost total 
development a military production. In fact, a premature start to the development of 
commercial aircraft production had begun in 1973 with the government approval of the 
Y-10 project. The development of this ‘large’ airliner was assigned to the Shanghai 
Aircraft and Design Institute. The design of the four-engine large-haul aircraft took two 
years to complete. A full size aircraft destructive test was carried out in 1978 and the 
first fight of the Y-10 took place in September 1980. Two prototypes were built and the 
121 fight trials took in every major Chinese airport, including Beijing, Hefei, Harbin, 
Urumqi and Chengdu/Lhasa.52 Then, suddenly, the project was terminated due to cost 
and market limitations.53 Thus, whilst China had demonstrated that it was capable of 
undertaking basic aircraft manufacturing, it still had some way to go before it could 
secure the commercial expertise to produce commercial airliners. For this to happen, 
particularly the need to produce high quality, safety premium commercial aircraft, it 
would have to divert scarce resources away from military aircraft production. 
Accordingly, the way forward was deemed to be civil-military integration and 
conversion. Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 maxim was … “Combine the military and civil, 
combine peace and war, give priority to military products, let the civil support the 
military, (Junmin Jiehe, Yimin Yangjun军民结合，以民养军).”54 
 
Thus, from 1979 onwards the policy thrust was to transform the near total military 
production structure to joint military and civil production systems. Via this approach, 
the costs of creating commercial aviation production capacity would be reduced through 
obtaining beneficial military spin-offs. It was also a possible lever for obtaining 
important aviation technologies from overseas aviation contractors that could then be 
‘spun-on’ from the commercial sector into the military aerospace industries. Thus, 
although the ‘military first’ policy-emphasis was maintained, a boost was given to 
commercial aircraft ventures. Because civil-military integration meant that the sharing 
of fixed cost technologies and facilities could be enjoyed, including common 
technologies, processes, labour, equipment materials and facilities, R&D, 
manufacturing and maintenance operations, China’s commitment to succeed was there 
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and increasingly the resources were available to support the industry’s growth, which 
was dramatic. In 1978, the output value of China’s civil aviation sector was just 6.5% of 
total value, but by 1986 this had increased to 61.2% of the aerospace sector’s total 
output value.55 Although still on a small-scale, local civil aircraft were nevertheless, 
beginning to enter the market. This included the 50-seat Y-7 and 19-seat Y-12 
passenger aircraft; the latter being exported to 18 countries after obtaining British CAA 
and US FAA airworthiness certificates. 56  Moreover, license-production of Western 
products began to play a part in the development of the industry; for instance, in the 
production of the Z-8 and Z-9 large multi-purpose and French Dolphin helicopters, 
respectively.57 On the conversion side, with defence production beginning to decline, 
the push was to diversify and convert military capacity to non-aviation production. 
These civil goods covered the spectrum, typically including automobiles, motorcycles, 
refrigerators, and textile machinery, accounting for about 75% of sales in 1996.58 It has 
also been reported that more than 2,500 defence technologies have been released for 
civil use since the early 1980s.59 
5.4.2 Subcontracting through offsets 
General speaking this has regard to licensed production of foreign OEM aircraft, parts 
and subassemblies. This developed to be an important aspect of China’s aircraft 
industry development strategy, given growth of domestic air passenger transport, and 
therefore of commercial aircraft, provided the authorities with the opportunity to 
demand work transfer packages for China’s aircraft factories tied to the big volume 
procurement of foreign aircraft. These offset deals led the way to hundreds of 
subcontract deals being signed with numerous overseas OEMs, including those from the 
US, UK, Germany, France and Canada. It has been estimated that by the latter part of 
the 1990s these subcontracts amounted to over US$750m, of which US$617m related to 
the production of aircraft spares and US$133m to engine components. 60  These 
subcontracting programmes included several with the US company, Boeing; namely 
Shanghai Aviation Industry -737 horizontal stabilisers; Xi’an Aircraft Manufacture -737 
vertical fins and 747 railing edge ribs; Shenyang Aircraft Corporation -737 tail sections 
and 757 cargo doors; and the Hongyuan Forging and Casting Factory - Titanium alloy 
Forgings.61 Another US company, Lockheed, subcontracted work to the Shanxi Aircraft 
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Company, linked to its modification contract on China’s Y-8 medium transport 
aircraft.62 BAe, the British Company, subcontracted the landing gear for the BAe-146 to 
the Harbin Aircraft Factory and the rudder assemblies to the Shenyang Aircraft 
Company. Since 1982, the Canadian company, shorts, has subcontracted cabin doors, 
freight doors and service doors on its SD3 series aircraft to Harbin Aircraft Factory.63 
 
In the aero-engine field, General Electric (US) subcontracted work to Chinese aerospace 
companies on critical engine parts, such as the compressor and turbine disks and rear 
shaft high-pressure turbines for the (French-US) CFM-56 engine.64 Subcontract work 
was also undertaken for the European Airbus Industries by the Xi’an and Shenyang 
Aircraft Companies, including emergency exit doors for the A320, service doors for the 
A300/A310 series, and in 2001, the 100th A320 rear- boarding gate was delivered by 
Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation.65 
 
The subcontracting mechanism facilitated by offsets (China’s purchases of foreign 
passenger aircraft) has proved a successful vehicle for the transfer of technology and 
work packages. Subcontracts also necessitated Chinese manufacturers using advanced 
management and production techniques and implementing high-level quality assurance 
procedures. There is thus no doubt that this approach has contributed to China’s 
commercial aviation capabilities, but there is evidence to suggest that the technological 
nature and degree of value-added has been at a low-level.(see section 5.7.1) Therefore, 
the Chinese authorities introduced a complementary development strategy based on the 
need to advance local capability through foreign joint venture projects. 
5.4.3 Promotion of International Joint-Venture Aviation Projects 
From a programme of restructuring that took place in 1993, the Aviation Industries of 
China (AVIC) became the ‘core’ enterprise within China’s aviation aerospace sector. It 
was, and is, a huge state-owned company responsible for developing and producing 
military and civil aircraft, missile, engines and an array of civil commercial consumer 
goods. Within AVIC, defence accounted for 60-70% of aerospace output, but AVIC had 
plans to change this ratio in favour of civil aerospace.66 A three-pronged strategy was 
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agreed that would eventually lead to China becoming self-sufficient in the development 
and production of large aircraft by 2010.67 The three strategic development stages are:  
 
Stage 1:  Licensed production of major parts of airframes 
Stage 2:  Development and production of a 100-seat regional jet, developing the 
               capacity and competence in the areas of quality control and certification 
Stage 3:   Indigenous design and production of a 180-seater passenger jet by 2010.68 
 
Stage 1 developments have already been discussed, including the successful 
development of Y-7 and Y-12 aircraft, based on the import of foreign technology. 
China’s 1975 license-production of the Roll-Royce Spey MK202 engine was another 
early manifestation of this strategic approach, as was also the licensed production of the 
50 Dolphin Helicopters from the French company Aerospatiale. Licensed production of 
the helicopter’s Ariel 1C engines was also agreed.69 
Whilst licensed production of modern foreign parts, subassemblies and the fabrication 
of sections of the airframe were certainly important steps in gaining technological 
capacity, the early 1980’s failure of the local Y-10 project convinced the authorities that 
the development of a medium to large aircraft was crucial for the growth of China’s 
aviation industry. As a consequence, China Aero-Technology Import Export 
Corporation (CATIC) and Germany’s MBB reached agreement on the joint 
development of a 75-seater passenger aircraft in 1988, with CATIC holding 20% of the 
joint company’s shares.70 More than 200 Chinese aeronautical engineers were sent to 
Hamburg for training, but shortly afterwards the project was prematurely ended without 
any aircraft being built.71 Germany’s industrial reorganisation of MBB was a major 
reason for this projects’ cancellation. However, China’s approach to its Stage 2 strategic 
goal was unique. The development of a 100-seat regional aircraft would be the ‘reverse’ 
of the normal path of design, development, and certification through to market, 
manufacture, delivery and support. 72  The project would begin with final assembly 
capability, then expanding to include fabrication of components, creating the demand 
for local suppliers and finishing with design and certification of a local indigenous 
aircraft. The MD-82 co-production programme with US company McDonnell Douglas 
(MD) would be the first test of this strategy. The plan was to start with final assemblies 
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and major subassembly kits, and then to complete manufacture, supported by full 
technology transfer. MD transferred major subassemblies to Shanghai for final 
assembly, including the nose section, complete empennage and fuselage skin sections. 
Blueprints were also transferred, with the US company assisting with FAA certification 
on the basis that the designs, parts, indeed, the entire aircraft were identical to its US-
built counter-part, except that it was ‘made in China’. The programme produced 25 
MD-82 aircraft at the rate of eight units per year.73 Major subcontracts were given to 
two Chinese aerospace companies: 10 went to the Shanghai Aviation Industry and with 
the Chengdu Aircraft Company.74 Some complex assemblies were produced like the 
nose and cargo doors, but they did not substantially increase industrial capacity as they 
represented just 15% of the airframe.75 Nevertheless, the production of the MD-82 was 
held be to a great success, laying solid foundations for joint development of medium-
sized aircraft with foreign assistance.76 On this basis, the Chinese agreed to partner on 
the local development of the next-generation passenger aircraft, the MD-90. 
 
The MD-90 plan was to increase local production, and additional work was allocated to 
Chinese aircraft companies: Shanghai increased its share of subassemblies production, 
becoming responsible for final assembly; Chengdu built the nose and the entrance and 
airstair doors; Shenyang fabricated and assembled the empennage and all electrical 
wiring for the aircraft; and Xi’an fabricated and assembled the fuselage section and the 
wingbox. MD supplied all the machine tools, and Chinese aviation teams went to MD’s 
long Beach, California, factory, and the entire programme, including buybacks, was 
agreed in record time in 1993. 77  Thereafter, however, the project was affected by 
problems. Firstly, the aircraft had to be modified, due to poor runway conditions at 
China’s major airports.78 Then, by the time the extensive modifications to the landing 
gear were complete, infrastructural improvements at the airports had made the 
modifications unnecessary. Secondly, when the MD-82 programme was first introduced 
into China in the early 1980s, the country was still essentially a communist, centrally 
planned economy and the decision to buy the aircraft was taken by the central 
authorities. By contrast, in the early to mid-1990s, China’s domestic airlines were free, 
under a more liberalised economic regime, to make their own procurement decisions. 
The decision by most of the airlines was not to buy the MD-90, but, instead Boeing and 
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Airbus aircraft.79 There were thus no customers for 20 MD-90 aircraft in assembly kits 
in Chinese warehouses.80 Finally, in April 1997, it was announced that Boeing was 
taking over McDonnell Douglas, further delaying decision-making and putting the 
whole project in jeopardy. Eventually, in mid-1999, the MD-90 project was terminated 
at great expense to all parties, seriously delaying China’s plans to establish an 
indigenous commercial aviation capability. 
 
In parallel with MD-90 fiasco, China sought to promote a separate US$2bn aircraft 
project built around Asian cooperation and supported by Western aviation OEMs. This 
early 1990’s project was called the Asian Express 100 - a 100-seater aircraft that would 
be developed through a risk-sharing partnership. Potential overseas partners had in sight 
the revenue-earning benefits of being linked into the fast growing Chinese civil aircraft 
market. Thus, there was much foreign interest from Western aircraft prime-contractors, 
including Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, DASA, Samsung and Singapore Technologies 
to tie-up with the Chinese partner, AVIC. In addition, overseas’ ‘super’ subcontractors, 
such as Rolls-Royce, General Electric, SNECMA, Messier-Dowty and Aircraft Brake 
Systems, were positioning themselves to access this project through subcontract work 
or as joint-venture partners as parts of the AVIC’s supply chain. The Asian Express 100 
aircraft project was another example of China’s efforts to close the aviation technology 
gap with the West. The goal of self-sufficiency was the driver, but the country’s desire 
to access advanced technology posed a problem for the advancement of this project.81 In 
the end, Airbus and the Singapore Technologies Group were favourites to lead on the 
joint design and manufacture of this Asian Express 100. However, the foreign 
companies grew increasingly concerned with China’s insistence that it should be 
responsible for systems integration, despite its clear lack of capabilities in this area.82 As 
a consequence, yet again, a Chinese collaborative commercial aircraft project was 
aborted. 
5.4.4 Reviving the Dream: Developing Chinese Commercial Aircraft 
In 1993, the 3rd strategic stage in the development of China’s commercial aviation 
industry was focused on indigenous design and production. This was when the Eighth 
National People’s Congress put the entire aviation industry under AVIC control, and 
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became the growth pole of China’s aviation development efforts. Initially AVIC was 
weighed down with an excessive payroll and diversified product portfolio that lacked 
coherence and focus. Gradually, however, it rationalised and raised efficiency, 
increasingly looking a viable Chinese company to help achieve China’s aviation goals. 
Aside from several rounds of re-structuring, the aerospace and aircraft manufacturing 
sectors began to receive priority status in the context of China’s science and technology 
programme, attracting research and training education resources to reinforce design and 
support capabilities. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) more than RMB5bn was 
spent on R&D in the field of commercial aerospace technology compared to RMB1.7bn 
in the Nineth Plan.83 Moreover, China-based scholars now account for a very substantial 
share of paper submissions to leading aerospace journals.84 
 
Due to these additional resources supporting aviation development, the target date for 
an indigenous aircraft was set at 2010, but this seemed wildly optimistic, given the 
difficulties China had faced in achieving its second strategic goal of developing a 100-
seater regional jet. As a result, the planning process began to change to reflect these 
realities. Instead of three ‘sequential’ strategic stages, the development of China’s 
commercial aviation sector would now be via the ‘simultaneous’ pursuit of all three 
stages: subcontract work, primarily through offsetting technology transfer, though also 
through competitive contracts, if possible; collaborative production with foreign civil 
aerospace prime contractors, particularly in respect to the (elusive) long-planned 
regional 100-seater aircraft; and, the continued goal of indigenous design and 
manufacture of a large passenger aircraft. 
 
Commitment and consolidation were to take the industry into the 21st century, and 
access to technology would continue to emphasize cooperation with Western OEMs, 
but increasingly, investment funds would be directed towards raising local aviation-
related research, design, development, systems integration and support capabilities. 
China was undeterred by its succession of failed international cooperation ventures and 
would seek to continue its promotion of such projects. Positive changes in China’s 
domestic economic environment were leading to a greater willingness of foreign 
aviation companies to invest in China. This was partly to do with China’s 2002 
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membership of the WTO,85 and its associated determination to liberalise, incentivize 
and commercialise China’s economy; it was also partly linked to China’s annual 
double-digit economic growth, and the consequent massive expansion of  demand for 
air travel; and partly to do, finally, with China’s recognition that it needed equal 
‘partnership’ with overseas companies rather than unbalanced relationships to forge 
long-term mutually beneficial and, most importantly, sustainable industrial 
undertakings. There were, thus, rising numbers of Western aerospace companies keen to 
engage with China, not just through sale, but through offsets, FDI and joint-ventures. 
The conducive business environment, combined with China’s massive projected 
demand for commercial aircraft, led to a step-change in the West’s involvement in the 
rapidly expanding Chinese aviation industry. From 2000 onwards, major new 
manufacturing ventures were started in China, and these spanned the spectrum of 
international prime contractors, from Airbus and Boeing, to Brazil’s Embraer and 
Canada’s Bombardier. Following the primes, came the world’s leading aircraft sub-
contractors, including Roll-Royce, General Electric and Safran. The development 
foundations were at last being laid, and indigenisation finally becoming realisable. The 
next section examines the nature and growth of this stage of aviation development, 
setting the stage for subsequent analysis of the ‘depth’ of local technological 
development. 
5.5 New Millennium: The ‘Long March’ (Changzheng) Towards 
Indigenous Design and Production  
As mentioned earlier, AVIC is at the heart of China’s efforts to indigenise its aviation 
industry. Although China’s aviation sector began formally to emerge in 1951, with the 
requirement to produce military aircraft, the recognition of the importance of 
commercial aircraft production had to wait until 1963. In that year, the Ministry of 
Aviation Industry was created to manage the development of the aircraft industry, 
Thirty years later, in 1993, socialist ownership of aircraft production was replaced by 
the creation of a joint-stock company, the Aviation Industries of China (AVIC). In a 
policy initiative to introduce greater focus and commercial efficiency into this huge 
industrial conglomerate the enterprise was split in July 1999 into AVIC I and AVIC II. 
The restructuring was driven by global shifts in economic policymaking and emphasis 
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placed on competition and the search for core competences. China’s policy-makers had 
determined that AVIC I and AVIC II would henceforth both cooperate and compete. 
 
However, the split enterprises remained huge by international standards. AVIC I 
possessed 53 large- and medium-sized industrial establishments, 31 research institutes, 
and 20 specialised companies and institutions. 86  Employing 230,000 workers, it 
produced a wide assortment of military and commercial aircraft, including fighter 
bombers, trainers and transports.87 For non-aero products, more than 3,000 different 
types of products in eight major categories had been developed, including gas turbines, 
automobiles, motorcycles, refrigerators, machinery and environmental protection, 
equipment.88 AVIC I had 45,000 other staff employed in the research institutes, with 
company total assets valued at RMB150bn.89 AVIC II was similarly huge, employing 
210,000 staff and controlling 64 large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises and 
three research institutes, with total assets of RMB78bn.90 AVIC II was focused on the 
development and production of, again, both military and civil aircraft, helicopters, 
trainers and UAVs.91 AVIC II has produced more than 6,800 aircraft (including 800 
helicopters), 26,000 aeroengines and 10,000 tactical missiles.92 Co-developed/produced 
projects, include the K8-jet trainer with Pakistan, the EC 120 helicopter with France and 
Singapore, and the ERJ-145 aircraft with Brazil. AVIC II’s non-aero business includes 
automobiles, motorcycles, related engines and parts, gas turbines and wind power 
electricity generating equipment.93 With respect to automobile production AVIC II has 
become a major development and production base in China. Its annual output is now 
accounting for one-tenth of national automobile production.94  
 
Self-sufficiency remained an important strategic objective of this restructuring, but a 
principal secondary objective was to make the industry more flexible, specialised and 
competitive. At that time, however, the split in industrial structure moved against the 
global tide of emphasising competency through scale and merger. 
 
AVIC I and AVIC II effectively cover the entire Chinese aircraft industry, and the split 
in the 1999 aircraft industry was a major restructuring process. Thus, when the second 
restructuring exercise was announced in November 2008, there was sense of shock, but 
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not surprise. It is widely recognised that the 1999 split did not work as was intended; 
there was no competition between AVIC I and II because both companies were 
essentially producing different products. The planned reintegration of the two 
companies will lead to six subsidiaries, expected to be based on product lines. A 
subsidiary specialising in helicopter production has already been confirmed, likely 
taking over all rotary-wing production within AVIC. Equally, units focused on 
propulsion will join together to form a Chinese aeroengine company, and China’s huge 
number of aircraft systems manufacturers will come together to create the Chinese 
equivalent of Honeywell and GE Aviation Systems. Defence units will remain separate 
from the commercial aviation units, which are likely to be floated on the stock 
exchange. Significantly, the commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) has 
been created to manage the AVIC’s commercial subsidiaries, and is viewed as an 
industrial organisation that in the future will come to rival Airbus and Boeing.95  
 
The re-integrated AVIC will still represent a huge monolithic aerospace organisation, 
even with six distinct subsidiary enterprises. AVIC’s associated establishments will still 
be in place, and will continue to make an important contribution to the output and 
welfare of the company. For instance, the aviation industry has two hospitals: one is in 
Beijing (Central Hospital of Aviation Industry) with 520 staff, including 12 consultants, 
91 Vice-consultants and 57 doctors, and the other (China Aviation Industry Xiangfan 
hospital) is in Hubei, having 220 beds and 30 consultants.96 The aerospace industry also 
has six aeronautical universities, including the Beijing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Zhengzhou 
Institute of Aeronautics.97 In addition, there are numerous specialised higher education 
technical colleges and school-level institutions specialising in aerospace. Moreover, the 
Chinese aviation industry has been active in promoting overseas technical cooperation. 
An important aspect of this comes through a growing export market and also the 
importation of relevant aerospace technologies. Specifically, for this purpose, the China 
National Aero-Technology import and Export Corporation (CATIC) was formed in 
1979. It provides a two-way street in aviation-related trade. Since CATIC was launched 
in 1979, it has promoted the export of Chinese-made aircraft and engines, airborne 
equipment and various other related products to many countries. Also, from the supply-
 195
side, CATIC has arranged subcontract work of parts and components at numbers of 
AVIC factories at Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, 
Hanzhou, Harbin and Dalian. CATIC also has representative offices in 30 countries and 
cooperative relations with more than 100 countries.98  
5.6 21st Century of International Cooperation 
International cooperative ventures are viewed by the Chinese planning authorities as 
technological ‘stepping-stones’ towards aviation self-sufficiency. There are two issues 
here. Firstly, all countries seek to partner with advanced countries as a means of gaining 
technology access. In reality, however, this has not been straight-forward, given the 
advanced countries’ reluctance to release proprietary knowledge. So interpretation of 
the benefits for a country like China will be influenced by the nature of the project in 
terms of technological sophistication as well as the bargaining power between the 
project’s prospective partners. If for instance, the project is high technology and the 
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recipient country has low market power, then the potential for substantial technology 
transfer is low. There is in fact, by reference to Figure 5.1, a mix of possible outcomes 
dependent upon the strength of the technology-market combinations. In the case of 
China, the FDI projects it seeks to attract will be high technology and its market power 
is also, clearly, high. Thus, this conceptualisation of the ‘ease’ of technology transfer in 
international cooperative projects suggests that China is in a position to leverage 
technology transfer. The next section will explore to what extent such transfers have 
taken place, contributing to the policy goal of aviation self-sufficiency. To begin, the 
technology development impact of Western OEMs operating in China will be evaluated, 
followed by local aircraft building initiatives. 
 
5.6.1 Boeing in China 
Boeing and the Chinese have enjoyed a long corporate relationship. In 1916, when the 
US company was founded, a Beijing-born, MIT educated engineer Wong Tsu was hired 
to design a seaplane, the Model C, for the US Navy. Aside, from China’s occasional use 
of Boeing aircraft since that time, the next major milestone in Boeing’s relations with 
China was in 1972. This was the year when US President, Richard Nixon, visited China 
before America’s long-standing ally, Japan, cementing a new era in China-US relations. 
Significantly, in the same year, China ordered 10 Boeing 707 passenger aircraft.99 In the 
years that followed, China’s policy view regarding the strategic importance of aviation 
was symbolised by, firstly, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the Seattle Boeing 
747 production line during his US State visit in 1979; Secondly, by President Jiang 
Zemin’s visit to the Boeing plant in 1993; and, finally, President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit 
to the Boeing Everett Factory, when he stated that …  “Boeing’s cooperation with 
China is a vivid example of … mutually beneficial cooperation and …[a] .. win-win 
outcome.”100  Evidence of the strength of Boeing’s presence in China can be given by 
noting that as of 2006, 565 or 61% of the 924 commercial jetliners operating in China 
were Boeing aircraft (both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas), 251 or 27% were Airbus, 
and 108 or 12% were from other manufacturers.101 Moreover, given the expected growth 
in aircraft demand, Boeing is confident that its dominance will increase. The company 
estimates that China will require 2,600 new airplanes worth US$213bn by 2024, and of 
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these, single-aisle aircraft such as the Boeing 737 will be the largest category with 1,768 
air planes and next will be the 787-777 category with about 568 aircraft.102 Some orders 
have already been realized. In 2005, Boeing received 120 firm aircraft orders and a 
further 40 were received in 2006.103 On a country basis, these are big numbers; they 
include a purchase of 60 new 787 ‘Dreamliner’ aircraft, valued at US$7.2bn and 90% of 
a total order for 150 new generation 737 aircraft.104 
 
Boeing’s entry strategy into China is not one based on licensed production of complete 
aircraft, though there is economic justification for pursuing such an approach, given the 
500+ Boeing aircraft that China is currently operating.105 Instead, Boeing’s focus has 
been on placing subcontract work into AVIC factories and developing joint-venture 
programmes in non-manufacturing activities. Table 5.1 illustrates the broad range of 
these cooperative ventures. The work is extensive, both in value and the variety of 
product work undertaken. For example, the value of current supply contracts (737, 777 
and 787 signed in 2005 alone was US$600m.106 The value of total ‘active’ contracts in 
place with China’s aviation industry in 2005 was valued at US$1.6bn.107 There are more 
than 3,900 Boeing aircraft throughout the world with parts and assemblies built in 
China; this is 30% of Boeing’s entire world fleet of approximately 12,000 airplanes.108 
Finally, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Boeing has integrated China’s AVIC  
Table 5.1:  Boeing’s Industrial Presence in China (1999-2007) 
No AVIC company/products 
Aircraft Models 
737 747 757 767 777 787 
1 Procurement from Chinese-
owned factories             
BHA Tianjin:             
composites √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Chengdu:             
Rudder           √ 
Forward entry doors √           
Over-wing exit doors √           
Empennage (vertical, horizontal, 
tail sections)     √       
Hafei (Harbin)             
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Wing to body fairing Panels           √ 
Shanghai:             
Horizontal stabilizers √           
Xi’an:             
Horizontal stabilizers √           
trailing edge wing ribs   √         
floor beams and subassemblies 
(BCF)   √         
Vertical fin, forward access door √           
Shenyang:             
Vertical Fin Leading edge           √ 
Aft fuselage subassemblies √           
  Cargo doors     √       
2 747-400 Boeing Conversion Freighter (BCF) Joint Venture-Xiamen 
3 Boeing Joint Venture and enterprises 
4 Training, Technical Assistance and support 
5 University Cooperative projects 
6 Ad Hoc Technology transfer programmes 
Source: Author, abstracted from various sources. 
 
factories into its Global Supplier Network. China therefore enjoys subcontract relations 
with some of Boeing’s powerful subcontractors, including Fisher, Fokker, General 
Electric, Goodrich and Hamilton Sundstrand. The types of work packages currently 
bringing China into Boeing’s Global production network of suppliers include the 
building of large electric wire harness packages (1,000 harnesses per month) for the 737 
in Langfang, near Beijing; the building of the General Electric CF34 fan cowling at 
BHA, Shanghai; other procurements by General Electric for Harbin, Shanghai, Xi’an, 
Sichuan, Suzhou, Guizhou, and Shenyang; 737 vertical fin and horizontal stabiliser at 
Shanghai and Xi’an for Korean Aerospace Industries; components for Pratt and 
Whitney engines at Xi’an, Shenyang and other locations in China by Rolls-Royce.109 
 
Aside from subcontract work to Chinese aviation companies, Boeing has promoted 
several other forms of investment over the last 37 years. Table 5.1 gives examples of 
these additional cooperative activities. They include joint-ventures in aircraft 
maintenance, modification and repair, maintenance training, flight training and 
logistical support. An important joint venture, BHA Aero Composites Company, was 
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started in 2002 between Boeing, Hexel and AVIC I. This supplier forms part of a 
growing Tianjin aerospace cluster. Boeing has a 40% interest in this composites 
producer, which employs over 500 workers. 110  Training, technical assistance and 
support are also offered. Often described as ‘soft’ technology transfer, this covers 
training in flight safety, reliability and efficiency. Boeing has provided high value 
infrastructure in China to support local development and training, including pilot 
techniques, flight operation, and air traffic management. These training programmes 
have been so extensive that Boeing claims 32,000 Chinese aviation professionals have 
received enhanced professional training from its courses since 1993.111 Additionally, 
Boeing has contributed to China’s policy efforts of encouraging local universities to 
partner in aviation science and technology development programmes. Thus, Boeing 
collaborates with the Tianjin-based Civil Aviation University of China (CAUC) in the 
delivery of maintenance training to university students, airline and MRO employees. 
Boeing has also donated two 737 simulators to the Civil Aviation Flying University of 
China, Guanghan, along with the associated instructor-pilot training, curricula and 
mentoring evaluation materials.112 Finally, Boeing has worked together with China on 
ad hoc technology transfer projects, including joint work on Air Traffic Systems. This 
has been aimed at a range of technical areas, including safety and capacity improvement 
to China’s air traffic system and terminal manoeuvring and ground operations at 
Beijing’s Capital Airport. One further important cooperative venture between Boeing 
and China’s is the 747-400 Boeing Conversion Freighter (BCF) programme. Boeing has 
a 9% equality participation in this joint venture project.113 Started in Xiamen in 1993, it 
has over 2,600 employees and specialises in the conversion of old 747s into converted 
freighters. 114  Boeing sells both ‘turnkey’ completed freighter modifications and 
knocked-down kits of assembled parts to TAECO, the Chinese joint-venture operation 
that undertakes the build of the parts and subassemblies and does the conversion work. 
Nevertheless, some of the work is subcontracted out to other Chinese aviation 
companies. The AVIC factory at Xi’an, for instance, builds the floor beams and some 
detailed parts and small assemblies for the conversion work. 
 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the contribution of China’s aviation companies to the 
fabrication of Boeing 737 and 787 aircraft, and whilst Chinese work participation is  
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Figure 5.2: China’s Important Role on the B-737 Aircraft Programme 
 
Source: Boeing in China, http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/boechina.html, 17 May 2009. 
Figure 5.3: China’s important role on new B-787 Dreamliner airplane 
 
Source: Boeing in China, http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/boechina.html, 17 May 2009. 
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growing, the technical sophistication and degree of value-added generated is an open 
question. 
5.6.2 Embraer: ‘South-South’ Technology Cooperation 
The Brazilian aviation company, Embraer, represents a success story. It is one of the 
world’s leading producers of regional passenger aircraft, having delivered more than 
7,000 aircraft in the 40 years of its existence.115 Between mid-1999 and  2007, its ERJ 
family of regional aircraft had delivered over 1,200 in the 37-50 seat (ERJ 135,140 and 
145 range) and 70-108 seat (ERJ 170, 175,190 and 195 range), with 1,750 firm 
orders. 116  Embraer believes that the global demand for regional jets will grow 
dramatically in the future. For the period 2008-27, it is projecting deliveries worldwide 
of 7,450 jets, with North America accounting for 45% of this total and China 
representing the third major market, with 10%.117 This represents 730 aircraft, of which 
450 will fall into the 91-120 seat range and 170 in the 30-60 seat range.118 Such growth 
forecasts were a key factor in persuading Embraer to compete for entry into China at the 
beginning of this century, offering licensed production of its aircraft.119 
 
In year 2000, Embraer opened its representative office in Beijing to act as the 
organisation’s HQ in China, as a point of contact in liaison with Chinese aviation 
government officials, and as a China sales office. Sales of Embraer aircraft were modest 
in the early 2000s, mostly ‘light’ commercial jets, but the company believed that market 
for regional aircraft was set to grow rapidly. This was based on the fact that at that time, 
Chinese airlines only had 73 regional aircraft, 7.1% of the country’s total fleet of 
aircraft, compared to a 35% ratio for the US and Europe.120 Accordingly, Embraer 
entered into China as a long-term ‘strategic’ partner, forming a joint-venture with AVIC 
II in December 2002. The joint venture was located at the AVIC II Harbin aviation 
factory complex and was thus called the Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry. The 
ownership is split: Embraer 51% and local partner HAFEI 49%; the first time a foreign 
aviation company operating in China has been allowed to have controlling market 
share.121 The total investment commitment was US$40m, with an emphasis on quality 
control and equivalent production standards as in Brazil, and a commitment to transfer 
technology. 122  Currently employing 250 workers, the joint-venture by 2005 had 
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delivered 14 aircraft to various Chinese Airlines,123 and enjoys a full order book until 
2010, with deliveries in 2008 reaching 200 regional jets.124 The big breakthrough for 
Embraer came in August 2006 when it won its first contract for ERJ jets on mainland 
China. This was the sale of 50 ERJ 145 and 50 ERJ 190 aircraft, worth US$2.7bn.125 
Following this success, Embraer invested in a spare parts warehouse in Beijing and a 
Fight Training Centre in Zhuhai. 
5.6.3 Airbus China: The European Breakthrough 
The December 2005 signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between visiting 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo, and EADS Airbus, at its headquarters in Toulouse, France, 
signalled Europe’s breakthrough into the Chinese aviation market via licensed 
production of the successful Airbus A320 passenger aircraft. This was not a sudden 
development, however; Airbus China had opened its representative office in Beijing as 
long back as 1990, and now employs 260 staff, four out five being Chinese nationals.126 
Over the years, Airbus’ presence in China’s aircraft market has grown. In 2008, there 
were 260 Airbus aircraft in service with Chinese carriers.127 The European company’s 
first sale in China was to the Shanghai-based CAAC (now China Eastern Airlines) in 
1985; it is now Airbus’ biggest China customer, with a fleet of 93 aircraft.128 As with 
Boeing, Airbus grew its business in China over the years by agreeing ‘offset’ 
subcontracts with AVIC companies. From Table 5.2, it can be observed that the 
Shenyang and Xi’an aircraft factories produced various components and subassemblies 
for both the A320 and A330/340 Airbus families of aircraft. Thus, around 50% of the 
Airbus fleet in service worldwide has parts produced by Chinese companies.129 
 
The creation of the Airbus China factory at Tianjin’s Binhei New Coastal district is to 
build the Airbus A320 aircraft. In essence, this licensed production of the A320 is an 
offset project tied to China’s October 2006 procurement of 150 of these aircraft; the 
transfer of assembly capacity being a condition of Airbus winning this massive order.130 
The Tianjin complex will comprise production areas, hangars, offices and related 
facilities. The ‘shop-floor’ will be technological ‘state-of-the-art’, similar in all respects 
to the Airbus single-aisle finally assembly line in Hamburg, Germany. The Airbus 
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Table 5.2:  Airbus’s Industrial Presence in China (1999-2007) 
No AVIC company/products Aircraft Models 
A320 A330/A340 
1 Procurement from Chinese-
owned factories 
    
Tian Jin:     
Final assembly line √   
Cheng Du:     
Rear passenger door √   
Nose section √   
Shen Yang:     
Emergency exit door √   
Fixed leading edges √   
Wing interspar ribs √   
Skin plates √   
Cargo doors   √ 
Xi’an:     
Electronic bay doors  √ √ 
   
Fixed trailing edges on wings √   
Medium air ducts    √ 
Brake blades    √ 
Shanghai:     
Cargo doors frame √   
Hong Yuan Forging & 
Casting (HYFC) 
    
Titanium forging parts to 
mount powerplants on to 
wings 
    
Hafei (Harbin)     
Horizontal stabilizers ribs √   
Horizontal stabilizers  √   
Guizhou     
Maintenance jigs and tools      
Airbus Joint Venture and 
enterprises 
  
Tian Jin: joint venture 
between Airbus and a 
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Chinese consortium of 
Tianjin Free Trade Zone 
(TJFTZ) and China Aviation 
Industry Corporation 
(AVIC).  
2 Airbus (Beijing) Engineering Centre (ABEC): joint venture between 
Airbus and AVICI, AVICII 
  Training, Technical Assistance and support 
  Airbus Beijing training centre 
3 Airbus customer support centre 
  University Cooperative projects 
  Technology transfer programmes 
4 Complete wing manufacture of the A320 
5 Industrial partnerships  
  Roll-on, roll-off ship that transports A320 components was built at the 
Jinling shipyard 
Source: Author, abstracted from various sources. 
 
China plant commenced operations in 2008, with the plan to deliver the first A320 
sometime in late 2009. By 2011, it is expected that the production line will be 
producing four A320 aircraft each month.131 
 
Airbus has committed to developing new industrial partnerships in China based around 
its Tianjin assembly complex. For example, given that the Tianjin Airbus assembly line 
is the first to be located outside Europe, the logistical challenge of shipping major 
aircraft sections from Toulouse to China is profound. Thus, a Chinese team of engineers 
was involved in the design of a specially commissioned ‘roll-on, roll-off’ ship that 
transports Airbus components/subassemblies from Europe to China; the ship itself was 
constructed at China’s Jinling dockyard.132 
5.6.4 ‘Flying Phoenix (Xiong Feng): China’s Aviation Industry Comes-of-Age? 
China’s burning ambition to develop its own passenger aircraft led to the dramatic 
launch of its first ‘indigenous’ aircraft, the 90-seat ARJ 21-700,(Advanced Regional Jet 
for the 21st century).133 It made its maiden flight in November 2008, landing safely at 
Shanghai’s Baoshan airport after an hour’s flight. The aircraft has been designed and 
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produced by the commercial aircraft corporation of China (COMAC), part of AVIC’s 
industrial empire. It is produced under COMAC management at AVIC’s Shanghai 
factory and the plan is to obtain the airworthiness certificate in late 2009. China has 
presently secured 208 orders for the jet including five firm orders from General 
Electric’s aircraft leasing arm.134 Production capacity for ARJ 21 is currently 20 per 
month, but by 2011, will ramp-up to 30 per month.135 The first five aircraft will be used 
for the flight test programme, and another two for ground-based stress and fatigue 
trials.136 
 
Western OEM interest in participating in the ARJ 21 programme is driven by the fact 
that it is a Chinese-government backed project, placing it at a competitive advantage 
over local and foreign rivals, Embraer and Canada’s Bombardier, respectively, in the 
regional aircraft market. It is also competitively priced, selling at around US$27m, 
compared to US$30m for the 90-seat Bombardier jet.137 COMAC argues that its 3,000 
km range will mean that the ARJ21 jet will take 60% of China’s 900 mid-sized aircraft 
market over the next 20 years, not least because it will have …“less fuel consumption 
and longer flight hours … than the current large aircraft above 140 seats on short and 
medium routes.”138 
 
China’s development and production of the ARJ 21-700 aircraft is a key milestone in 
the development of China’s indigenous aerospace industry. Combined with the 
investment by Boeing, Embraer and Airbus, it is clear that a critical mass of aviation 
capacity and capability in China is being developed. It is also a dynamic environment 
with Airbus planning to building around 5% of its next-generation A350 aircraft in 
China’s factories,139 with Boeing sourcing sizeable chunks of work from China on its 
next-generation 787 aircraft, and Embraer considering expanding its Harbin production 
range to include the bigger ERJ-190. 140  Moreover, China’s emphasis on 
competitiveness, rather than technology transfer alone, is arguably right.141 The ARJ 21 
is positioned precisely in the market segment that local producer Embraer is targeting 
with the ERJ-145 aircraft, and this is clearly deliberate on the part of China’s planning 
authorities, seeking the benefits of cost-reduction.142 Part of this search for production 
efficiencies, however, involves China’s recognition that 21st century aircraft production 
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does not equate to self-sufficiency for any of the manufacturing countries, save possible 
for Russia. In a globalised economy, aircraft production, by definition, means 
engagement into global production networks to exploit the advantages of international 
specialisation. Thus, China’s ‘indigenous’ ARJ 21 has a multitude of Western 
subcontractors accounting for a high proportion of this aircraft’s value-added.143 Here 
subcontractors include: GE (aircraft engines). UTC Hamilton Sundstrand (power 
generation); Rockwell Collins (Avionics); Parker Aerospace (fuel systems and 
hydraulic products); Honeywell-Parker Hannifin (primary flight control systems); 
Liebher Aerospace (landing gear); ACSS (communications and surveillance); Eaton 
Group (integrated cockpit assemblies); and FACC AG (aircraft cabin interior design 
and production).144 
 
The final point to emphasise is that the ARJ 21 does not represent the end-game in 
China’s aviation industry’s ambitious plans. It still seeks to move from ‘basic 
fabrication to global competitor, vying with Europe’s Airbus and America’s Boeing as 
the World’s third major developer and producer of large passenger aircraft. The May 
2008 creation of COMAC is a tangible expression of that dream. Not only did COMAC 
inherit the ARJ 21 production apparatus, but it was also charged with the future build of 
a 150-seat aircraft that would compete with Boeing and Airbus by 2020.145 As with the 
ARJ 21 programme, foreign OEMs, will likely seek to engage these further 
development plans…as one Rockwell executive put it. … “we understand that … 
[China] … may well want to develop an indigenous industry, but we want to stay part 
of it as long as we can.”146 To complement the development of China’s future large 
aircraft airframe, it was announced in November 2008 that China would invest 
US$883mn (RMB6bn) to indigenously develop the aircraft’s engines. AVIC is to 
partner with the Shanghai government to develop China’s First high-tech, commercial 
aircraft engine.147 AVIC’s Executive Vice-President is quoted as stating that … “the 
initiative is costly and risky, but it is worth attempting because the aeroengine industry 
would stimulate supporting industries.”148 Although restrictions on foreign holdings may 
be imposed, as Beijing sees the aeroengine industry as ‘strategic’, the venture will likely 
involve international participation with strategic partners, such as GE and RR.149 With 
 207
or without equity partnership, the big aircraft aeroengine project will procure parts and 
design through international tendering.150 
5.7 Progress Towards Indigenous Industrialisation 
The road to indigenous aerospace capacity in China has proved long and difficult. 
During the Second World War, the Chinese gained some basic aeronautical experience, 
repairing US warplanes.151 Then, after 1949, there was the close relationship with fellow 
Communist state, the USSR, leading to the licensed production of Soviet aircraft. In 
1958, Beijing stated, unrealistically, that it would surpass Britain's economy  in 15 
years, but then came the 'big leap', the departure of Soviet advisors, and the uncertainty 
of the Cultural Revolution, when the technology gaps between China and rest of the 
World increased and China’s aviation industry was paralysed.152 
 Table 5.3: Summary of China’s Aviation Company Survey, 2008 
Profile Embraer Airbus 
AVIC 
(ARJ 21) 
Rolls 
Royce Safran 
Year of 
Commencement 2000 2009 2008 1997 1989 
Product Range Commercial 
Jets, Executive 
Jets 
Defence Jets 
A320 
assembly 
production
full range, 
including 
civil and 
military 
aviation, 
marine and 
energy  
Aerospace 
Propulsion 
Aircraft 
Equipment 
Defence 
Security 
Employment 
2008 270 N/A 400,000 350 3290 
Sales 2008 US500m to 
550m 
N/A RMB150 
billion 
N/A N/A 
Source: author 
 
The new dawn began in 1978 with the introduction of the 'open-door' policy. Looking 
back, it is difficult to identify the existence of any coordinated and progressive 
government strategy.153 yet notwithstanding the lack of a coherent strategy, it is possible 
to identify three distinct development periods: from 1980 to 1990, foreign aviation 
companies were invited to relocate, but this new-found 'capitalist' liberalisation era 
focused on solving short-term problems, creating employment and profit rather than 
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pursuit of the long-term goal of indigenisation; the second phase during the 1990s, was 
much more focused towards learning management and manufacturing skills through 
increased international cooperation. The pace of technological learning picked up in the 
latter part of this decade, through the local production of components for Boeing 
aircraft; finally, in the post-2000 period, China promoted the joint-venture concept, 
welcoming foreign companies through whole-aircraft licensed production, covering 
such aviation programmes as Embraer-Harbin, Airbus-Tianjin, and extending to 
including helicopters and aero engine production. China is now entering a fourth and 
possible final stage, where the focus is on ‘Chinese made’ aircraft.154 AVIC's position is 
clear in this regard, that to progress towards increased indigenisation, international 
cooperation is essential. However, the search for cooperative harmony 155 is not easy. It 
is reported that GE sought a 'signing-on' (or entry) fee for a particular cooperative 
programming, amounting to US$100m.156 Presently, all three phases (corresponding to 
the three stages outlined in 5.3.3) coexist. Subcontract work, often secured through 
offsets, helps China develop and enhance skills, creates local jobs and raises capacity-
utilisation, production quality and shopfloor management. International equity 
investment, as at BCF (Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co.), Xi'an, and BHA Aero 
composites Co, Tianjin, is now an established model that injects risk-sharing capital  
Figure 5.4: Metrics to Evaluate Progress towards Developing an Indigenous 
Chinese Aviation Industry 
 
into China-based manufacturing operations. License-production by Embraer and Airbus 
of complete aircraft, increases the level and sophistication of risk-sharing and also the 
'potential' for technology transfer, leading to indigenous development. The question is 
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whether these different forms of technology transfer have raised indigenous capability; 
that is, whether value added, technological innovation and supply chain capabilities (see 
Figure 5.4) have actually been raised. 
5.7.1 High Value Added Production 
Value added in China's commercial aviation factories remains at a low level. This 
represents an informed judgement, because the interviewees found this to be a question 
that they were unable to respond, even with approximate values. What is known is that 
China has always viewed international cooperation as a means of achieving effective 
access to technology. The first major cooperative project with the West did involve 
transfer of technology, albeit that the MD-82 was itself 'old' technology. 157  All 
documents and blueprints were transferred to the Chinese partners, but local production 
only involved the airframe.158 The follow-on international cooperation project was with 
Airbus on the Asian Express 100, but this project failed because Airbus would not agree 
to, firstly, technology transfer, particularly, wing technology, and, secondly final 
assembly in China. In the end, Airbus preferred to develop an alternative aircraft, the 
A319 on its own.159 The senior Embraer representative indicated that 97% of aircraft 
production work at Harbin was done by local people,160 but later in the interview she 
stated Harbin’s focus was on assembly and testing.161 The major high value systems 
continue to be imported from foreign-based OEM suppliers; that is, Embraer's 
programme in China is concerned with licensed production of existing aircraft, not the 
development of new aircraft.162 It is a similar story for the licensed production of the 
Airbus A320 at Tianjin. This is an assembly project, and there is thus only minimal 
transfer of technology,163 and this is a major reason for AVIC’s small (9.8%) equity 
share. Finally, although China is a supplier of  parts to Boeing on its B787 aircraft (see 
Figure 5.3), its share of the global programme’s structures (and, correspondingly, value 
added) is less than 4%, whilst Japan takes 35%, equal to that of Boeing. 164 
  
The lack of serious technology transfer to China is reflected by the role of the sub 
systems manufacturers. Rolls-Royce, for instance, has been in China for close to 50 
years, since China purchased British Viscount Turbo-prop commercial aircraft, using 
Rolls-Royce aero engines. Subsequently, in the 1960-1970s, China purchased Trident 
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aircraft, also using Rolls-Royce engines, but this was an aircraft that proved to be 
uncompetitive against the B727, allowing American Aircraft and aeroengine 
manufacturers to increase market share in China.165 In 1983, RR sold China 50 new 
Spey engines for military purposes (integration into the PLA Navy’s ‘Flying Leopard’ 
Attack Fighter). Also sold were a number of reconditioned ex-RAF engines, and later, 
RB211 engines for China's growing commercial fleet of aircraft.166 Since 1989, because 
of the embargo on military sales, Rolls-Royce has focused on growing its civil activities 
in commercial aviation (for instance, it is a supplier to most of China's airlines; indeed 
on the A330 programme, it received an order for 100 engines, where it has captured a 
100% market share).167 Rolls-Royce also has important markets in marine propulsion, 
offshore oil/gas exploration, energy power generation and even the supply of 
compressors for the Sino-Russian 'West-East' Gas pipeline. 168  However, throughout 
Rolls-Royce's long and close business relationship in China, technology transfer has 
never been conceded by the British company. A Rolls-Royce executive argues that it 
will not transfer technology, as it must safeguard the interests of its shareholder.169 A 
further point is made that to enjoy a sustainable business model in the West, low cost 
structures and the promotion of training in the development and production of 
commercial aeroengines are essential conditions. However, as yet, these considerations 
are not ingrained in the Chinese business culture, and so business risk for foreign 
collaborators increases to unacceptable levels.170 Even today, it seems China's traditional 
centralised industrial culture remains: status and hierarchy being more important than a 
focus on product-to-market efficiency.171 
 
Minimal technology transfer into China’s aviation industry means low value added in 
an industry where there is limited local absorptive technology capacity. For instance, in 
the field of technology offsets, China introduced an offsets policy in 1993, specifying 
an institutionally required target of 30% (conservative by present day standards, where 
100% is standard), but because of low levels of local technological capability, not even 
that low percentage figure could be reached, being drawn down to 4-6% by the late 
1990s.172 The problem of low value-added production in local programmes also extends 
to China's ‘indigenous’ ARJ 21 project. It is argued that this Chinese aircraft will have 
only 15-20% of local value-added, with 80% of the high value propulsion, electronics 
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and avionics work coming from foreign companies that are supplying 19 major 
aerospace sub-systems.173  
  
The full picture of value added for the principal aircraft programmes in China is given 
in Table 5.4 below. It is clear from this table that value added in China's aviation 
industry is low. With China’s aircraft building programmes importing almost all the 
high technology sub-systems, local labour is simply engaged in fabrication activities. 
Table 5.4:  Local Value Added in China’s Aviation Industry, 2008 
Local Value added 
(%) Embraer Airbus 
ARJ 
21 Boeing 
Rolls- 
Royce Safran 
>20             
≤20 and ≥10      √       
<10 √ √  √ √ √ 
Source: China Fieldwork (October 2008) 
 
The local value-added content of Chinese produced aircraft will rise in the future, 
however, as the technology and learning is ‘infused and diffused’ across the aviation 
sector, from both local and foreign endeavours. For instance, Airbus has several major 
technology transfer programmes underway, including, the transfer of wing technology, 
focused in the first instance on the complete wing of the A320 family to be 
manufactured in China.174 
5.7.2 Technology Innovation 
None of the companies interviewed admitted to having registered patents: indeed, for 
the sub-systems manufacturers it would have been surprising to find that patents had 
been registered. This is not their purpose for being in China, rather it is to develop 
markets, sell aircraft or systems, so adding to corporate profitability. The same applies 
to R&D expenditure; Embraer and Airbus programmes focusing on assembly of 
components and aircraft structures produced elsewhere. China's aviation industry, as 
yet, is too immature to engage in innovation prior to gaining industrial expertise in 
manufacturing these systems. Roll-Royce provides an example of how foreign aviation 
companies’ focus is on business development in China, rather than on technological 
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partnership. Rolls-Royce has never had any production in China, nor assembly, nor 
testing work. 175  There are no logistical advantages for sitting such work in China. 
Moreover, the Chinese government imposes no local content requirement on foreign 
investment, and currently, there no offset conditions.176 Notwithstanding Rolls-Royce 
historical trading focus in China, its position is beginning to change as this global 
company starts to 'localise'. For instance, until 2003, all service representatives’ 
frontline engineers at the interface with customers were expatriates, but now all 38 
service representatives are Chinese nationals.177 
  
Innovation is held to occur through problem-solving, via industrial flexibility, the 
interchange of ideas, clear communications and as a deep understanding of the 
technology processes and requirements. However, it is well-known that the Chinese 
innovation system is struggling to overcome the centralised inflexibilities and 
inefficiencies of the Communist Central Planning regime inherited by AVIC and faced 
by foreign companies operating in China. Although AVIC controls research institutes 
and several specialised aviation universities, there is no evidence that focused 
innovation is emerging. China's successful space effort, however, proves that innovation 
can result from institutional specialisation and generous government financial 
sponsorship. This appears to finally be about to happen in aviation, promoted by both 
national pride, as in the space programme, and also the commercial benefits from the 
country's massively expanding demand for commercial aircraft. However, as shown in 
Table 5.5, ‘corporate’ R&D expenditure in China’s aviation industry is negligible. 
Table 5.5:  R&D Expenditure in China’s Aviation Industry, 2008 
R&D Budget Embraer Airbus 
AVIC 
ARJ 21 Boeing 
Rolls-
Royce Safran 
Some     √       
No √ √   √ √ √ 
Source: China Fieldwork  (October 2008) 
 
China’s institutional and corporate culture is likely to change with the country’s new 
competitive realities. The China aviation survey found no obvious cultural problems 
associated with the industry's numerous foreign partnerships. There was mention of 
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slowness in decision-making due to hierarchical structures;178 the lack of commercial 
priorities leading to relatively higher cost structures, and here it is instructive to note the 
higher costs of producing the Tianjin A320 compared to the equivalent aircraft 
produced in either France or Germany.179 Although not a major problem holding back 
the advancement of China's aviation industry, there was evidence of some 
misunderstanding and poor communications between local and foreign management 
teams resulting in inefficiencies. In one instance, this had occurred in the 
implementation of the ‘Six Sigma’, management system, where there had been 
misinterpretation regarding management requirements between the Chinese and 
overseas partners.180 
  
Technology can be both 'hard' and 'soft'. On the soft side, an important element is 
knowledge and learning. Here, much more is being done by foreign aircraft companies 
in China to promote the transfer of knowledge. As can be seen from Table 5.6, most of 
the major aviation programmes have incompany training schools. This is unsurprising, 
given that in those programmes, focused on manufacturing, but also applying to even 
services, a premium is based on quality and safety. For example, the Airbus Aviation  
Table 5.6: Incompany Training School in China’s Aviation Industry, 2008 
Incompany 
training 
Schools Embraer Airbus 
AVIC 
ARJ 21 Boeing 
Rolls-
Royce Safran 
Yes √ √ √ √   √ 
No         √   
Source: China Fieldwork  (October 2008) 
 
Training facility at Beijing airport is particularly impressive. It was established jointly 
with the China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Corporation in 1998, and is 
claimed to be the most modern such facility in China, with two full simulators: one for 
the A320 family and one for the A330/340 family.181 The centre has trained thousands 
of maintenance engineers, cabin crew and pilots.182 Moreover, AVIC has signed an 
agreement with Cranfield University to train 150 of the company's engineers in aircraft 
and jet engine design, with the aim of creating a 130-seat indigenous aircraft.183 
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5.7.3 Aviation Supply Chains 
The possession of local subcontractor value chains is what distinguishes advanced 
industrialised countries from those that are industrialising. Small, specialist supplier 
firms are where the pool of labour skills is located, generating technological innovation 
through networking between customers in the supply chain and also through 
relationships developed locally with similar companies and also specialist research 
institutes and local universities within the industrial cluster. 
 
A major challenge China faces in the short to medium-term, is not so much 
manufacturing aircraft, but learning supply chain management; that is, the need to both 
provide ongoing support services for a global fleet of commercial aircraft and also the 
requirement to develop the specialist manufacturers that will support the ARJ-21 and 
similar projects in the pipeline, in the evolving large indigenous aircraft and engine 
programmes. For an industrialising country, such as China, that has not had the benefit 
of generations of industrial development, the conventional approach is to cultivate the 
creation of industrial clusters as a way of ‘leap-fogging’ over the very long-term time 
period required to evolve a subcontractor base. Accordingly, China has been active in 
applying policies to promote such clusters in its growing civil aviation area. Chengdu, 
for instance, has long been the focus for the production of military aircraft. However, in 
recent years, it has been working hard to diversify into commercial production. In 
March 2008, for instance, AVIC I cooperated with the Chengdu Municipal Government 
to create what is claimed to be China’s first aerospace high-tech industrial base.184 The 
plan is to develop Chengdu’s high-tech zone into a cluster of aerospace-related 
supporting industries. A telecommunications university (University of Electronic 
Science and Technology of China) is located there and also an integrated circuit supply 
chain, including 50 design companies; indeed, there are more than 11,800 companies 
registered in this cluster, among which 674 companies are foreign enterprises, including 
33 Fortune 500 companies, including Intel, IBM, Symantec, Microsoft Fujitsu, NEC, 
Motorola, and Nokia.185 
 
Harbin, the home of the Embraer aircraft production facility, has also been developing 
its own cluster. Embraer’s investment in Harbin has been totally through its own risk 
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capital; there being no Chinese government support.186 It has entered into the joint-
venture with AVIC on the basis of long-term mutual benefit.187 Thus, it intends to 
gradually build-up a local supply chain. Currently parts of the fuselage and some of the 
composite fairings have been outsourced to local suppliers.188 This represents modest 
beginnings, but it is a start. In Tianjin, the central/local government is equally keen to 
promote a local aerospace cluster. Airbus is reportedly investing between RMB8-10bn 
in this project, embedding more than 200 Airbus technicians in the Tianjin factory to 
direct the assembly process.189 Airbus also intends to engage in a long-term strategic 
partnership with China that will contribute to the promotion of local value-added, skills 
and value chains.190 In this regard, six Chinese manufacturers are already involved in 
manufacturing parts, such as wing components, emergency exit doors and assembly and 
transportation tools for other Airbus aircraft. It is reported that in 2007 alone, Airbus 
sourced US$70m worth of components and materials from Chinese companies; this will 
treble to US$200mn by 2010, and will double again to US$450mn in 2015.191  
 
In the case of Boeing, whilst it has no ‘whole-aircraft’ production facilities in China, it 
has nevertheless contributed substantial numbers of offset contracts to Chinese aviation 
factories, including Chengdu for 787 work and Shanghai and Xi’an for 737 fabrication 
packages. Xi’an also acts as a major supplier to Boeing in its 747 conversion factory at 
Xiamen. Other long-standing suppliers include Southwest Aluminium, Chongqing, a 
supplier of Aluminium Forgings on 747s since 1988, and Hongyuan, Sanyuan, a 
supplier of titanium forgings for 747s since 1984.192 In terms of foreign sub-systems 
suppliers, such as Rolls-Royce and Safran, both companies are now beginning actively 
to contribute to the development of local subcontractors. Rolls-Royce, from a position 
where it had no suppliers a few years ago, now has five local suppliers.193 All are state-
owned Chinese groups, including Xi’an-based suppliers producing turbine glide blades 
and assembly of aeroengine blades. 194  Rolls-Royce, like Airbus, is committed to 
developing a local value base. This can be evidenced by the trend of increase in Rolls-
Royce’s China procurement budget: US$20m in 2003, US$200m in 200, rising to 
US$500 m by 2011, including plans to develop a local non-destructive testing factory.195 
The French company, Safran, is also engaged in a rapid expansion programme in China. 
The approach that it is taking is to create specialist subcontractors through joint 
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ventures with local aerospace companies, primarily, to date, AVIC. By April 2008, 
three joint venture factories had been opened in China, specialising in, for instance, 
systems controls for aeroengines. 196  A further six factories are planned that will 
specialise in engine parts, the forging of aeroengine blades, and MRO services. 197 
Safran’s Chinese employees now more than 3,290 and the company sponsors eight 
Chinese students every year to train in France via aeronautical internships.198 Safran also 
collaborates with the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Xi’an 
North West Polytechnic on major high technology research projects.199  Table 5.7 shows 
that all China’s aviation companies are seeking to promote local supply chains. 
Table 5.7:  Prime Contractor Support for Local Subcontractors, 2008 
Involvement 
with local 
subcontractors Embraer Airbus 
AVIC 
ARJ 21 Boeing 
Rolls-
Royce Safran 
Yes √ √ √ √ √  √ 
No            
Source: China Fieldwork (October 2008) 
 
China’s government is committed to the development of an indigenous aviation 
industry. AVIC, in particular, recognises that this strategic or ‘backbone’ industry must 
take the responsibility for driving the development of a local supply base, as a means of 
overcoming the present capability weaknesses in raw materials, electronic components, 
metal products and processing supply.200 There is also a recognition that this will be 
expensive, because access to foreign high technology is restricted by the reluctance of 
foreign OEMs to transfer; added to which are the controls placed by foreign 
governments on the transfer to China of sensitive technologies, such as critical engine 
and composite technologies, electrical systems and sophisticated micro electronic 
chips.201 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions  
6.1 Summary 
The purpose of this research project has, firstly, been to evaluate the development of 
Asia’s aviation industry, and, secondly, at a more focused case study level, to analyse 
China’s progress towards the policy-goal of developing an indigenous aviation capacity. 
Although these research questions are clear, there are a number of contextual factors 
which act as important conditioning variables on the outcome of this analysis. Firstly, 
the aviation industry is generally regarded by economic planners in developed and 
developing countries, alike, as a ‘strategic’ industry. There are several reasons for this 
policy emphasis, the more important of which include:  
 
• Economic: the aviation industry employs relatively high numbers of workers (in the 
case of China, there are over 500,000 workers in AVIC, alone). The industry also has 
the potential to stimulate employment in supplier industries, from metals, wiring and 
plastics to electronics, avionics and services. Moreover, from the standpoint of 
micro-and macro-levels of economic activity, the industry’s income and investment 
expenditure will contribute powerful economic multiplier effects to regional 
economic growth. 
 
• Technology: there is no doubt that the aviation industry is more than simply a 
growth pole within the economy; it also operates at the technological frontier, 
pushing the boundaries of innovation to new levels. Technological developments 
may impact on materials, such as composites, so as to reduce aircraft weight and thus 
operational cost, and on electronic technologies, whereby the introduction of 
computerised flight systems carries the benefits of reduced cost and, more 
importantly, increased safety. From interviews, the issue of safety has been 
highlighted as a major consideration in the design, development and production of 
aircraft components and systems for the commercial, far more than the military, 
customer. This emphasis on product improvement represents a key sub-theme of the 
aviation industry’s technological development, influenced by the extent and depth of 
local research and development capacity. This may be expressed in different ways: 
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firstly, through formal corporate and government-sponsored R&D activities; 
secondly, through innovational developments by the high tech. subcontractors in the 
supply chain; and, thirdly, through the embedded skills of the engineering staff 
within the industry. The successful global aviation players, such as Boeing, Airbus 
and Embraer, will likely enjoy high levels of expertise at all three levels. By contrast, 
the emerging countries’ aviation industries, such as those in Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia, will suffer deficiencies, particularly in regard to corporate and 
institutional R&D as well as from limitations from the ‘gaps’ in local supplier-
customer interactions. 
 
• Political: there is an important political dimension to the creation of a local strategic 
industry such as aviation. The development of an international ‘branded’ good 
derived from domestic industry carries with it national prestige and broader regional 
and even global respect. Most countries have the aspirations, but few have the 
necessary resources, scale and long-term commitment to acquire quality engineering 
required for entry into large aircraft production; the latter, thus symbolizing a major 
achievement in the acquisition of technological capability. 
 
• Military: an important associated characteristic of developing commercial aircraft 
production capacity are the likely benefits to be obtained from technological spin-
offs and civil-military integration. For most industrialising countries, including 
China, the early years of economic development would have focused on two 
objectives: the transition from agricultural to industrial activities within the economy 
and the creation of a defence capability to defend independence. The production of 
commercial aircraft is normally not considered during the early phases of 
industrialisation, but military aircraft is a different matter. The depth of capability 
will be dependent on the extent of industrialisation achieved, but the initial creation 
of aircraft building capacity will be limited to the availability of local resources, 
including capital and appropriate engineering skills. Inevitably, the lack of access to 
technology will be a major limiting factor to local aircraft production. Thus, the 
import of combat aircraft will be a necessary first step, and then over time, the 
growing value of aircraft purchases can be used to leverage technology transfer. In 
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the beginning, such transfers will be rudimentary, moving from basic MRO 
provision, to progressive transfer of manufacturing capability. Military production 
capacity is prioritized because of the need to protect the host country’s nationhood, 
sovereignty, and independence. Sovereignty is fundamentally important for poor, ex-
colonised states, and even in the present era of globalisation, it remains a key driver 
of industrial and technological planning. Sovereignty requires interpretation, 
however. Not even Boeing and Airbus are self-sufficient in the design and 
development of large aircraft, with much of the work outsourced to systems and sub-
systems suppliers. For instance, as stated in the main body of the text, around 40% of 
the components and structures in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner is sourced from 
overseas companies. Yet, whilst Boeing is global, having manufacturing networks 
spread across many countries, it is still viewed as a US company. Significantly, many 
of the world’s aerospace companies produce both civil and military aircraft platforms 
and systems. Thus, as the industry develops and matures, there is the potential for 
technology spin-off to occur, so that military-related aerospace innovation can be 
transferred to the commercial aircraft division of the same company. For instance, 
EADS, the parent body of Airbus, builds Airbus commercial aircraft, such as the 
A380, as well as the A400M heavy-lift military transporter aircraft; Boeing produces 
the B747 ‘Jumbo’ aircraft as well as the F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft; the 
Indonesian aircraft company, PT Dirgantara, builds both commercial and military 
versions of the CN235 aircraft; and the Chinese aviation company, AVIC, builds 
military aircraft, such as the SU-27 and J-10 ‘indigenous’ fighter as well as the ARJ-
21 commercial aircraft. Perhaps the real policy issue is not whether major 
innovations have been transferred from the military part of the business to the civil, 
and vice versa, but rather whether accumulated technology resources are sufficiently 
‘cross-threaded’ to ensure that civil-military synergies can be enjoyed by the 
company. Civil-military integration can thus be viewed as exploiting the dual-use 
nature of skilled labour, technical capacity, test equipment, MRO as well as key 
enterprises in the emerging value chain. 
 
For all of the above reasons, as China has ‘opened-up’ and developed its industrial base, 
it has partially defined sovereignty (indigenisation) in terms of sustainability, and to 
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achieve this goal in an increasingly commercial environment, there is a need for 
competitiveness. This is an enlightened business model, reflecting the need to reduce 
the high opportunity costs of inefficient local production when benchmarked against 
imports from off-the-shelf procurement. Therefore, up to the present time, China’s 
apparent policy-goal has been to promote local aircraft production capability through 
licensed production, such as with Airbus, Embraer, Rolls-Royce and Safran, and the 
technology transfer sought has not so much been on the ‘hard’ side but rather the ‘soft’ 
side; that is, training, management techniques, logistical organisation and supply chain 
modalities. This may be beginning to change, though, as signified by China’s recent 
policy emphasis on developing an ‘indigenous’ aircraft, the ARJ-21, and also the vision 
of developing a large aircraft and related large engine. The rationale for promoting an 
aviation industry, as a strategic industry, is therefore multi- dimensional in character. In 
the 21st century context, however, scale (volume) and to some extent scope (diversity) is 
critical. Size matters, but so does specialisation, and that accounts for Embraer’s 
survival, given the limited size of Brazil’s domestic market. An external export focus is 
thus an important consideration. It is simply not sufficient that Boeing is located in the 
world’s biggest economy and Airbus is located in the equally big European market, 
because whilst the domestic base for aircraft should be substantial, the local market does 
not provide the level of demand required for critical mass to be achieved. The world to 
this point can only sustain a global ‘duopoly’ of aircraft producers. However, China’s 
huge projected domestic demand for commercial aircraft linked to the country’s 
explosive growth in air transport demand may provide the economic justification for 
China’s entry into the global high tech. aerospace market. 
 
A poor country cannot simply build commercial aircraft; it needs to put in place a 
manufacturing infrastructure, and, importantly, the appropriate skill base. So a poor 
country obviously prioritizes design and implementation of policies to promote basic 
development, driven by the need for economic transition from agricultural dependence 
(on cash crops) to industrialisation. To facilitate such a transformation, the poorer 
countries will need access to technology. This very quickly becomes a serious challenge 
to policy-makers, because by definition poor countries do not have access to 
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technology, or at least their own technology. Under such conditions, countries must 
choose one of the following options: 
 
i) Incountry Technology Development:  
This will tend to come through local R&D and the creation of domestic capacity 
and skill enhancement programmes. This, however, is an expensive option and 
unlikely to succeed quickly because of the absence of manufacturing 
infrastructural foundations. There really is no precedent for poor countries 
embarking on industrialisation to position local industries in the high technology 
field. 
 
ii) International Technology Alliances:  
This is a method some countries use for acquiring technology, and at the same 
time sharing the acquisition cost, but here as before with option i), above, it is 
expensive and not an appropriate strategy for an emerging nation. The approach 
requires that country-partners make an acceptable contribution to the collaborative 
effort, either through capital funding or industrial capability. However, poor 
countries will likely have nothing to contribute. So whilst Japan is partnering with 
Boeing on the development and production of the B787 Dreamliner aircraft, and 
with Roll-Royce, Pratt and Whitney, GE, and MTU on the V2500 turbo-fan 
engine, it is doing so from a position of industrial and technological maturity. This 
technology advantage will not apply to the majority of other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
 
iii) Technology Transfer via FDI/Offsets: 
Most developing countries seek not to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in their policies to 
promote technology development. FDI is a logical way forward, therefore. By 
contrast to the 1970s, when MNCs were viewed as exploiting labour in the so 
called Third World countries, this view has now been completely reversed in 
today’s era of globalization. All countries now see FDI as a positive force, with 
MNCs creating production capacity, jobs, skills, exports, backward linkages, and, 
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through technology transfer, the prospect of self-reliant industrial capability. 
Whilst MNCs can bring such benefits to the overseas host economy, the net 
advantages are not always so clear-cut. Taking a ‘realist’ perspective, it is obvious 
that the big foreign aviation OEMs will release technology reluctantly, rightly 
fearing loss of competitive advantage. So if foreign firms do transfer technology, 
it will be ‘old’ technology as in Vernon’s theoretical IPLC model and as also in 
the applied example of MD-82 aircraft production in China. 
 
The developing countries see ‘offsets’ as a possible way around the technology 
transfer ‘impasse’. Offsetting investment can be sourced either through military or 
civil contracts, and is viewed by most industrializing countries as a ‘win-win’ vehicle 
for technology access. As with FDI, reality does not often match policy, but 
nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 3, offsets have led to sustainable manufacturing and 
MRO capacity in some of the ASEAN4 countries. Offsets is an area not fully 
explored in the literature, particularly in the aviation field, and so further research is 
required. However, Chapter 3 has gathered evidence through empirical investigation 
that offsets can play a positive role in the technological development of the local 
aviation sector. 
 
At a higher technological level, offsets have now replaced the 1930’s technology 
diffusion process, whereby transfers move from Japan to the NICs and ASEAN4 
countries (as per Akamatsu’s Flying Geese Model). Instead of the diffusion of 
technology from the regional leader, Japan, the need for OEMs to provide offsetting 
investment to purchasers of ‘big ticket’ items has meant that technology now 
transfers directly from the US and Europe, by-passing Japan. In the process, offsets 
have created global production networks in aviation, spread across Asia-Pacific and 
further afield. Japan is itself part of these ‘linked’ networks, where manufacturing 
work is allocated according to the technological level of countries in the network. 
Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia receive work packages at a lower technology order 
than those agreed with Japan. Indeed, Japanese aviation company, Mitsubishi, is now 
a full technology partner with Boeing, each of these companies taking a 35% share in 
the production ‘and’ development of the B787 Dreamliner. For Japan, technology 
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sharing is a ‘stepping-stone’ towards absorbing technology and ultimately achieving 
indigenous technological development. It is in this light that China’s search for self-
reliance in commercial aircraft building should be seen.  
 
Deng Xiaoping used two aphorisms in 1978 to explain and justify economic 
liberalisation as a means of promoting the development of China’s economy. The 
first had regard to China’s employment of Capitalism as a partial ideological 
rejection of Communism: 
不管黑猫白猫,能捉老鼠就是好猫. Translation: It does not matter whether the 
cat is black or white; as long as it catches the mouse, it is a good cat. 
(Commenting on whether China should turn to Capitalism or remain strictly in 
adherence with the economic ideologies of Communism)  
 
The second aphorism can be interpreted as explaining that the ‘stepping-stones’ for 
achieving a particular policy goal may not been visible at first sight, but are no less 
effective:  
摸着石头过河. Translation: wading across a river by feeling the submerged 
rocks. (referring to the fact that China had absolutely no experience with modern 
Capitalism). 
 
China’s ambitions to develop a sustainable and indigenous commercial aircraft industry 
have been delayed by war, militarism, communist inefficiency and, more recently, 
policy mismanagement (AVIC’s separation and then subsequent re-integration). 
However, in this third phase of foreign industrial cooperation there is a sense that at last 
a momentum has been achieved whereby critical mass, minimum scale, and a 
compelling commercial business case (for foreign OEMs) are factors finally propelling 
the aviation industry towards economic take-off. If this prognosis is correct, then 
Akamatsu’s Flying Geese Model requires fundamental amendment, as shown in Figure 
6.1. The Figure offers a dynamic profile of China’s aviation industry, moving from 
Figure 6.1.a), the traditional Akamatsu view, where impoverished China does not even 
show-up in the Flying Geese Pattern, to Figure 6.1.b) where by 2020 China accelerates 
230 
 
to a market position behind that of Japan, to finally, Figure 6.1.c), where by 2030, China 
has overtaken Japan as the aviation technology leader, becoming the ‘lead goose’. 
6.2 Conclusions 
In the 21st century, China is arguably the only country in the world that challenges the 
dominance of the global aviation duopoly, Boeing and Airbus. This is a global industry 
which demands big economies of scale to ensure viability. The fixed costs of R&D and 
production processes are huge, and when combined with the increasing costs of 
securing ever higher safety levels, environmental standards, and fuel- efficiency, then 
the risks of investment to achieve long-term sustainability are high. Scale is the factor 
that allows these rising cost structures and corporate/government risks to be managed 
and kept under control. However, scale is a relative factor, and the demand schedule 
that scale reflects will be influenced by numerous considerations, including the risks 
associated with the delivery of new products. In this regard, both Boeing and Airbus 
have suffered serious delays in the introduction into service of the B787 Dreamliner and 
the Airbus A380, respectively. The degree of competitiveness in the airline industry 
means that aircraft orders will be cancelled if aircraft cannot be delivered to schedule. 
Moreover, there is also the unpredictability of events that adds to the uncertainty of 
forecasting aircraft demand and thus scales of production. Strategic plans are built 
around assumptions of future market stability. But forecasting is a ‘black art’ and in 
reality nothing is stable, nothing is certain. The rapid and dramatic onset of the present 
international recession and the threat of global pandemics are evidence of this fact. It is 
thus due to these technical, financial and market risks that the aviation industry has 
transformed itself from the fragmented national market structure of the1920s/30s to the 
global duopoly reflecting today’s aviation industry. The sense of anticipation regarding 
China’s efforts to break the Boeing-Airbus aviation market stranglehold is because only 
China, over the next two decades, has the internal market potential of huge aircraft 
demand to deliver the production scale necessary for business sustainability. Align such 
demand and scale considerations with relatively high economic growth, rising income 
levels, an expanding consumer and corporate appetite for air travel, and most 
importantly, an ‘interventionist’ government that has the resources and commitment to  
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Figure 6.1: Dynamic Profile of Flying Geese Model Applied to the Aviation Industry, 2009-2030 
 
 
Source: author 
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support the development of China’s aviation industry, then, ceteris paribus, the 
chances are good for success. 
 
Yet, how is success to be defined?  Like scale, it is a relative concept, and for some 
companies it may simply mean survival, but for others, it will be market domination, 
either at the national or international level. In the international aviation market, there 
appears a pre-occupation with market share, characterised by the continuous public 
relations contests at the top end of the market, between Boeing and Airbus, and at the 
bottom end, between Embraer and Bombardier. New entrants to this market are rare, 
because of high barriers to entry. Thus, as around 90% of global aircraft production 
value is accounted for by Europe, North America and Brazil, China’s efforts to 
develop a global aircraft industrial presence is remarkable, representing this 
dissertation’s research problem. In addressing this ‘problem’, the study has attempted 
to evaluate the historical background to the industry’s evolution. The impact of the 
liberalisation on the industry has also been examined to establish how the ‘opening-
up’ of China and the encouragement of foreign aviation enterprise to participate in 
industrial development has progressed. In the process of evaluation, a number of 
questions have been addressed. Has technology transfer occurred? Has it been 
substantive and successful? Has it made a contribution to the development of a 
genuine ‘Chinese’ aviation industry? Finally, this study has sought to analyse the 
indigenisation of China’s aviation industry by reference to certain metrics held to 
reflect the breadth and, significantly, depth, of local indigenous endeavour. 
Accordingly, based on the findings of the analysis in Chapter 5, this study offers the 
following conclusions: 
 
 
1. China’s aviation industry did not exist until 1950s: 
The origins of China’s aviation industry go back to the 1920s, when many of the 
industrialised countries were beginning to establish production capacity. It was WWI 
which advanced the development of aircraft and it was WWII which later 
consolidated and progressed the technological capability of the aviation industry. For 
Development: Taxiing along the Runway, Waiting for Take off …
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China, however, internal conflicts and the War of Independence against Japan caused 
the stagnation of aviation development. Chapter 5 identifies the modest beginnings of 
aircraft production in China, but also acknowledges that the country’s only aircraft 
production pre-1950s was copy production of US warplanes (assembly of US aircraft 
kits produced in America) during the Second World War. 
 
Development planning through Five-Year Plans was delayed until the mid-1950s due 
to China’s active engagement in yet another conflict, the Korean War. Once China 
was able to focus its energies on development, then, finally, it was forced to confront 
the rigidities, inflexibility and contradictions of the Communist economic regime. 
Output was determined by production targets, not by market signals, such as price or 
profit. Efficiency and cost reduction did not factor into the equation. Equally 
damaging was the fact that the politico-economic environment was not conducive for 
risk-taking, technological innovation and market development.  
 
The command economy has a role to play, particularly in the early development of an 
underdeveloped country. This will be through central direction of policy, careful 
allocation of scarce capital resources, identification and support of ‘strategic’ 
industries, and the adoption of a macro, long-term planning policy, based on the 
development of the economy rather than on a market forces perspective, driven by 
capitalist short-termism. In post-WWII China, development planning was centralised, 
but lacking in consistency and logic. In any case, for much of the post-war period the 
economy was in transition from agricultural dependence to industrial development 
and the thrust of planning was directed towards capital goods production and the 
associated build-up of defence capacity. This approach was in harmony with the 
Soviet Planning Model, and given the close Sino-Soviet partnership during the 1950s 
and early 1960s, China’s aircraft production was almost totally concentrated on 
military aircraft; products and processes were sourced from the Soviet Union, and 
production was vertically integrated, as in the Soviet arms factories. This heavy policy 
focus on defence and combat aircraft meant that resources were not available for the 
sponsorship of commercial aircraft capacity. When Soviet collaboration ended, it 
quickly became clear that no indigenous capacity had been created.  ‘Production’ had 
been through assembly of Soviet Aircraft and, as a consequence, no local design 
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capacity and no supply base had been developed. In development economics, this 
absence of local capacity is often referred to as industrial ‘hollowing-out’. 
 
From the 1960s through the 1970s, China attempted to develop local commercial 
aircraft capacity but the economy, whilst growing, was unstable, negatively impacted 
by macroeconomic planning uncertainties. The disastrous cultural revolution gave 
way to the ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign, which in turn gave way to the Great Leap 
Forward. Mao Zedong’s death was the signal for political infighting, but change was 
about to come in the latter 1970s with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘open-door’ economic 
policies and implementation of the ‘Four Modernisations’: agriculture; industry; 
science and technology; and defence. Significantly, for aviation production, defence 
took the lowest priority amongst the Four Modernisations, encouraging, finally, an 
emphasis on commercial aircraft. 
 
 
2. China’s reliance on FDI for access to technology was necessary, but not 
sufficient.  
China’s embrace with capitalism was delayed and not total, but it was certainly 
welcome, and in ‘harmony’ with the process of liberalisation that would accelerate 
over the coming decades. China, as evidenced, through policy statements, would 
welcome foreign technology and expertise to support the development of local 
industry and this transfer of technology would complement centralised government 
policies to promote ‘strategic’ industries. Import-substitution industrial strategy would 
be conducted under market-socialism principles. An ideological and theoretical 
contradiction, perhaps, but in light of the recent revealed excesses in capitalism, it is a 
hybrid planning model that clearly carries merit. 
 
Even after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, foreign investment was attracted to 
China, but not in great volume until the mid-1990s, when globalisation and the 
charisma of Deng Xiaoping persuaded foreign enterprise that China’s economy was 
on a long-term trend of rapid growth. Agreements would be honoured, foreign 
investments would be safe, and importantly, money could be made. 
 
Technology Planning: the Focus on Post-1978 FDI
235 
 
However China’s ambitions of gaining technology through foreign partnership did not 
materialise. This study’s field work confirms that minimal technology was 
transferred. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given the foreign OEM’s obvious 
reluctance to release technology: if they were to do so, they would quickly lose their 
comparative and competitive advantage. There is some evidence from foreign 
aviation suppliers, such as Rolls-Royce, operating in China, that to secure long-term 
sovereignty, Beijing prioritizes competitiveness, over access to technology, to achieve 
sustainability, at least during the 1990s to the present time. In assessing the 
contribution of FDI to the development of Chinas’ aviation industry, it is certainly the 
case that global players, such as Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, Rolls-Royce and Safran, 
have contributed to the development of local capacity in the production of 
components and sub-assemblies, but this falls short of laying a strong local design and 
manufacturing base for indigenous industrialisation. In this regard, the foreign OEMs 
have been necessary but not sufficient. What is also required is indigenous capacity 
and this can only come about through greater self-reliance, arguably through design 
and production of ‘Chinese-made’ commercial aircraft. 
 
 
 
3. China’s early aircraft construction programmes were a failure:  
Several decades of attempting to design and produce ‘Chinese’ commercial aircraft 
have led to failure, when defined as the creation of a viable, sustainable, aviation 
industry. Examples of failure litter the development of the industry. In the 1970s, 
China successfully developed from a Soviet design, the Y-10 commercial aircraft. 
This was a significant first step, though one which did not lead to follow-on models, 
and eventually had to be abandoned. Also, the collaborative venture to license 
produce the MD-82, along with plans for its successor model, the MD-90, also ended 
in the termination of the programme, due to a variety of reasons, including Boeing’s 
acquisition of McDonnell Douglas, and non-procurement of the MD-90 by China’s 
airline companies, which had evolved to become commercial entities in the newly 
liberalised Chinese ‘market’ economy. There was, finally, China’s attempt in the 
1990s to engage in the development of a medium-sized passenger aircraft through an 
international collaborative programme. The project was called the Asian Express 100, 
Technology Development: Encountering Turbulence from 
China’s Early JV Aircraft Programmes 
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but this also eventually foundered over the failure of the principal partner, China, to 
obtain substantial technology transfer. Into the 21st Century, then, the development of 
China’s aviation industry can be characterised as four decades of policy effort 
resulting in the failure to both design and manufacture a ‘sustainable’ Chinese 
commercial aircraft. However, the planning question linked to this study’s research 
problem, is to what extent has FDI, combined with local investment, created an 
industrial and technological platform for future growth and development of China’s 
aviation industry? 
 
 
4. There is little evidence to support the view that China has created an 
‘indigenous’ aviation industry:  
It is clear that the ‘open-door’ policies of Deng Xiaoping alongside the impressive 
growth on the demand-side of China’s aircraft market have encouraged foreign 
aviation companies to relocate capacity into China. It is on the supply-side, however 
where the weaknesses lie. The following grouping of conclusions from this study’s 
fieldwork represents an objective evaluation of the impact of government policies to 
date: 
 
4(a). Government policy has been directed, supportive, and coordinated:  
On the plus side, government policy has been a powerful force in 
implementing positive change in the aviation industry. Whilst mistakes have 
clearly happened, such as the separation of AVIC I and II and then nine years 
later their re-integration, the government’s strategic approach has led to 
substantial strengthening of industrial activities. Importantly, the 
encouragement of foreign OEMs has created new skills, capacity and learning. 
There remain questions as to the ‘depth’ of the capabilities created, but the 
beginnings of an industrial aviation landscape have been put in place. 
4(b). Policy has actively promoted both industrial and technological clusters 
and global production networks:  
Fieldwork investigation indicates that progress has been made in integrating 
Chinese production of components and subassemblies into the foreign OEM 
Indigenous Industrialisation: the Elusive Goal?
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global supply chains. Thus, not only have foreign aircraft companies awarded 
subcontracts to Chinese aviation enterprises, but this output has been 
networked into the global production chains of both Boeing and Airbus. Much 
of this output was originally linked via technology offsets to China’s purchase 
of foreign aircraft. From a policy perspective, it is critical to see whether 
China will win future contracts on a competitive basis or whether offsets will 
remain the lever. It is important to recall that while composites contracts 
awarded to Malaysia and Indonesia were the result of open competition, the 
original deals which created the capacity and learning were offsets-driven. In 
addition to China’s participation in global production networks through the 
government’s FDI policies, central planning has also led to the promotion of 
strong aviation industrial clusters. The central and municipal authorities have 
invested heavily over the last decade in creating aerospace clusters of local and 
foreign OEM and supplier companies in cities, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Harbin and Chengdu. Cluster formation is a ‘hot’ topic in the West, where 
governments are actively promoting clusters for the purpose of stimulating 
product innovation and production efficiencies, particularly directed towards 
high technology industries, including aviation. Significantly, aviation 
universities are being linked into China’s clusters. 
4(c). The creation of local supply chains has made only modest progress at this 
point in time:  
Fieldwork results indicate that Chinese high tech. value chains have not 
emerged. Local expertise and capacity were not in place when FDI first started 
to penetrate China’s aviation industry in the 1990s, but with the support of 
foreign OEMs to ensure acceptable quality, and, arguably, increasing pressure 
from the Chinese aviation authorities, gradual, though not dramatic, progress 
is being made. What appears to be happening at present is that foreign OEMs 
located in China are procuring from their regular (foreign) suppliers, now also 
relocated to China. This adds to local employment, but not to ‘deep’ 
technological capability if the high technology packages are imported and 
simply assembled in China. 
4(d). Technology innovation in China is characterised more by the provision of 
training than research and development:  
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The responses from interviews and questionnaires indicate that although 
aviation companies are actively sponsoring training and education, which will 
be beneficial for the future development of the industry, there is little evidence 
to suggest that original R&D is occurring. Thus patents are limited, and, 
outside of AVIC, corporate R&D institutes do not exist. Value-added in 
China’s aviation industry remains low, and this is because only meagre 
indigenous production exists. Fieldwork findings show that indigenous content 
is low for all producers of commercial aircraft in China. Whilst 97% of 
Embraer’s ERJ-145 aircraft is assembled in Harbin, only a small amount of 
subcontracting is undertaken in China. Moreover, at the present time, Boeing 
does not produce complete aircraft systems in the country, probably due to 
US-China politics inhibiting post-Tiananmen US technology transfer. Airbus 
has agreed to local assembly of its Airbus A320 aircraft, but there is to be no 
‘real’ technology transfer, and local production rather than ‘assembly’ will be 
incidental and ad hoc. Similarly, with Roll-Royce and Safran, with neither 
company agreeing to anything but modest technology transfer. Indeed, even 
the ‘Chinese’ ARJ-21 is not an indigenous aircraft, with at least 80% of the 
systems and sub-systems supplied from foreign OEMs; and irrespective of 
whether they are, or are not, located in China, local value-added remains 
severely limited. 
 
 
5. A more speculative conclusion, albeit based on interview data, is that 
within two decades, China will have an indigenous aviation industry to 
compete with Boeing and Airbus: 
Whilst the conclusions from this research do not provide an enthusiastic endorsement 
of the progress China has achieved in developing an indigenous and sustainable 
aviation industry, there is a sense that a critical mass of demand and supply capacity, 
has now been reached. The huge market potential for commercial aircraft to service 
Chinese air transportation growth will incentivize foreign OEMs to increasingly 
partner, and even share, and jointly develop aviation systems with their Chinese 
counterparts. Significantly, the Chinese government will play an important strategic 
role in directing future technology development. After decades of failure and 
China’s Indigenous Aviation Industry: Blue Skies Ahead? 
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disappointment, the authorities remain committed to the goal of developing their own 
commercial aircraft industry. The ARJ-21 is just a ‘stepping-stone’ for achieving the 
main ambition of developing and producing a Chinese ‘large’ wide-bodied 
commercial aircraft. Planning for this is now advanced, as is the new RMB6bn 
investment in a big aerospace engine facility to develop the engine that will power 
this large passenger aircraft. 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
This study has not been concerned with business analysis, though clearly micro-
performance impacts on macro development. Policy recommendations will thus be at 
the strategic level, reflecting on how technology development and indigenous 
industrialisation can be achieved. This suggests policy relevance to both the Chinese 
government and foreign OEMs wishing to share in the benefits of the rapid growth 
and development of China’s aviation industry. It goes without saying that these policy 
recommendations, directed at China, will also resonate with the circumstances of 
Asia’s wider emerging aviation industry. 
 
The policy recommendations, as derived from the principal conclusions (section 6.2), 
of this study, are as follows: 
 
1. Government has played, and will continue to play, a critical role in 
sponsoring the development of China’s aviation industry. To date, the results of 
this sponsorship have been mixed. However, many of the aviation experts and 
executives (Chinese and foreign) interviewed during the fieldwork expressed the view 
that within two decades China will have developed a powerful local aviation sector, 
built around the domestic aviation giant, AVIC. This opportunity (or threat – if you 
are a competitor company) needs to be recognized by policymakers at the corporate 
and governmental level and appropriate coping strategies thought through. 
 
2. It is recommended that industrial planners in China undertake 
comparative evaluation of the policies and progress achieved in the specialist 
aerospace clusters that have been promoted, especially in France and Japan. 
China has made a strong start in creating high technology aviation and aerospace 
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parks and clusters, but more needs to be done in integrating aircraft companies into 
such clusters, particularly via the creation of local supply chains. 
 
3. An important attribute of 21st century cluster development is the need to 
ensure that foreign enterprises are encouraged to integrate within the cluster, 
benefitting all stakeholders from their industrial participation. China’s planning 
authorities need to evolve policies to accelerate foreign OEM involvement in the 
emerging aviation clusters, facilitating knowledge dissemination, innovation through 
horizontal and vertical technology pressures in the value chain, and joint R&D via tie-
ups with cluster-based specialist universities. 
 
4. In terms of technology access, it is recommended that China undertake 
comparative empirical evaluation as to the success of technology offsets in 
creating the industrial foundation of local capacity and skills. Particular 
attention should be paid to securing sustainable production of aviation 
components and sub-assemblies awarded under competitive contracts. Offsets as 
a facilitator of indigenous technology development is an important finding from this 
study’s Asia aviation fieldwork, because it contradicts the conventional view that 
benefits from offsets are illusory. 
 
5. China’s policymakers are recommended to examine the successful ST 
Aerospace strategic model based on an MRO focus within the commercial sector. 
ST aerospace’s preparedness to exploit the synergies that exist between its civil and 
military is instructive. This is significant to China, given that the re-integration of 
AVIC is aimed at separating civil and military aircraft building operations, driven by 
political requirements over US aviation industry participation in China’s future 
aircraft projects. 
 
6. It is recommended that China pursues an interim strategy of promoting 
skills for integration of the systems and sub-systems of passenger aircraft in 
defined market niches. This is essentially the Embraer Model, but whilst Brazil does 
not offer local market volume or the resources for long-term expansion of value added 
through indigenization of foreign OEM systems, this is not the case with China. China 
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has already started to travel along this strategic path with the ARJ-21 project, but it 
can be taken further. 
 
7. This doctoral-level research project has signalled to the broader Chinese 
aviation community that beyond the ‘fascade’ of shiny new aircraft models 
produced in China, including those supposedly ‘Chinese’, there is remarkably 
little value that is being generated from within the Chinese aviation industry. 
This is a high cost form of development, given that ‘off-the-shelf’ acquisition of 
foreign passenger aircraft will certainly carry a lower cost. It is therefore 
recommended that a debate be started amongst informed stakeholders, Chinese and 
foreign, to consider the purpose and nature of developing China’s aviation industry. 
This doctoral study will hopefully initiate the beginnings of such a debate, and the 
intent is that others will make their own contribution to this important debate. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Asia’s Commercial Aerospace Industry Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire Aim: To evaluate Asia’s Aerospace industrial performance. The 
information gained from the completion of the questionnaire will provide the contextual 
and comparative background to a more focused study examining the development of 
China’s aerospace industry; the latter being one of its emerging hi-tech pillar industries. 
 
Guidance in completing the questionnaire: most of the questions are 
UNSTRUCTURED, allowing survey participants to comment broadly and deeply on 
particular issues. All replies will be treated as confidential. 
 
Sections covered in this survey: 
A General Information 
B Foreign Direct Investment 
C Cross-Cultural Challenges 
D Government Policy 
E Indigenous Technology Development 
 
Data Sensitivity: The questions are mostly descriptive and non-sensitive. The survey 
data are intended to support a Chinese student’s doctoral research. 
 
Output: It is planned that the work will be published and a copy of the article will be 
distributed to all survey participants and other interested observers. This will allow the 
study results to be disseminated more widely, encouraging others to make their own 
contribution to this important debate. 
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A. General Information 
 
1). Respondent name/designation:____________________________________ 
2). Company name:_________________________________________________ 
3). Year of establishment:____________________________________________ 
4). Company ownership:_____________________________________________ 
5). Range of products/services produced:________________________________ 
6). Employment when company started:_________________________________ 
7). Employment in 2008:_____________________________________________ 
8). Number of production facilities:_____________________________________ 
 
B. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
9). What are your sources of technology transfer? 
  Technology acquisition   Joint venture 
  Use of technical publications   Foreign Direct Investment 
  Purchase of corporations   Sale of technology data 
  Technical personnel    Offset programmes 
  Total project contracting   Total process contracting 
  Major process contracting   Know-how contracts 
  Trademark agreements   Franchise agreement 
  Engineering services contracts  Employment of experts 
  Technical consultancy contracts  Licensing 
 Purchasing machinery supplies  Use of personal contacts 
 Others, (Please indicate strategy): _____________________________  
 
10). Number of FDI projects, by country: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 Above 5 
US        
Japan        
Taiwan        
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Korea        
Dutch        
Germany        
France        
Other 
(please 
specify 
       
 
11). Do you believe FDI has been successful? 
  Yes      No  
If the answer to Q11 is yes, State what you believe have been the critical 
success factors?  
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
12). What have been the biggest challenges? (rank in order of importance) 
¾ Access to technology        
¾ Insufficient finance        
¾ Acceptable level of communications with foreign partner   
¾ Achievement of acceptable product quality     
¾ Appropriate local skills       
¾ Efforts to indigenise production      
¾ Lack of awareness: many organizations are not aware of available 
technology.          
¾ Lack of knowledge: if an organization is short of skills and knowledge, it 
may be unable to use the technology offered.   
  
¾ Lack of funds: organizations may be unable to purchase or develop 
technology.          
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¾ Lack of common interest: organizations may exhibit a lack of motivation 
to reach agreement or settle differences of opinions about available 
options.         
¾ Conflict of interest: competing organizations may be unwilling to 
collaborate.          
¾ Poor coordination: individuals within an organization or collaborating 
organizations fail to effectively coordinate about activities, processes, 
goals and directions of the venture.      
¾ Lack of resources: this can include both physical resources and loss of a 
key member.          
¾ Lack of time.          
¾ Lack of trust.          
¾ Technical problems         
¾ Changes in the project structure       
¾ Organizational problems        
¾ Management attitudes        
¾ R&D effectiveness         
¾ Short-term pressure         
¾ Resistance to change         
¾ Poor information flow        
¾ Weak links between customers and suppliers     
¾ Dependency on public R&D institutions      
¾ Cultural differences         
¾ Geographic difference s       
¾ Others (please specify) 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
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13). Has FDI improved the growth and development of your company? 
  Yes      No  
If the answer to Q13 is yes, please specify in what ways has FDI has 
contributed to the growth/development of your company? 
 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Cross-Cultural Challenges 
 
14). Has your company experienced cross-cultural problems with its overseas 
partnerships? 
  Yes      No  
15). Please provide examples: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
16). How were these problems resolved? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
D. Government Policy 
 
17). In what general ways has government policy supported the growth and 
development of your company?  
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
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_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
18). What existing policies need to be improved? What new policies need to be 
put in place? 
  Yes      No  
19). Has government policy assisted with R&D? 
  Yes      No  
20). Please give details: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
21). Is stronger government support required? 
  Yes      No  
If the answer to Q21 is yes, state in what ways government can help? 
 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
22). Has government policy assisted the process of FDI with your company?  
  Yes      No  
23). Please give details: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
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E. Technology 
 
24). Please estimate the level of value-added in your company’s principal product 
fields: 
Product 1-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-100% 
           
           
           
25). Is FDI located only at the production level? 
  Yes      No  
26). Has FDI begun to move upwards into higher value added activities like 
R&D? 
  Yes      No  
Please give details: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
27). Number of local patents registered, if any? ___________________________ 
  Yes      No  
28). Has FDI raised local work skills? 
  Yes      No  
 Please give details: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
29). Has FDI actively encouraged the development of local subcontractor 
networks? 
  Yes      No  
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30). Please explain how FDI has helped the development of local suppliers: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
31). Have industrial networks/clusters assisted in the development of your 
company? 
  Yes      No  
If the answer to Q31 is yes, explain in what ways networks/clusters have 
helped? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
32). In your view, what can be done to expand and develop indigenous supply 
chains? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
33). Does your company cooperate with science parks? Please provide details:  
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2 
附录二 
 
China’s Aerospace Industry Questionnaire 
中国航空工业调查提纲 
 
Questionnaire Aim: To evaluate China’s aerospace industrial performance. The 
information gained from the completion of the questionnaire will provide data for 
evaluating the development of China’s aviation industry; an emerging and hi-tech 
strategic industry. All replies will be treated as confidential. 
目的：本调查所搜集的资料，将为中国新兴的高新技术产业发展现状研究，特别
是航空工业研究提供相关背景。 
 
F. Foreign Direct Investment关于外国直接投资 
1). Do you believe that FDI .foreign collaboration in aerospace has been successful? 
您认为外国直接投资进入中国成功吗？ 
Yes 是      No 否  
If your answer to Q12 is yes, please specify the major critical success factors.  如果
您的答案是肯定的，请说明原因。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
2). What have been the biggest challenges?外国直接投资的最大挑战是什么？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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3). In your view, have FDI processes improved the growth and development of China 
aerospace? 
Yes 是      No 否  
If the answer to Q14 is yes, please specify the nature of such processes. 如果您的
答案是肯定的，请说明原因。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
G. Cross-Cultural Challenges 关于文化差异 
4). Has the aerospace industry experienced cross-cultural problems with its overseas 
partnerships? 外国直接投资是否面对跨国文化差异问题?        
Yes 是      No 否  
Please provide examples: 请举例说明与合作伙伴的文化差异。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
5). How were these problems resolved? 如何解决以上问题? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
H. Government Policy 关开政府政策 
6). In what ways has government policy supported the growth and development of 
aerospace capacity? 政府出台哪些政策支持航空工业发展? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
7). Has Plan 863 or other government policies been important supportive policy 
instruments? 863计划是扶持政策的一部分吗？ 
Yes 是      No 否  
Please provide examples: 如果是请说明具体内容。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
8). What existing government polices need to be improved? What new policies need to 
be put in place? 政府现有哪些政策需要改进，哪些政策需要进一步加强执行? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
9). Has government policy assisted with R&D? 
Yes 是      No 否  
Please give details:  
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
I. Value-added Performance关于 增值表现 
10). Please estimate value-added in your company’s principal product fields. 请评估航
空工业公司主要产品的增值部分？ 
Product 
1-9 
% 
10-19
% 
20-29
% 
30-39
% 
40-49
% 
50-59
% 
60-69
% 
70-79
% 
80-89
% 
90-100
% 
           
266 
 
           
           
           
           
           
 
11). Do local content regulations exist? 本地的政策包含什么内容？ 
Yes 是      No 否  
12). Explain how FDI has helped to indigenise production in your business?外国直接
投资有助于企业的国产化吗？如果“是”的话，又是如何实现国产化的？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
13). Has FDI begun to move upwards from production into higher value added activities 
like R&D? 外国直接投资是否从制造生产转移到高附加值的研发？ 
Yes 是      No 否  
14). Is it policy to develop local supply chains? 企业发展策略是否促进当地供应链
的发展 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
15). Provide examples of development cooperation between aerospace prime 
contractors and local suppliers: 贵公司如何与当地供应商发展合作？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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16). What % of total supply is sourced locally for selected airliners? 贵公司本地供应
商的数目？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
17). Explain the intentions/plans to raise value-added in the future:  请您简要介绍公司
计划，如何增加产品的附加值？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
J. Technological Innovation技术创新 
18). What are your sources of technology transfer? 贵公司主要技术来源何处？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
19). Are there commercial aerospace R&D facilities in China? 
Yes 是      No 否  
20). Explain the principal activities of such R&D plants? 贵公司有研发机构吗？. 
__ Yes 是      No 否  
21). Estimate the total number of commercial aerospace R&D staff in China贵公司研
发员工人数？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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22). Estimate the % of R&D staff possessing PhDs: 其中多少员工拥有硕士、博士学
位？有多少是本土人才？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
23). Are there any aerospace patents held in China贵公司持有中国专利数目(请具体
说明) 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
24). Has your company tried to encourage an innovational culture? 
Yes 是      No 否  
25). Explain the principal aspects of this innovational policy/culture: 请介绍企业的创
新文化。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
26). Has government policy supported China’s aerospace technological development? 
政府有否出台支持贵公司技术开发与技术创新的政策？ 
Yes 是      No 否  
Please give details: 请举例。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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27). Can you explain the nature China’s aerospace cooperative agreements with local 
R&D institutes and/or universities? 贵公司有没有与本地研发机构和大学合作? 
             Yes 是      No 否  
 
Please give details: 请举例。 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
K. Skill Generation 技术水准 
28). Comment on China’s approach to aerospace training/education 对中国航空工业
人才培训的看法？ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
